ISBN 978–5-7218-0923-1

The eighteenth volume of the series presents papers by Russian and foreign experts on most topical issues of international migration in the context of economic development and political problems.

The authors’ views may differ from those of the Editorial Board.

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Artwork of this volume was done by Ivan Aleshkovski

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INTRODUCTION

It is generally recognized already that international migration is closely interrelated with many issues of development of the states, regions and the world in the whole. The countries, which actively participate in international migration flows, focus their attention on better understanding of these interrelations to background their national migration policies as well as interstate cooperation in the field, in order to benefit economically, politically, and demographically.

In 2006, the search for most optimal forms of migration management aimed to answer interests of all the actors concerned — states, societies, and individuals — became an issue to investigate and discuss at the highest level: international migration and development was on the agenda of the United Nations High-Level Dialogue in September 2006. This event gave an impulse to elaborate new approaches to potential opportunities of migration for the purposes of economic, social, demographic, cultural, and finally, individual development.

The present issue of the scientific series «International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World» includes the papers dealing with complicated interrelations between migration processes, on the one hand, and economic and political issues, on the other hand. International migration is mostly an economic process in the sense that migrants are usually guided by economic motives and they join labour markets in receiving countries. Numerous migration flows between the countries encourage development of bilateral trade relations, facilitate economic integration, and add to positive mutual interest. However, in case of irregular migration, it can result in interstate political tension.

Of the particular interest in the present volume is the theoretical essay by Ronald Skeldon (UK) which investigates ambivalent relationships between migration and poverty and offers some hypotheses to explain them. The author agrees that migration can be both the creator and the product of poverty. However, he clearly proves that “mobility enhances economic growth and improves the lot of most, but not all, of the population”. His conclusion for migration policy-makers is: “policies that accept the wider mobility of the population are likely to accord with policies that will enhance the well-being of greater numbers of people”. In his theorizing, professor Skeldon distinguishes migration for survival from migration for human betterment.

Yelena Sadovskaya (Kazakhstan) puts the same question: Is labour migration a strategy for survival or development in the Central Asian states? Migrant remittances are an important factor to reduce poverty in the sending countries. They play a positive sociopolitical role, contributing stability in the communities in the countries of origin and destination and in the region as a whole. However, to make ‘migradollars’ work for development it is necessary to develop programs that would channel remittances to investments at different levels.

The paper by Vladimir Moukomel (Russia) is a view on labour migration from the perspective of the receiving country, namely Russia. The core question of the paper is how to manage migration in such a way that makes it not a new form of ‘neocolonialism’ associated with exploitation, indignity and neglect of
human rights but serves for economic and political benefits of both Russia and post-soviet sending states.

Alexander Tchernov (Russia) offers another perspective towards participation of Russia in international migration flows. Taking the case of Murmanskaya Province, he demonstrates how radical market reforms in mining & fishing industries have affected unemployment and migration processes in the regions, which have been developed primarily by means of migration inflow.

The paper by Ivan Aleshkovski and Vladimir Iontsev (Russia) deals with methodology of illegal immigration studies and its contemporary characteristics. The paper is focused on interrelations between illegal immigration and economic development because the authors consider illegal immigration to be predominantly an economic phenomenon by nature related to irregular employment in a destination country. On the other hand, relationships between illegal immigration and politics are becoming more and more evident, particularly after dramatic events of 9/11 in the USA.

The Northeast Asia region where cross-border migrations are hampered by migration policies of the states of the region and partially by political tension between them, on the one hand, but stimulated by economic needs, on the other hand, gives a good example of how migration issues can influence interstate relations. Tsuneo Akaha (USA) is scrupulous in analyzing migration flows in the region, including migration of Chinese people to the Russian Far East, in the context of security, national and cultural identities, and inevitable growing of interdependence of national economies. Properly managed, international migration can be and should be a facilitator of regionalism in Northeast Asia, and elsewhere. This conclusion is extremely topical for the post-soviet region.

Mark Tolts (Israel) attracts attention to an uneasy task to get reliable data on migration of certain ethnic groups. With his analysis of the worldwide distribution of the Jewish population originating from the former Soviet Union, Tolts gives a good example that only deep knowledge of history and traditions of an ethnic group can be a background for evaluation and proper understanding of existing data. Otherwise, migration data defects can be a reason for contradictory conclusions and even serve and instrument of political intrigue.

The Russian version of the book includes full text of all the papers, while the English version carries full text of only those papers, which were submitted by the authors in English. The rest are presented with brief summaries.

The Editorial Board is grateful to the dean’s office of Faculty of Economics of the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University for the decision to support financially publication of the scientific series “International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World”.

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The scientific series “International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World” is open for both distinguished experts and young researchers engaged in international migration issues. To get detailed information on contribution terms or to send your papers including electronic version, please contact the Editorial Board. E-mail: iontsev@econ.msu.ru; ivakhniouk@econ.msu.ru.

Editorial Board
CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA:
A FACILITATOR OF REGIONALISM
OR A NEW SOURCE OF FRICTION?

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Introduction

Northeast Asia has lagged behind the global migration trends, but cross-border movement of people is fast becoming an important element of international relations in the region. Northeast Asian nations (China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia) were home to approximately 1,627 million people, more than one-quarter of the earth’s population in the year 2000. The total migrant stock in these countries was 19,029,000 persons, or only 11.7 percent of the world’s total migrant stock of approximately 175,000,000. (Cited in Van Arsdol, Jr. et al, 2003, p. 7). This points to a potentially substantial expansion in international migration in this region. Approximately 318 million persons, or one-twentieth of the earth’s population, lived within the more narrowly defined region of Northeast Asia, including Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin Provinces of China, the Russian Far East, and the entirety Japan, North and South Korea, and Mongolia).

The growing human flows across national borders in this region have the potential to contribute to the development of a regional identity, which has historically been prevented by imperial aggression, ideological conflict, and nationalist rivalries. On the other hand, if mismanaged, international migration flows may also become new sources of tension in the international relations of the region.

In this brief analysis, we will examine the nature of growing migration flows across national borders in Northeast Asia (narrowly defined; hereafter simply referred to as “Northeast Asia” or “the region”) and discuss their implications for the development of regionalism in this part of the world. The empirical material for this analysis comes from an international collaborative research project, “Cross-border Human Flows in Northeast Asia: A Human Security Perspective”\(^2\). The project includes case studies of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East, North Korean migration to northeast China, Chinese, Korean, and Russian migrants in Japan, and immigration and emigration issues in South Korea and Mongolia. The case studies have been conducted by colleagues from Russia, China, South Korea, Mongolia, Japan, and the United States\(^3\).

\(^2\) The project was jointly sponsored by the Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Peace and Governance Programme, United Nations University (UNU), and supported by grants from UNU, the Freeman Foundation, and the US Institute of Peace. The authors of this paper are alone responsible for the analyses and opinions presented here.

\(^3\) The case studies can be accessed at http://www.miis.edu/rcenters-ceas-pub.html (Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California).
Before presenting the case studies, we should briefly describe the perimeters of the following discussion. First, “migration” here refers only to voluntary migration and does not include forced migration. Second, the discussion is limited to the voluntary movement of individual citizens of the Northeast Asian countries from their place of birth to another country within the region. Furthermore, in some cases, “migration” is defined broadly to include not only individuals who have established or plan to establish long-term or permanent residence in a foreign country but also those who visit a foreign country on a short-term basis for business, as tourists, and for other purposes. The inclusion of short-term visitors is justified by the fact that they have as much potential or real impact on the local communities in the host country as well as on bilateral relations between their home country and the country they visit.

Migrant Population and Cross-Border Migration in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia has a disproportionately small share of the world’s migrant stock (United Nations 2002; cited in Van Arsdol, Jr. et al 2003, p. 7). With about 28 percent of the world’s population and only 11.7 percent of the world’s migrant stock living in the region, international migration is bound to grow in this part of the world. Excluding Russia, the migrant stock in Northeast Asia is only about 3.4 percent of the world total. Migrants in Russia, estimated at 13,259,000, are the largest migrant stock of all Northeast Asian countries and represent 68 percent of the entire migrant stock in the region and about 9 percent of Russia’s population. Russia is followed by Hong Kong (2,701,000), Japan (1,620,000), South Korea (597,000), China (513,000), North Korea (37,000), Macao (16,000), and Mongolia (8,000). Migrants represent 66 percent of the population of Macao, 39 percent of Hong Kong, one percent of ROK, one percent of Japan, and less than one percent of the remaining Northeast Asian political entities (United Nations 2002; cited in Van Arsdol, Jr. et al, 2003, p. 7–8).

Migration policies of the Northeast Asian countries appear to be driven by a demand for labor and reject government-sponsored recruitment of migrants due to a perceived threat to cultural homogeneity. The policies favor the circulation of unskilled workers and highly skilled personnel and restrict permanent settlement. As migration policies of countries outside of the region become increasingly restrictive, migration pressure within Northeast Asia is rising (Van Arsdol, Jr. et al, 2003, p. 8). However, as of 2000, all Northeast Asian governments except Russia viewed their levels of immigration as satisfactory and planned to maintain their immigration policies or not intervene. Russia reported its level of immigration as too low and a policy of raising immigration. All Northeast Asian countries viewed their levels of emigration as satisfactory, and sought to either maintain the current emigration policy or not intervene (Van Arsdol, Jr. et al 2003, p. 9). The combination of the potential migration pressure and the relatively strict immigration and emigration policies of the governments in Northeast Asia points to a prospective growth in illegal migration in the region, including human trafficking.
Given the fast-graying populations, high living standards, and growing labor shortages in certain sectors in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, these countries have become attractive destinations of international labor migration, along with Russia, which favors higher levels of migration. Japan attracts both skilled and unskilled workers from the neighboring countries, although the Japanese government currently does not permit unskilled labor migration. Instead, the government-sanctioned industrial trainee program is often used to meet the labor shortage problem in the manufacturing sector. South Korea also maintains a relatively strict migration policy but is facing the problems of visa overstaying by foreign visitors and illegal labor migration. Taiwan has become a popular destination of workers from Continental China, but Taipei has recently imposed a strict labor import policy due to the rising unemployment in Taiwan. Most migrants to Russia come from former Soviet republics but they are inadequate to compensate for the national population decline. Therefore, Chinese migration to Russia is likely to grow. Chinese migration to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is also likely to increase. In addition, there are short-term, non-labor flows of people across national borders throughout Northeast Asia and they are also likely to grow in the future as increasing disposable incomes are spent on international sojourns and shuttle traders look for market niches in their neighboring countries. Short-term migrants often become permanent settlers as well (Van Arsdol, Jr. et al., 2003, p. 19).

Demographic patterns and economic changes in the region are such that international migration will become an increasingly important part of the regional scene. Balancing the need to import foreign labor with the need to maintain cultural and social homogeneity will remain an important but increasingly difficult task for most Northeast Asian countries.

**Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East**

China has almost 80 percent of the entire population of Northeast Asia, including Russia. Northeast China has about one-third of the population of Northeast Asia. The higher density of Chinese population along the border of sparsely populated Mongolia and Russia enhances population dominance by China (Van Arsdol, Jr. et al., 2003, p. 2). Hence, population dynamics in China generally and in its northeastern provinces particularly have far-reaching implications for the neighboring countries.

Chinese migration has attracted the attention of politicians and the public in the Russian Far East since the early 1990s. The issue has been a subject of heated debate in Russia. Russian analysts have discussed local Russian concerns about a loss of control over the growing Chinese migrant population in their territories (see Larin, 1998, 2001; Vitkovskaya and Zayonchkovskaya, 1999; Gelbras, 2001; Motrich, 2001; Alexseev, 2000). U.S.–based researchers have also examined the phenomenon and analyzed the local fear, triggered by the burgeoning Chinese

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migration, concerning the territorial and economic security of the Russian Far East, the human security of Chinese migrants, manipulation of the local fear by regional politicians, and divergent policy priorities between Moscow and the region (e.g., see Alexseev, 2001; Wishnick, 2001). The politically charged local reaction in Primorskiy Krai prompted Moscow in 1993 to impose a strict visa requirement on Chinese (and Mongolian) migration to Russia. On December 9, 1993, the Chinese and Russian governments signed an agreement requiring visas for all Chinese citizens visiting Russia. This caused a drastic decline in the number of Chinese travelers to the Russian Far East and, with it, a dramatic drop in bilateral trade (e.g., Li and Tkalev, 2001, p. 50; cited in Zheng, 2003, p. 5).

Since then Chinese migration into the region has gradually increased and appears to be at manageable levels. Local concerns have also related to illegal activities by some Chinese in the Far East, including members of organized crime.

The size of the Chinese migrant population in the Russian Far East has been a subject of wide-ranging speculations. Some exaggerated estimates have placed it at around one million, but more realistic estimates put it at around 200,000–300,000. In 1989, there were only 1,742 Chinese migrants registered in the Russian Far East, but the number increased to 15,000 in 1990, and 100,000 in 1993 (Rybakovskiy et al, 1994, p. 15; Fedotov and Selivanov, 1997, p. 5). By 2001, the number of registered Chinese citizens in the region had grown to 237,000 (“The General Misfortune”, 2001).

The most important push factors in northeast China are the lack of economic opportunities, population growth, and the rising unemployment caused by the closure of state–owned enterprises (SOEs). As well, there are increasing numbers of Chinese tourists who visit the Russian Far East, including those who go to casinos, which do not exist in their own cities. The pull factors in the Russian Far East include post-Soviet trade and economic liberalization, decline in domestic consumer goods supply, and labor shortage in agriculture and construction.

The sense of vulnerability on the Russian side is fueled by the precipitous decline in the population of the Russian Far East — from the peak of 7.9 million in the late 1980s to less than 6.7 million today (Minakir and Freeze, 1994; Goskomstat, 2002). With the population of the Russian Far East expected to decline by 6.1 percent from 2000 to 2010 and the expected growth of over 10 percent in the neighboring Chinese provinces during the same period, Chinese migration into the Russian Far East will remain an important issue for both the region and Moscow and as a bilateral issue (The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 2000, p. 24; The Estimated Population of the Russian Federation up to 2015 1998: 7; State Statistics Committee of the People's Republic of China 1997). A government report submitted to President Putin in September 2001 warned, “Russia has a minimum time left to overcome the demographic disaster”, and made a not so subtle allusion to China’s possible encroachment on Russia’s

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5 Akaha interviews with migration agency officials in Vladivostok, March 2003.
6 Ibid.
border areas when it stated, «Vast tracts of land are under-populated and Russia borders China with a large and growing population with ‘an acute shortage of territory'» (‘Conception of Demographic Policy of Russia for the Period to 2015’; quoted in Jane’s Information Group, 2001). In the opinion of migration agency officials in Vladivostok, however, the migration situation in the Russian Far East is largely under control now and the threat of Chinese expansion into the Far Eastern territories is more a reflection of the sense of vulnerability among some politicians and journalists in the face of economic difficulties in the region than a realistic assessment of the relationship between China and Russia. If the population in the Far East continued to decline unabated and the Chinese migration pressure in northeast China were allowed to overwhelm the frontier control currently in place along the Chinese-Russian borders, Russia’s national security concerns could rise to serious levels. For now, however, that possibility is very small, particularly in view of the firm commitment in both Moscow and Beijing to sustain their strategic partnership.

North Koreans in China

There is much international controversy surrounding North Korean migrants in China despite the fact that very little is known about how many of them there are, why they leave their country, how they live in China, and what fate awaits them and their families. “Instead largely unfounded speculation has replaced factual analysis and sober research”, decry Smith. She adds, «Policies of major states including the United States, are being founded on hearsay, exaggeration, and heavily skewed ideological agendas» (Smith, 2003, p. 112). Smith notes, for example, that in August 2001, “the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives passed a resolution that included reference to estimates of 100,000 to 300,000 North Koreans resident in China ‘without the permission of the government of China’” (Smith, 2003, p. 114). Smith calls those estimates unfounded. Instead, she refers to the U.S. Committee for Refugees’ estimate of 50,000 North Koreans living in China at the end of 2000 as more realistic (U.S. Committee for Refugees; cited in Smith, 2003, p. 114). She adds that by the fall of 2002, the number of North Koreans illegally living in Yanbian had fallen to around 10,000 to 20,000.

The legal status of North Koreans in China and the concomitant obligations on the part of the Chinese government and the international community are

7 Akaha interview with migration agency officials in Vladivostok, March 2003. The officials’ views were corroborated by Victor Larin, Director of the Institute of History, Archaeology, and Ethnology of the Far Eastern Peoples in Vladivostok, whom Akaha also interviewed in March 2003.
9 Smith notes a similar estimate by the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health (Smith, 2003, p. 115).
important issues that clearly have human security implications. As Smith notes, North Korean migrants to China have been variously called “refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, defectors, and escapees” (Smith, 2003, p. 116). Most North Koreans in China are economic migrants fleeing extreme poverty in their country, but some North Koreans would qualify for refugee status under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees “because they would have a genuine fear of punishment on return to the DPRK, including imprisonment, torture, and at worst death, either through execution or from the affects of ill-treatment in prisons” (Smith, 2003, p. 117). Few North Koreans directly seek refugee designation from the Chinese government, but some have claimed asylum by breaking into foreign embassies and consulates in China (Smith, 2003, p. 117). The Chinese government has refused to recognize those individuals as refugees but allowed many of them to leave the country for permanent settlement in South Korea via the Philippines.

The plight of an unknown number of North Koreans in China, including those that fear political persecution should they be forced to return to North Korea and those who have successfully sought safe haven in third countries, has mobilized human rights groups in Northeast Asia and elsewhere and raised some difficult political questions for the countries concerned. However, so far, diplomatic maneuvering on the part of these countries has prevented these issues from developing into national security problems. One possibility that cannot be ruled out is the outflow of huge numbers of refugees from North Korea in case of a regime collapse in Pyongyang or a violent conflict and political chaos in the country. Not only would the scale of human tolls be incalculably high; such a development would be a serious threat to the peace and stability of the entire region. It would not be simply an issue of “human flows” defined them in this study.

Chinese, Koreans, and Russians in Japan

Foreign migrants in Japan and Japanese traveling abroad have added a human dimension to the internationalization of the country in the last decade. Japanese nationals traveling overseas outnumber foreigners entering Japan by a large margin. In 2002, for example, 16,522,804 Japanese went overseas and 5,771,975 foreign nationals entered Japan — a ratio of roughly 3.5 to 1. Nonetheless, the number of foreigners coming to Japan has grown significantly — from 2,985,764 in 1989 (Japan Immigration Association, 2003, p. 6).

The growing size of foreign population in the country is raising serious questions about the very notion of Japanese identity as a homogeneous people. The nation is in the middle of a debate over how widely it should open its doors to the foreigners seeking opportunities in Japan. Some are arguing that Japan’s near-zero population growth and its fast-graying population and consequent labor shortage will severely limit its future economic growth and, therefore, it must open its job market more widely to foreign workers, including unskilled laborers who are currently not allowed to work in Japan. Others are advocating that Japan should keep its restrictive immigration policy in place in order to maintain its
assumed ethnic homogeneity and its cherished social order even at the risk of reducing its prominence on the world economic scene (Sakanaka, 2001, p. 3–21). The outcome of the national debate is far from certain (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 2000, p. 46–51). In the meantime, Japan’s official policy is designed to control the importation of foreign labor, while serious labor shortages are forcing Japanese companies and the government itself to violate the principles upon which that policy is based (Cornelius, 1994, p. 387).

Among the more established foreign communities in Japan are the ethnic Koreans and Chinese, who originally came to Japan during Japan’s imperial period through the Second World War. In 2001, there were 632,405 registered North and South Korean nationals in the country, representing 35.6 percent of the total population of registered foreigners in Japan. The second largest foreign population was Chinese, with 381,225 citizens of Taiwan and PRC registered (21.4% of the total). There are so-called «newcomers» among the contemporary foreign communities in the country. They include Brazilians and Peruvians, most of them of Japanese ancestry. In 2001, there were 265,962 Brazilian nationals and 50,052 Peruvian citizens registered in Japan. Russians are also «newcomers», but there were only 5,329 Russians registered in Japan, a mere 0.3 percent of the total, in 2001 (Judicial System Department, 2002).

The size of the ethnic Korean community in Japan has been relatively stable over the last decade, but because the numbers of other foreign residents have risen, the proportional size of the Korean resident community has fallen (from 51.7% of all registered foreigners in the country in 1993 to 35.6% in 2001). The age structure and naturalization have been the main causes of the slow but steady decrease in the number of Korean residents (Mervio, 2003, p. 1).

Mervio notes, “Japanese policies towards the Korean community have always had two contradictory objectives: to facilitate total assimilation and to maintain control” (Mervio, 2003, p. 1). Although the increased immigration and the growing awareness of the multiethnic make-up of contemporary Japan are expected to improve the situation of Koreans in Japan (Kimu, 1999, p. 7–62; cited in Mervio, 2003, p. 3), Mervio cautions that discriminatory practices continue and strong political resistance exists to significant reforms concerning the status and conditions of foreigners in Japan (Mervio, 2003, p. 3). Nonetheless, it is true that new migrants and visitors from South Korea, who outnumber all other nationalities coming to Japan, are contributing to the further diversification of the ethnic mix in Japan.

A case study by Zha of the Chinese community in Niigata Prefecture shows that the provincial administration is eagerly developing ties with its counterparts in northeast China, often in order to develop international economic ties for the benefit of local businesses (Zha, 2002, p. 92–113; Zha, 2003, p. 42–62). “Sister-city” ties are the most symbolic of such efforts. Historical ties with Manchuria have also been a factor promoting Niigata citizens’ interest in ties with northeast China, particularly Heilongjiang. The study also reveals that many young
Chinese come to study or receive industrial-technical training in the prefecture and they are often given scholarships and other financial support from public and private sources in the prefecture. In 2001, for example, 516 Chinese were studying in universities and technical schools in the prefecture and 609 Chinese were there as trainees. Niigata has also used Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to China as a lever to develop closer ties in the neighboring country. Another element of the Chinese connection in Niigata is the fairly large number of Chinese who are married to Japanese citizens. Out of the 3,120 Chinese citizens who were registered as resident in the prefecture in 2001, 588 were married to Japanese citizens.

Zha’s study also shows there are some potentially serious problems. Many Chinese trainees do not receive the kind of industrial and technical training they expected to receive when they first came to Japan. There is also evidence of exploitation of some Chinese trainees who are recruited by agents in China and sent to Japan, where they are placed by Japanese contractors in companies that provide “training” but which do not enter into contractual agreements directly with the foreign trainees. The “training” system is often by name only and many businesses hire Chinese as cheap labor. The system is also abused by some Chinese, who come to Japan ostensibly to receive training but leave their place of assignment to find better-paid employment opportunities elsewhere. Similarly, many Chinese students enrolled in Japanese universities and technical schools work illegally to support themselves, some of the permanently disappearing from school rosters. These problems add to the negative image the Japanese public are developing of Chinese migrants in Japan. Frequent media reports of crimes committed or allegedly committed by Chinese in Japan contribute to the formation of negative stereotypes of Chinese people (e.g., Rozman, 2001, p. 97–125; cited in Zha, 2003, p. 59).

The Russian community in contemporary Japan is a recent phenomenon. It is also quite small. In 2002, the number of newly arriving Russians ranked 19th among all nationalities and the number of Russian citizens (6,026 of them) registered in the country ranked 20th among all resident foreign communities. Nonetheless, Russians living or visiting Japan are steadily growing in number. In 1995, 24,232 Russians entered Japan but by 2002, the number had grown to 36,693 (Japan Immigration Association, 2000, p. 14; Judicial System Department 2003). These numbers do not include the substantially larger numbers of Russians who visit Japanese port cities on a special landing permit. For example, the city of Wakkanai at the northern end of Hokkaido is annually visited by well over 50,000 Russians who come from Sakhalin and go shopping or eating in the city while their ships are anchored in the port. Wakkanai’s population is much smaller than the total number of Russians who visit the city.

Case studies by Akaha and Vassilieva in Hokkaido and Niigata, two popular areas of residence for Russians in Japan, indicate that their growing presence is having visible impact on the members of some host communities with respect to
their views of Russia and Russians (Akaha and Vassilieva, 2003). In some areas, local demands for expanded ties between Japan and Russia have eased state control over mutual visits between Russian and Japanese citizens. In Hokkaido, the Russian-Japanese dispute over the sovereignty of the Northern Territories (southern Kuriles) has been a focal point in local efforts to change the nature of Japanese-Russian relations, and the efforts have resulted in the establishment of a regime of reciprocal visa-free visits between Russian residents on the disputed islands and former Japanese residents and their relations. The development of special arrangements for Japanese access to fishery resources in Russian waters, including in areas surrounding the disputed territories, is another example of local efforts to engage Russia. In both cases, the approval of national governments was required and obtained (Akaha, 2003).

The local reaction to the Russian presence has not been uniform. On the one hand, those who are predisposed toward international exchanges and intercultural experiences generally seek out opportunities to meet Russians and develop more differentiated, nuanced, and balanced views of Russians. On the other hand, those with little or no interest in Russia and no direct contact with Russians, including many young people, are unlikely to change their views of Russia. On the contrary, since they tend to have negative images of Russia and Russians to start with, their unfavorable impressions are bound to solidify when they see or hear media reports of illegal activities or culturally offensive behaviors of some Russians in Japan.

What is the nature of the Russians’ experience in living in Japan? Our studies show that their experience has been somewhat mixed. Some Russian residents are frustrated by the rather superficial interaction they have with the Japanese locals and feel a cultural and social distance. Whether imagined or real, the distance is likely to remain unless the local Japanese more fully embrace the Russians in their midst as true neighbors. On the other hand, most Russian residents in Hokkaido and Niigata maintain their admiration of and interest in Japanese society and culture, finding the opportunity to live in Japan rewarding and enriching.

**Migration Policy Issues in South Korea**

The number of overseas Koreans has increased dramatically — from a mere 700,000 in 1971 to over 6 million today. They live in 151 countries, but 88 percent of them live in Asia, mostly China and Japan (Lee, 2003, p. 3–4). As the number of Koreans abroad has grown, the South Korean government has come under increasing pressure to play an active role in promoting the status of Korean diasporas in both their countries of residence and Korea. In response, in 1997 the Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF) was established as a non-profit public corporation affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The government has also founded the Korea Education Institute to promote Korean language and cultural education overseas (Lee, 2003, p. 7).
The task of balancing the need to promote ethnic solidarity among overseas Koreans and their affinity to their ancestral land on the one hand and, on the other, the need to bring South Korean laws and policies into line with international norms is not easy. In November 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that the definition of ethnic Koreans with different nationalities in the Overseas Koreans Law violated the principle of equality. The proposed amendment to the law would include ethnic Koreans living in China and Russia in the definition of «overseas Koreans», thus promoting the rights and economic activities of these people. However, offering special privileges to overseas Koreans in the form of a special law would go against the spirit of international law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits discrimination on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds. Moreover, the inclusion of ethnic Koreans living in China into the definition of overseas Koreans could become a diplomatic issue with China (Lee, 2003, p. 9–11).

The presence of foreign nationals in South Korea also poses difficult questions for the Korean society and government. Until the early 1990s the government maintained a strict immigration control. Since then, however, the booming economy, rising living standards, and resulting labor shortages have forced the government to relax its policy. As a result, the number of foreign residents in South Korea has steadily increased. As of the end of 2002, there were an estimated 629,006 foreign residents in the country. The increase of foreign population in the country has created the problem of illegal foreigners. In the end of 2002, the estimated number of illegal foreigners in the country was 289,239. Both legal and illegal immigrant workers experience discrimination, human rights abuses, and social mistreatment in their working environments (Lee, 2003, p. 12–13). In 2002, the Korean government provided a two-month registration period for the estimated 265,848 unauthorized foreigners, but whether the policy will be effective in eliminating the illegal presence of foreign nationals in Korea remains to be seen (Lee, 2003, p. 15-16). The sexual exploitation of female illegal immigrants is also a growing problem in South Korea.

Lee concludes that the network of 6 million Korean diasporas could contribute to furthering the political and diplomatic interests of South Korea in the international arena if the government would stop regarding overseas Koreans as “former Korean citizens” and start viewing them instead as “permanent Korean nationals”, and address their needs and rights (Lee, 2003, p. 21). Lee also concludes that the South Korean government needs to address the fact that the strict regulation it maintains over immigration into the country is creating an increasing number of “illegal” and “unauthorized” foreign residents in the country. She proposes that the government incorporate “unauthorized” individuals into the population of authorized migrants (Lee, 2003, p. 21).

**Migration Issues in Mongolia**

Russia’s influence in Mongolia has diminished in recent years and Mongolia’s economic ties with China have grown. This has raised Mongolia’s
apprehension about excessive Chinese influence in the country (Batbayar, 2003). The huge population of China (1.3 billion) to Mongolia’s small population (2.5 million) cannot but be a source of concern in this context. The neighboring Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region has a population of some 20 million as well. China’s population density is 127 times greater than Mongolia’s. Mongolia and China are «opening their economies to freer trade, but at a price that threatens Mongolian cultural identity and economic independence» (Nelles, 2001, p. 67–68; cited in Batbayar, 2003, p. 1).

In December 2000, the Mongolian Parliament amended the 1993 Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens, to require foreign visitors to Mongolia to register within seven days of arriving in the country. Although the Parliament subsequently agreed to exclude travelers from the registration requirement, the legislative move clearly reflected the Mongolian lawmakers’ determination to restrict foreign immigration11.

As of May 31, 2003, there were 3,232 foreign permanent residents and immigrants registered in Mongolia. Immigrants include 1,315 Chinese (56.1%), 977 Russians (41.6%), and 52 others (2.3%). The number of immigrants has not exceeded 3,000 for the last three years. The number of immigrants admitted per annum is around 30 people. For example, 32 immigrants were admitted in 2001 and 30 in 2002 (Batbayar, 2003, p. 3).

The majority of foreign visitors to Mongolia come from China and Russia. In 2002 alone, 92,657 and 71,368 people visited from China and Russia, respectively (Batbayar, 2003, p. 5). Visa overstaying is a major problem among the Chinese and Russian visitors. Mongolia also offers Chinese and Russians ample opportunities for low-cost living and profitable trade, and also serves as a transit point to more advanced countries. Forgery of travel documents for transit to a third country is a problem, as is narcotics trafficking. In 2000, Mongolian police detained about 50 foreign citizens, including 23 Chinese and 21 Russians (Batbayar, 2003, p. 6).

China, given its overwhelming size along all dimensions of national power, including population, and the long border it shares with Mongolia, is the primary concern to Mongolia’s national security and a source of its sense of vulnerability12. The increasing economic presence of China in the country, much of it supported by a growing network of small but vibrant business concerns, represents both an opportunity for the local population and a challenge to the policymakers in Ulaan Baatar who are acutely aware of the country’s vulnerability to its giant neighbor. As Batbayar notes, however, for now the

11 The amendment also established a new government service responsible for dealing with matters relating to foreign citizens and immigrants. (Batbayar, 2003, p. 3.)
12 For example, a Canadian analyst asserts that Mongolia has difficulty defending itself from Chinese influence on a variety of fronts from imported goods, foodstuff, to business and investment, intermarriage and illegal immigration or settlement. (Nelles, 2001, p. 67–68; cited in Batbayar, 2003, p. 1).
Mongolian government has been successful in tightly controlling the influx of all foreigners, including Chinese, into the country. Chinese migration, therefore, remains a potential — not a real — security concern.

Implications for Regionalism

What is the potential impact of the growing international migration in Northeast Asia on the development of regionalism? The impact is likely to vary for different aspects or regionalism, i.e., economic, political, institutional, social, cultural, and security dimensions. The voluntary movement of people across national borders has lagged behind transnational movement of information, capital, technology, goods, and services. This is because the movement of people involves the difficult task of reconciling cultural and social differences and mediating and negotiating political loyalties between different ethnic and national groups. The rising tide of cross-border migration in the region, therefore, is a sign that integration between the Northeast Asian economies is deepening.

Can international migration become a facilitator of regional integration, rather than a consequence of deepening integration? There is no question that economic integration will continue and migration will grow as a result. However, as we noted above, the growing contacts between people of different ethnicities and nationalities are generating various degrees of tension in the impacted communities and various challenges for government authorities in all Northeast Asian countries. So far, we have seen no summitry among the national leaders of the region to deal with international migration issues in Northeast Asia. Nor is there any serious discussion about the establishment of institutional mechanisms for multilateral coordination of migration and related policies. Virtually all policy changes in the migration sector have been through domestic (i.e., unilateral) processes.

There is no question, however, that the border-crossing people in Northeast Asia are creating new social networks within and between countries. In fact, the growing tide of international migration is both a sign and a facilitator of deepening social integration. In this context, labor migration can be expected to play a particularly important role. The role is not altogether positive, however.

Japan and South Korea — the two countries that present the most powerful pull factors in labor migration — are under growing pressure to liberalize their

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13 Rozman suggests there are five dimensions to “regionalism”: (1) an accelerated increase in economic relations supported by a common strategy for economic integration (i.e., economic integration); (2) advancement of political relations through summities and institutions designed to establish common action (i.e., institutional integration); (3) social integration through labor migration and corporate networks or a common agenda concerning various existing problems (i.e., social integration); (4) shared recognition of a regional identity facilitated by a common culture amidst globalization (i.e., identity formation); and, (5) an expanding security agenda for reducing tension and ensuring stability (i.e., security integration). (Rozman, 2005).
immigration policies. The international community sees the need to provide employment opportunities for migrants from the labor-surplus countries such as China and some Southeast Asian countries. Many NGOs and business leaders in Japan and South Korea are also advocating more liberal immigration policies to fill the labor shortages in their countries. However, the two countries’ restrictive policies have forced growing numbers of foreign migrants to work illegally there. Many illegal migrants become easy targets of discrimination and exploitation. Some of them are also being lured into criminal activities by domestic and foreign organized crime. The mass media’s daily reports on illegal labor, exploited workers, and crimes committed by foreigners are threatening the sense of safety and cultural sensibilities of the public. As a result, pressure is building to crack down on illegal workers and the governments in Tokyo and Seoul are committing more resources to find and deport illegal migrants. On the other hand, some civil society groups in the two countries are advocating more liberal migration policies and protection of the human rights of legal and illegal foreign workers. Despite the social and cultural resistance, the integrative forces of labor and other forms of migration are likely to grow.

Is cross-border migration contributing to the development of a regional identity among the peoples of Northeast Asia? The case studies we have reviewed above indicate that ethnic, cultural, and national identities remain strong in Northeast Asia and that the influx of foreign migrants and visitors into local communities is reinforcing those identities. There is no sign that the contemporary cross-border migration is eroding people’s identities based on their ethnicity or nationality14.

What is the impact of international migration on the security concerns of the governments and peoples of Northeast Asia? The growing cross-border human flows have given rise to some human security issues, e.g., the rights of foreign workers in Japan and South Korea, the human rights, economic survival, and political fate of North Koreans in China, and the economic and social well being of Koreans overseas. However, these issues have so far not threatened the national security interests of the countries concerned. Nor are they bringing the countries

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14 This observation excludes the long-established minority communities in the region, e.g., the Koreans and Chinese in Japan, Koreans in the Russian Far East and China, and Russians in Mongolia. The strength of these minority identities varies. In the case of Korean minorities in Japan, as Mervio notes, members of younger generations are fast losing their Korean cultural identity along with their Korean language ability. There is not one identity but many among the ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East. They include the so-called “Soviet Koreans,” descendants of the Koreans who were forced to move from Far Eastern territories to Central Asia during Stalin’s reign of terror, the offspring of Sakhalin Koreans who had been forced by the Japanese to move to Sakhalin from the Japanese-controlled Korean peninsula but remained on the island after the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, North Korean contract laborers in forestry and construction projects, Chinese citizens of Korean background shuttling between China and Russia, some of whom have settled in the Far East, and South Koreans conducting business and cultural activities in Far Eastern cities.
closer in terms of international cooperation. The Chinese migration into the
Russian Far East has generated politically charged local reaction, but the
tightened control of the migration flows since 1994 has diffused bilateral tension,
although the mass media in the region continues to reflect remaining anxieties in
the local communities. The one migration stream that could very well threaten
the national security interests of Northeast Asian countries is the potentially huge
outflow of refugees from North Korea if the regime in Pyongyang should
collapse or a violent conflict should erupt in the country.

Against the background of globalization, cross-border human flows cannot
but grow in the future in this and other parts of the world. In Northeast Asia,
 economic interdependence is gradually deepening through market forces. As
market economies continue to grow in China, Russia, and Mongolia, so will the
complementary linkages among the economies of the region. Social integration
proceeds through networks of individuals, enterprises, and other groups and
organizations whose activities transcend national borders. Cultural integration
can also deepen through exchanges between individual citizens, business
organizations, and civil society groups. This region also needs integration
through cooperation in non-traditional security fields, such as environmental
protection, resource management, control of illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons,
and humans, containment of the HIV/AIDS and SARS epidemic, counter-terror
measures, and management of cross-border human flows.

The realities surrounding cross-border migration are changing but they are
still far behind the needs of regional integration in Northeast Asia. It is hoped
that the political leaders and economic decision-makers in the countries of the
region recognize not only the potential economic benefits of international
migration in each country but also the integrative force of cross-border human
flows for the region as a whole. Whether the region’s leaders will seize the latter
for the benefit of the region’s peace and stability or succumb to the temptation to
exploit them for their parochial political interests remains to be seen.

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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
IN THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Growing scale of illegal immigration is one of significant global migration trends. As it was noticed on the 59-th Session of International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1974 “despite the efforts of main receiving countries, the number of illegal migrants is still significant. And if we consider this question on a global scale we will find that such migration is more likely a rule than an exception”.

Nowadays despite the active efforts of major receiving states to combat illegal immigration, estimated numbers of illegal immigrants there continue to increase. The reasons for that are rooted in enlargement of economic and demographic gap between sending and receiving countries and demand for cheaper labor force against restricted migration management and narrow channels for legal entry and employment of foreign workers in developed countries. As a result, in the countries with relative liberate immigration policy, which remain essentially open to immigration (such as USA, Canada, Australia, etc.), illegal immigration is an alternative for those migrants who do not meet the required criteria, for those who would have to wait longer than they wish in order to obtain immigrant visa, as well as for those for whom unauthorized immigration is less expensive. At the same time in the countries with restrictive immigration policy, where opportunities for legal entering and staying in a country are limited (such as the European Union), illegal migration for the majority of migrants, is the only way to improve their financial position. All these things lead to the fact that for many countries illegal migration has become typical.

It is very difficult to estimate illegal immigration. Different indirect methods let us give just approximate estimations that may disperse a lot. For instance according to the estimation of UN experts from 2 to 4.5 million people every year cross the borders of the countries illegally. Moreover, besides this fact a number of illegal migrants is growing with people who came to the country administratively legally, but overstayed there, violated the conditions of residence. According to the different estimations now from 10 to 15% of all international migrants (from 20 to 35 million people) stay in the countries violating the law. Now the number of illegal migrants is about 10-15 million in the USA, from 5,6 to 8,4 million in Western Europe, 3,5 to 5 million in Russia, 300 thousand to 1 million in Japan, 1 to 3 million in the Middle East, 1 to 3 million in South America. We have to admit that illegal immigration effects not only development of the country. All the countries having higher cost-of-living index than their nearest neighbors may become a victim of illegal immigration. For example Mexico, the biggest supplier of illegal immigrants in the world, is at the same time a receiving society for about one million illegal immigrants from countries of South America; the number of illegal immigrants in Argentina is about 800 thousand people. (Migration in an interconnected world, 2005, p. 32–34; ILO, 2004, p. 11–12; Papademetriou, 2005).
During long time the receiving societies were rather tolerant to migrants, including illegal migrants. However, social, economical and geopolitical reasons in the recent years seriously damaged the tolerance by general negativization of migration in the public opinion. Attitude towards illegal immigrants was affected in the greatest extent.

In the last third of XX and the beginning of XXI centuries the problems of illegal immigration become not only actual but they are also directly related with the standards of living of native populations, growth of criminality, international terrorism and other negative things. It has become obvious after the tragedy of 11th September in 2001 in USA when the topic of national security and the resistance of world terrorism appeared the main one. And it’s not surprising that in the last years illegal immigration takes more attention of the government of the developed countries, international organizations (UNO, IOM, European Union, Council of Europe), politicians and academics.

**Methodological Issues of Illegal Migration Studies and Management**

Before talking about contemporary trends and features of illegal immigration we have to define who can be considered an illegal immigrant.

There is no clear or universally recognized definition of illegal migration. To define these form of migration movements different scholars use such terms as “undocumented”, “paperless”, “illegal”, “unauthorized”, “with an irregular status”, “clandestine”, “quasi-legal”, etc., which often reflect different understanding of the essence of the phenomenon (Ghosh,1998; Okolski, 2000; Tapinos, 2000; Krasinets, Kubishin, Tuiruikanova, 2000; Vorob’ieva, 2001; Virkovskaya, 2002; Iontsev, 2002; Migration in an interconnected world, 2005; Papademetriou, 2005).

In Russia, the discussion on definition of illegal migration gains in 1990s not only scientific, but also political and social resonance. This resonance was caused by the appearance of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and by special attitude to the former Soviet citizens, hundreds thousand of whom moved to Russia after the disintegration of USSR. The status of some of them is still undefined in spite of the fact that many of them stay in Russia for more than 10 years.

Convention No.143 adopted by the 1975 ILO Conference defines clandestine or illegal migration movements as those where migrants find themselves “during their journey, on arrival or during their period of residence and employment [in] conditions contravening relevant international multilateral or bilateral instruments or agreements, or national laws or regulations”. This definition places the stress on the diverse aspects of irregularity: entry, residence in the host country and the undertaking of an occupation (Tapinos, 2000, p. 14).

The Programme of Actions of International Conference of Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) underlines that “undocumented or irregular migrants are people who do not fulfill the requirements established by the country of
destination to enter, stay or exercise an economic activity. Given that the pressures for migration are growing in a number of developing countries, especially since their labor force continues to increase, undocumented or irregular migration is expected to rise” (UN Programme of Action, 1994).

In the Glossary of Migration, prepared by International Organization for Migration, there is the following definition: “Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside or work in a given country. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.” (Glossary on Migration, 2004, p. 34–35).

In the Report of the Global Commission of International Migration we read: “The term ‘irregular migration’ is commonly used to describe a variety of different phenomena involving people who enter or remain in a country of which they are not a citizen in breach of national laws. These include migrants who enter or remain in a country without authorization, those who are smuggled or trafficked across an international border, unsuccessful asylum seekers who fail to observe a deportation order and people who circumvent immigration controls through the arrangement of bogus marriages. These different forms of irregular migration are often clustered together under the alternative headings of unauthorized, undocumented or illegal migration. The Commission is aware of the controversy surrounding the adequacy of these concepts, and concurs with the assertion that an individual person cannot be ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’. This report therefore refers to the people concerned as ‘migrants with irregular status’.” (Migration in an interconnected world, 2005, p. 32).

Thus, **irregular (illegal) migration** is the spatial population movements through the state borders dealing with the violation of rules of departure in the country of origin, rules of entry / residence in the destination country, or rules of transit through another country.

Illegal migration may appear within a country if it has restrictions for internal population movements without a special permission (for example in Russia at the times of serfdom, in modern China etc).

**Illegal migrants** are migrants who have violated rules of entry, departure, residence or transit through the particular country.

There are two main types of illegal migration: illegal emigration and illegal immigration. Besides, in the last years we face new forms of illegal transit migration dealing with smuggling of migrants and trafficking in migrants.
Let’s focus on differences between two main types of illegal migration.

**Illegal emigration** is usually non-return and very often takes a form of forced migration in case of successful entry to the country, as illegal immigrants often apply for refugee status. In case of failure in getting refugee status many people from this group become illegal immigrants and sometimes may be deported to their native countries that may result in punishment for them (for example in China).

Illegal immigration is usually return migration related to illegal job placement. In that case migrants can cross the state border legally (as tourists, business migrants, or with the invitation from friends and relatives), illegally (through poorly controlled boundaries) or unduly (using fake documents, transit visas), but in all cases with the further illegal job placement.

**Illegal employment** of migrants is employment without proper juridical registration according to the rules for foreigners in the receiving country.

Thus, significant characteristics for the illegal immigration are: 1) illegal employment — the main target of most of illegal immigrants regardless the way of crossing the border; 2) temporariness of employment — most of illegal migrants intend to come back to their native country.

We define three forms of illegal immigration (see also Okolski, 2000; Tapinos, 2000; Papademetriou, 2005, scheme 1):

1. **undocumented / unauthorized entrance** — one of the main forms of illegal migration (for example, in the USA this category accounts for about two-thirds of all illegal immigrants). They are citizens of one state who enter another state clandestinely. Most of such entrants cross land borders (for example from Mexico to USA near the river Rio-Grande; from Poland to Germany by crossing rivers Oder and Niebe; from Afghanistan to Tajikistan through mountains and then to Russia), but sea routes are also used regularly and wherever inspection regimes are permeable, so are air routes. In all instances, the entrant manages to avoid detection and hence, inspection. At the same time on many borders special channels for illegal migrants have been formed by human smuggling organizations.

A distinction should be made between unassisted and assisted illegal border crossings. Unassisted illegal migrant is a person who plan and execute an illegal entry by himself, whereas assisted illegal migrant turns to other people (or organizations) for help. Nowadays increasing proportions of clandestine immigrants are smuggled or trafficked. According to the estimations of ILO experts, about half of migrants cross the borders of the country when they become victims of human traffickers. Illegal immigrants often rely — voluntarily or forcedly — on assistance of “migration brokers”, i.e. transnational criminal groups specializing in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings. Smuggling and trafficking in migrants is a powerful international business with

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15 Among illegal immigrants there are asylum-seekers, terrorists and other criminals, however, generally illegal migration is labor migration by nature.
high profits and low risks. In fact, it is a specific element of informal migration infrastructure that opposes official international migration management institutions. In the USA, according to the data from the Naturalization and Immigration Service, in the late 1990s about 10,000 persons were involved in that business. According to Europol data, incomes of illegal immigration organizing networks are comparable to incomes of drug business.

2. **legal entry with false paper (fraudulent documents)**. This form is for migrants who come to the country of destination legally, but use fake documents for entry (fake passports or passports of other people, fake or changed visas, fake invitations etc). For this form we also name the making of fraudulent asylum claims and other documents necessary to make the identity of refugee.

3. **illegal (informal) employment**. This form includes people who enter another state properly (for example with tourist visas or private invitations), but later they violate the rules of residence. It may be violation of terms and conditions of a visa during their legal residence in the country of destination (for instance illegal job placement of students or tourists, changing the place of work despite the contract conditions) and also the violation of the time of residence prescribed by visa or other documents (for example foreign students “willfully” overstay their period of legal stay laps into irregular status; transit migrates with overdue visas working under international agreements and contracts that are run over their period of validity). For example in 2001 in the Korean Republic there were about 255,000 persons staying in the country after the allowed period of residence, and in Japan there were 224,000 of such people (ILO, 2004, p. 12).

**Forms of entry**

- administratively legal (paper in order) entry
- legal entry with false paper
- illegal entry

**infringement of duration of residence**
**infringement of conditions of residence**

**illegal (informal) employment**

Scheme 1. Structure of illegal immigration

**Economic and Political Aspects of Illegal Immigration**

Illegal immigration is mostly an economic process by nature. It’s not surprising that the majority of illegal immigrants are people looking for job or for higher earnings than they have in their native country.

From the economic perspective, illegal immigration is driven by expectation of economic benefits by four main participants of this process:

– *migrants*, who decide to choose illegal way of movement and job placement;
employers, who give job to illegal migrants;

- sending states;
- receiving states.

As to **illegal immigrant**, the reasons for illegal entry and job placement in the foreign labor market are concerned with the following factors:

- more possibilities for employment and higher salaries in a destination country in comparison with the country of emigration;
- no possibility to get the legal permission for entry and work in the wished country of destination;
- possibility not to loose time and money to get residence permit and work permission;
- possibility to avoid tax payments.

Migrants who come for seasonal jobs in the informal sector (building, agriculture, etc.) are especially intending not to get official registration of their stay.

As to **employer**, the attractiveness to use illegal immigrants has the following reasons:

- possibility to save money for salaries and social payments;
- disfranchised position of illegal migrants lets the employer to break labor rules and set up his own job conditions, salary, working schedule etc;
- necessity to fill the vacancies that are not attractive for local population (harmful, dangerous);
- disproportion of offer and demand for labor on the regional and sectoral markets;
- necessity to use more flexible schemes to hire employees;
- strict system of registration and licensing of foreign employees.

Thus immigrants working illegally are the cheapest and disfranchised working force that is a significant reason to hire such people in spite of increasing fines and sanctions (even imprisonment). For example, one of the reports of the USA Population Council directly points: businessmen get more benefits using the illegal immigrants that live and work in the terrible condition and get the lowest salary. This fact explains why corporate business in the USA lobbies for simplification of immigration rules, till the total openness of the borders. For example, the government found out that 80% of people gathering the harvest of onion in the state of Georgia were illegal immigrants. The Immigration and Naturalization Service tried to make its job and legalize these migrants or deport them, but the legislative instances of the state hampered the INS activity. Employers in agriculture, construction and low-paid sector claim that they must have a right to employ foreigners even if they are illegal (Buekenen, 2004, Immigration policy, 2002). According to the estimations of experts, the governments of developed countries will face growing press from businessmen who need new employees to maintain their competitiveness on the global market. Otherwise, under the conditions of globalization industrialized countries with
their population getting older and older and lack of young people will be hardly effective in competition with less developed economies on the global market.

Paradoxically, but not only employers get benefits from using labor of irregular migrants but the receiving state as well as they can be considered as “net taxpayers” (Linderdt, 1992) who participate in taxation in most cases (indirect taxes rather than direct taxes) but have no access to social security benefits. The research of American scholars confirm that receiving states gain from illegal immigrants in terms of lower prices and dampened inflation, higher competitiveness of their products at the world market. So, “in general illegal immigrants are not a burden for the treasury” and they positively influence the receiving countries economy (Tapinos, 2000, p. 30).

Sending countries may also encourage illegal migration as it can affect their economy positively, especially in the short-term run. Illegal migration contributes the decrease of demographic pressure in the countries of origin and reduce unemployment level. According to estimations, labor migration from Mexico to the USA reduces annual increase of Mexican population from 1.8% to 1.5% (ILO, 2004). Illegal migration also creates of huge flows of remittances to the emigration countries. The volume of remittances sent home by international migrants are growing rapidly. While accurate figures are hard to obtain, the World Bank estimates that the annual value of formally transferred remittances in 2004 was about $160 billion, representing a 50% increase in just five years. Remittances are now close to triple the value of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to low-income countries and comprise the second-largest source of external funding for developing countries after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Significantly, remittances tend to be more predictable and stable than FDI or ODA. They continued to rise during the Asian financial crisis, for example, while flows of FDI fell. This is not an isolated case. Evidence collected by the World Bank indicates that when a country encounters political or economic difficulties, citizens who are living and working abroad support their compatriots by increasing the amount of money they send home (GCIM, 2005, p. 26).

The mutual benefit of all participating actors makes illegal migration an essential and everlasting element of the world economic structure despite official attempts to combat it. The problem of illegal migration can’t be solved while on the labor markets of receiving countries there are possibilities for illegal job placement and interest of employers and government in cheap and disfranchised manpower that can provide the decrease of costs for social care and consequently provide lower price and higher competitiveness. On the other hand, the economic situation in the countries of leaving is always an active pushing out factor.

Together with the economic factors of illegal immigration we have to point at the political factor that is contributing to the increase of illegal migration scales provoking it from the side of host country as well as from the side of country of leaving. The Government of China supposes that the USA in fact encourages illegal migration by giving political asylum to the most of Chinese migrants.
while they are usually moved with economical reasons. At the same time, the Mexican Government, aimed to soften the problem of poorness, supports migration to the USA. Future illegal migrants are supplied with a necessary stock of food, water and medicine; they also get the address of social services that welcome immigrants without any questions (Buchanan, 2004).

Economic and political relationships between the countries play an important role in the increase of illegal migration, including traditional migration ties, gaps in economic development and cost-of-living indices, etc. Speaking about Russia and other former soviet states, we mention the following factors affecting illegal immigration:
- better economical situation in Russia in comparison with other CIS countries;
- weakness of boundaries (poor boundary infrastructure and lack of control especially in the Asian region);
- lack of common Russian labor market;
- the huge share of informal economy;
- lack of language barrier;
- weak punishment for usage of illegal manpower;
- contradictions in Russian law of foreigners’ enter and work placement.

The important factor of illegal immigration in some countries is their geographical position as transit countries. Many countries of East and South Europe face this problem. For instance, the Government of Malta claimed several times that they can’t manage with the huge number of immigrants from Africa that pass through Maltese waters to Italy, but have accidents and illegal landings to the banks of Malta. Starting from 2006, the European Union started to control water boundaries of Malta to stop the boats with illegal immigrants in advance.

Russia is facing the similar situation. After it has joined international migration flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has faced different, sometimes unexpected, consequences. One of them is related to geopolitical position of Russia as a transit country for migrants from Asia and Africa forwarding to Europe. According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, about 300,000 transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Shi-Lanka, Turkey and Ethiopia stay in Russia. We have to agree that Russian official institutes responsible for migration management didn’t manage to take transit migrants under control. Coming with transit or tourist visa or illegally, they just may be lost in the big country. At the same time border control in the western Russian boundaries is strict. By preventing illegal departure of transit migrants who stay in Russia, the Russian border services make the country a “settling pot” for illegal migrants.

In the late 1990s growing illegal migration has changed in its scale and structure. Russia has become the destination country for irregular labor migrants from the former Soviet states. In the recent years the labor migration becomes dominative. It is influencing Russian labor market particularly labor markets of the city of Moscow and the Moscow Province, St-Petersburg and its Province, the
Far East Region, etc.). It is mainly related to migration from neighboring ex-USSR countries.

The majority of illegal migrants enter Russia legally (for work, study, as tourists or with private invitations) but later they start to work illegally on the Russian territory. The major countries of origin are Ukraine, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, as well as China and Vietnam.

The surveys show that main spheres of employment of illegal immigrants in central regions and big cities of Russia are construction, commerce, public transport, and small-scale industries. In the cities they are usually involved in: jobbing, market trading, private taxies, repairing, cottage building, restaurant service and some others. In the countryside illegal migrants are usually engaged in seasonal building and agricultural works. According to the estimations of experts, 30 to 50% of workers in big construction sites in the cities are employed illegally (Krasinets, Kubishin, Tyuryukanova, 2002). Another option is informal sector that doesn’t require the registration and at the same time let people gain money quickly and avoid taxes (what is nearly impossible in the developed countries).

When irregular migration takes place on a significant scale, it has a number of negative social and economic consequences. We specify main of them:

– spreading of shadow economy, as the irregular migrants create unjustified benefits for the companies employing them in comparison with the other companies;
– creating the goods and services market out of control, stimulating the development of shadow economy and breaking the system of relations between market players and government, illegal migration hamper the development of effective civilized national labor market;
– illegal immigration can be related to smuggling, prostitution and drugs distribution and other criminal activities;
– illegal immigrants do not pay taxes from their income and the companies employing them do not pay social security payments that lead to the lost of fiscal gains. In some cases illegal immigration can also result in increase of taxes for native inhabitants as the budget loose money to support immigrants: for education for their children, security, prisons etc;
– illegal migration challenges can even become a threat to public security, especially when it involves corruption and organized crime;
– the guarantied minimum wage does not wound illegal immigrants that may cause the decrease of wages for unskilled workers;
– employees can ignore the requirements on safety, health care and accident prevention practices, this can lead to the injuries and even death of the immigrants;
– when in illegal status, migrants do not have medical checkup to define if they have diseases; they do not always make use of public services to which they are entitled, for example emergency health care. At the same time they can be exposed to the risk of illness especially if they travel illegally or under
compulsion, because of bad unsanitary conditions of living, hard labor conditions and extra labor exploitation. It might cause serious medical risks as the diseases may spread among population of the receiving country;

- migrants with irregular status are often unwilling to seek help from authorities because they are afraid of arrest and deportation, that’s why they usually become victims of crime;
- illegal immigration increase the level of criminality;
- illegal immigration is usually followed by creation of ethnic communities with significant ethnical and cultural distance from the local population that prevents them from integration into the receiving society. This may result in social and ethnical tension, strengthening of extremist nationalist tendencies;
- illegal migration can also generate xenophobic sentiments directed not only at migrants with irregular status, but also at regular migrants, refugees and ethnic minorities, that may lead to the social split;
- illegal migration is the main factor for ultra-right parties to win on the elections;
- social exclusion of illegal migrants from receiving society, forming of separate zones for migrants where they live according to their ethnic-based norms and values (ethnical enclaves) that is making integration of immigrants into the host society difficult or even impossible;
- in case of unfavorable development (prolonged accumulation of illegal immigrants) the situation can go out of control in some regions of country.

Such combination of factors is the reason for growth of problems related to illegal migration and illegal employment of foreigners. The situation is redoubled with criminal groups’ activities. They ‘assist’ illegal immigrants to get job in the shadow sector or clandestine industries, or use them for executing risky crimes. In fact, they sustain growth of the global scale of illegal immigration despite declared counter-irregular migration strategies in most receiving countries.

Illegal Immigration and State Migration Policy

In general, according to the state immigration policy the following measures against illegal forms of immigration can be taken: prevention (by information campaigns and special services for potential migrants); enhancement of border control; punishment of human traffickers and smugglers; strict sanctions against employers who hire migrants illegally; development of international cooperation between countries of destination, origin and transit in the field. There are exceptions when such immigrants can be legalized as well; however, it is possible only in definite cases and for particular reasons according to international law. At the same time, when arranging struggle against illegal immigration it is important to maintain confidence in asylum granting systems and in common migration channels as a whole.

In the recent years, governments in many countries, including Russia, were toughening up immigration policy. In the face of increasing international
terrorism threat, the following aspects take on priority significance: immigration control; intensification of migrants’ filtration according to national security requirements; toughening up measures against illegal immigration.

Strict laws against illegal immigration and against hiring illegal immigrants have passed lately almost in all developed countries: in 1986, 1990 and 2007 in the United States, in 1988–1990 – in Italy and Spain, in 1999 – in the United Kingdom, in 2002 – in Germany, etc.

Measures to reduce illegal immigration are introduced in the following main directions:

- *prevention of illegal immigration*. Information campaigns in the press, on television and radio in the main emigration countries, clarifying terms and conditions of stay and employment abroad, as well as dangers of legal immigration. With these campaigns, potential migrants in the countries of their permanent residence will be able and are expected to receive essential information on advantages of legal ways of immigration, transit and employment in the host countries. E.g., under the European Commission initiative, special information centers in the countries with the largest expected emigration flow are settled. The main function of these centers is to provide inhabitants with information on legal seasonal employment opportunities in the EU and to carry out information campaign about dangers of illegal immigration.

- *intensifying border control*. The European Commission considers that one of the key security components is effective guarding of the EU external borders. It is important not only in the context of anti-terrorism protection, but also against illegal immigration, human trafficking and organized crime as well. European borders protection agency - Frontex – is on duty to achieve this security goal;

- *suppression of criminal organizations activity*, that are engaged in illicit transit of migrants; *granting special visas* to those persons who act as witnesses against participants of such criminal groups;

- *imposing sanctions against transporters* – i.e. against transport companies bringing illegal immigrants on surface, by water or air;

- *increasing the extent of foreign citizens’ responsibility* for illegal stay in the country. Among the measures against such behavior there are administrative penalty, detention, custodial placement, deportation, interdiction or restrictions on reentering the country;

- *introducing administrative and criminal liability of employers* for hiring illegal labor force. E.g., levying delayed tax payments and social transfers of these companies, commerce licence withdrawal, shutdown, deportation expenses payment, imprisonment of directors;

- *intensifying cooperation between countries of destination of illegal immigrants*, interaction with countries of origin and transit of illegal migrants. In particular, readmission agreements are signed within the frames of this direction.
Existing laws analysis shows the dual nature of host countries’ policies against illegal immigration. On the one hand, policy on newly arriving migrants becomes more and more restrictive. On the other hand, there is legalization policy for those who arrived to the country earlier and were hired illegally. Thus, during the period from 1980 to 2005 over 25 migration amnesties took place in developed countries and more than 7 millions illegal immigrants was amnestied. It is significant that some experts oppose such campaigns as the last; in their opinion, migrants’ amnesties can only increase the scale of illegal immigration (for more details: OECD, 2000, p. 53–70).

In 2003–2005, the **Global Commission on International Migration** was launched by the United Nations Secretary-General and a number of governments. It was given the mandate to provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration and to achieve a more effective governance of it. One of the eight thematic projects was “Irregular migration, state security and human security”. This project examines the use and adequacy of different terms to be used in relation to the irregular immigration; examines the ways in which and the extent to which irregular migration constitutes a real or perceived threat to state security and sovereignty; provides an assessment of state policy and practice in relation to control of irregular migration. According to the recommendations of the Commission: border control policies should form part of a long-term approach to the issue of irregular migration that addresses the socio-economic, governance and human rights deficits that prompt people to leave their own country; states should address the conditions that promote irregular migration by providing additional opportunities for regular migration and by taking action against employers who engage migrants with irregular status; states should resolve the situation of migrants with irregular status by means of return or regularization; states must strengthen their efforts to combat the distinct criminal phenomena of migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In both cases, perpetrators must be prosecuted, the demand for exploitative services eradicated and appropriate protection and assistance provided to victims; states must respect the human rights of migrants, the institution of asylum and the principles of refugee protection (www gcim.org).

As regards situation in Russia, at the moment almost all the attention of Federal Migration Service (FMS) is concentrated on prevention of illegal immigration and struggle against it. Though, FMS is entrusted with developing and carrying out the state migratory policy. Unfortunately, it is necessary to admit that Russia has not worked out strategic vision of migration as a positive phenomenon yet. Misunderstanding of this idea leads to such an attitude of FMS heads to migration processes that is still very similar to the police one, and migration itself (both legal and illegal) is considered, first of all, as a threat to Russian national security. E.g., according to the Konstantin Romadanovsky, the FMS Director, illegal labour migration undermines competitiveness of the Russian labor market and the damage caused by illegal migrants staying in
Russia totals over 200 billion rubles a year. As a result, for over 10 years the Russian Government could not pass the State Migration Policy Concept. In the absence of such document, it is difficult to shape positive solution of illegal immigration problem.

To summarize, it is necessary to note that questions connected with illegal immigration management require complex approach. These problems should be considered in a broader context of the general immigration legislation. First of all, it should include definite juristic regulation of criteria and procedures for legal entrance to the country. This regulation should take into account the variety of modern immigration flows.

International experience of struggle against illegal immigration proves that in modern democratic societies this problem cannot be completely solved. At the same time it can be significantly reduced by encouragement of legal labor migrations.

In order to estimate illegal immigration effectively, first of all, it is essential for Russia to develop juristic base for legal immigration, extend opportunities for legal residence in the country, and simplify procedures to get work permit. On the other hand, policies on illegal migrants and employers that break the law should be toughened up.

With juristic guarantees being expanded, a part of immigrants who now prefer illegal ways of entering and staying in the country will switch to legal position. It is significant that the recent Russian legislative initiatives in the field of migration management that were put into the force in January 2007 can help this process. However, they cannot give a fundamental solution to the problem of illegal immigration as long as its advantages are evident for those who benefit from it (businessmen, employers, consumers, representatives of legal bodies, human traffickers, etc.).

References
LABOUR MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA: ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The paper intends to fill some gaps in existing investigations of irregular migration in Russia and focuses on methods to estimate numbers of irregular migrants and amounts of their remittances from Russia.

To have clear understanding of the problems related to irregular migration in Russia and methods to manage it, it is necessary to know not only total number of irregular migrants but also their structure, places of their origin, distribution over Russia, spheres and models of employment, skills level, competitiveness, demographic and educational profile, motives, integration intentions, social networks contacts, etc.

On the other hand, it is important to distinguish labour migrants from foreign residents; among irregular migrants — those who are employed and not, and their legal status. Lack of methodological basis for such an analysis prejudices representativeness of sociological surveys of irregular migrants.

There are two major paths to evaluate number of irregular migrants: first, by summarizing estimates for Russia’s migrant destination regions, second, by summarizing estimates coming from countries of origin. Both ways are defected by various methods of evaluation used in different regions and countries. These methods are of various reliability degrees that makes them hardly compatible. Besides, the estimates usually ignore composition of migrants working in Russia — by length of stay, age, family status, sphere of employment, and correspondingly, amounts of transfers. Roughly, there are three major groups of irregular migrants in Russia: (1) those who live more or less permanently with their families; they earn and spend money in Russia; (2) seasonal workers who come to Russia for 6–9 months aiming to earn and save money for their families left behind; (3) short–term migrants (petty–traders, small–scale businessmen). This classification is important to estimate amounts of migrant transfers from Russia.

The author estimates number of irregular migrants in Russia between 3.2 and 3.9 million. One third of them concentrate in Moscow Province and two autonomous regions — Khanty-Mansyiskiy and Yamalo-Nenetskiy, which are most advanced in terms of economic level and incomes in comparison to the rest of Russia.

Conditions of labour of irregular migrants in Russia, exploitation, indignity and neglect of human rights make the author speak about a new form of ‘neocolonialism’ in relation to the former Soviet republics.

The paper is rich in authors’ estimates and results of previous surveys of irregular migrants in Russia and sending countries.

The principal question of the paper is how to manage migration in such a way that makes it serve for economic and political benefits of both Russia and post-soviet sending states.
Yelena Sadovskaya

INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES IN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL OR DEVELOPMENT?

Introduction

The present paper offers the analysis of the latest trends in migration situation in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet migration context. The paper includes an estimation of the number of labor migrants in each country, and analysis of remittances and their impact on migrants’ households. The author argues that labor migration and remittances have become one of social strategies for survival in Central Asia in the 2000s, but not yet a strategy for community and national economies development.

The paper is based on the findings of the Research Project on Labor Migration in Kazakhstan implemented by the author under J. and K. McArthur Foundation grant N 04–81339–000–GSS in 2004–2005. The research has been focused on labor migration. The increasing role of remittances as well as a wider social and political impact of labor migration proved to be an important finding of this study. The full results of the research and analysis are forthcoming in a book to be published in 2006 (Sadovskaya, 2006a).

Remittances: Research Overview


The international migration has been widely studied in CIS countries (Iontsev, 1999, Ivakhnyuk, 2005, Krasinets, 1997, Ushkalov, Malakha, 1999, etc.). The role of labor migration and migrants’ earnings has also attracted scholars’ attention in various CIS countries in the 2000s. Several applied research projects have been implemented, and monographs as well as collections of articles were published under the auspices of the Independent Research Council on the CIS and Baltic States Migration Studies of IEP of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. (see, for example, Arutyunyan, 2003, Maksakova, 2003, Moshnyaga, 2001, Sadovskaya, 2001b; Zayonchkovskaya, 2001, Zayonchkovskaya, ed., 2003). Recently more attention has been given in Central Asia to studying migrants’ remittances per se (Olimova, Bosc, 2003b; Sadovskaya, Olimova, 2005a; Sadovskaya, 2006b, Sadovskaya, 2005a). However, remittances and their impact on households, communities, and national...
economies have not been studied in depth in Central Asia, and so far no representative comparative studies have been carried out in the Central Asian Republics. This paper offers analysis of these problems.

Changing Migration Trends In The Post-Soviet Space: Causes And Scale

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional structure, which evolved after the collapse of the USSR; and, in terms of migration processes, represents a common migration system. The former Soviet republics are still connected by common infrastructure, transportation and communication systems, economic, financial and sociocultural relations and human ties. The most economically advanced country, Russian Federation (RF) attracts migrants from all CIS states.

The character and size of migration movements have changed over the past 15 years: internal migration within a single (unitary) state USSR became international migration between sovereign states. Throughout the 1990s, forced migration — as a result of the «pushing» factors such as economic crisis and nation — building policies and discrimination against ethnic minorities in newly independent states — formed the bulk of the migration flow, mainly of Slavic groups, into Russia.

In the 2000s, due to favorable economic conditions (first of all, high oil prices) and relatively dynamic economic reforms, the socioeconomic situation in Russian Federation and Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) has been changing and they have become major receiving countries for labour migrants. The labour migration flows to Russia come mainly from Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, the Transcaucasian states, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Russia and Kazakhstan are also — but in a less degree — transit countries and migrant-sending countries. The native population of Central Asian countries prevails in contemporary labour emigration flows.

CIS countries have also become involved in global migration movements. In particular, Central Asian countries have become transit countries for migrants from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian countries. Often, it is not just transit labour migration, but also illegal migration into/via/from regional countries, trafficking in persons and drugs, other criminal processes, such as using international money transfer systems for illegal money laundering and financing of terrorism, threatening national and regional security.

Contemporary Migration in Central Asia: Formation of the Regional Migration Subsystem

From around 2000 onwards, Kazakhstan emerged as a receiving country, becoming a center of the subregional migration system in Central Asia, with sending countries being Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Sadovskaya, 2005b). This is caused by both the demand for labor force Kazakhstan, and the supply of excessive labor resources in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The difference in wages is also decisive in stimulating workers from labor excessive
and low wage countries to migrate to a labor scarce and higher wage country such as Kazakhstan. International labor migration in the countries like Tajikistan, which has experienced a civil war in 1991–1997 is high, and there is a number of “pushing” macroeconomic factors that are currently stimulating labor emigration from the country. International labor migration in Central Asia tends to be irregular or unregulated. (Sadovskaya, 2006a)

According to expert assessments, the number of irregular immigrants in Kazakhstan ranges from 300,000–500,000; up to 1,000,000 persons in 2004–2005. (Sadovskaya, 2006a, Sadovskaya, 2005b) Kazakhstan gets only part of its labor migration flows from the neighboring republics; major flows are directed towards Russia. According to the latest estimates by the Ministry of Interior of Kyrgyzstan, the overall number of labor emigrants from Kyrgyzstan is 500,000: 350,000 of them work in Russia and 120,000 in Kazakhstan in 2004. (www.irinnews.org). The number of labor migrants by other state authorities and experts estimates is even higher16. This translates to at least 25–35% of the economically active population in Kyrgyzstan being engaged in international labor migration (Sadovskaya, 2005b). The scale of those involved in labor migration from Tajikistan is similar: up to 25–30% of the economically active population are labor immigrants in other countries (Sadovskaya, 2005b). The number of international labor migrants in Uzbekistan has also grown rapidly over the last several years.

The Remittances in Central Asia: Types, Size, and Dynamics of Transfers

The size of remittances has considerably increased in the 2000s. There are two basic types of remittances by labor migrants: “official” and “unofficial”. Various international and national money transfer systems are used as official ways of sending money home. However, many migrants still bring money home themselves or send earned money “unofficially” via friends, relatives or an informal money transfer hawala system.

Hawala is the alternative money transfer system that has been operating parallel to the common banking system. It exists beyond or in parallel with traditional banking and financial channels. Currently, hawala is used in many countries. It differs from other money transfer systems because it is based on trust and extensive use of family connections and regional affiliations. Money transfer is carried out thanks to the ties existing between the members of the network of hawala dealers. (The hawala alternative remittance system…) In the countries like Afghanistan and Tajikistan many migrants still hand over earned money unofficially via friends, relatives or by the hawala system.

Russian Federation remains the key destination country for labor migrants from Asian countries and the main source of remittances. The amount of money transfers have increased by 4 times over the period from 1999 to 2004. The

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16 Materials of experts’ interviews conducted by the author with a standard unformalized questionnaire in Almaty and Bishkek in 2004–2005.
amount of remittances to the CIS countries comprised 64% (US$3.5 billion) in 2004 in comparison with 41% (US$543 million) in 1999, out of the total amount of remittances sent from Russia in the corresponding year. (www.cbr.ru)

According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the remittances by residents and non-residents from Kazakhstan since 2000 have been growing by 1.5-2 times annually over the subsequent five years. In 2004 remittances sent by official ways reached US$805.8 million. (http://www.nationalbank.kz).

Table 1. Dynamics of remittances of residents and non-residents to from the Republic of Kazakhstan in 200-2004 (million USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances to Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Remittances from Kazakhstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The left axis at the graph indicates quarter amounts of US$50,000. The right axis at the graph indicates year amounts of US$150,000.

The dynamics of remittances demonstrate seasonal fluctuations. They increase in the third quarter of the year, reach the peak in the fourth quarter (September — November), which is the time when labor migrants complete their jobs and get paid, and decrease in the first quarter when the migrants return to their country of origin.

For assessment of the size of remittances sent by labor migrants from Kazakhstan, a number of parameters should be taken into account such as a number of labor migrants, employment sector, level of wages, duration of the working period etc. Let us consider the ways of money transfer in particular.

According to the sociological survey\(^{17}\), 41.2% of labor migrants carry money they have earned on their own; 23.9% send it with friends; and 14.9% send it with relatives. Only 17.6% or less than one fifth of the total number regularly transfers money by post. This testifies to a great potential of the money transfer system from/to Kazakhstan. (Table 2).

\(^{17}\)Sociological survey among labor migrants in the South Region of Kazakhstan in April-May 2005. 255 persons interviewed using personal standardized questionnaire. Respondents were selected through snow-ball sampling. The sampling is targeted, homogenous. The geography of research: the cities of Alma-Ata and Chilik, localities in Chilik district of Almaty oblast, the city of Chymkent and the localities in Dzhetyssai district of Southern Kazakhstan oblast.
Table 2. How do you send remittances to your family?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Abs</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I carry it on my own</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I send it with friends</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I send it with relatives</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Union money transfer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal remittance</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t send it</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I use it to buy goods and carry them on my own</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have not sent it yet, since it’s my first visit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I send it with a special person</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know / no answer</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: respondents could choose more than one version, therefore the total percentage is more than 100%.

Taking into account all above mentioned parameters, an amount of remittances sent by labor migrants from Kazakhstan in 2004–2005 may be preliminarily estimated at US$ 0.5 up to US$1 billion annually. (Sadovskaya, 2006b, 2005c).

Kyrgyzstan so far lacks accurate statistics of remittances, but the first preliminary evaluation of remittances sent by Kyrgyz nationals working abroad was more than US$120 mln in 2003.

According to the National Bank of Kazakhstan data, residents and non-residents transferred US$774,000 from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan in 2004. However, the authors’ field study has shown that even semi-skilled Kyrgyz workers earn US$800 – US$1,500 each for one season on tobacco plantations in Alma-Ata Region. Research has demonstrated that most migrants send the earned money by ‘unofficial’ channels, i.e. via relatives, acquaintances, train and flight attendants, or carrying themselves. Using the data on official transfers and evaluating the amount of money sent via unofficial channels, a preliminary evaluation can be made that in 2005 at least US$500 million was sent by migrants to Kyrgyzstan from Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries.

According to the National Bank of Tajikistan, the remittances to this country reached US$260 million in 2004. The amount of remittances sent to these two countries — Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, therefore comprises more than 25% of GNI (Sadovskaya, 2006b). Concerning Uzbekistan, experts estimate the volume of income from migration in 2003, including remittances, independently–brought money and imported goods, at least US$400 million. Majority of migrants from Uzbekistan bring money themselves, or send money with relatives or friends. Labor migrants also bring to Uzbekistan expensive household (electric) appliances, clothes, footwear and other goods, usually for private use by families, and rarely for sale. (Center for Human Resources Development, 2004, p. 31).
Labour Migrants’ Remittances:  
a Strategy for Survival for Migrants Households

Migrants’ remittances and their impact on increasing living standards is the first and most important outcome of international labour migration. The survey on spending remittances in the households of migrants from Central Asian Republics demonstrated that “migradollars” earned abroad are spent mainly on food (55.7%) and clothing (47.2%). 30.3% of respondents reported that the money they earned only provides them with the living essentials. 22.5% of respondents said the earnings helped them pay for medicines and medical treatment and 25.5% of respondents said they financially supported their parents and children.

The spending of migrants’ remittances differs from country to country. Lower-income migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan spend the money for daily living needs. Migrants from Tajikistan who have been working in Kazakhstan for many years (71% of the Tajik respondents have been international migrants for more than 5 years), provide material assistance to relatives (47.1%), pay for medical services (35.3%), and purchase more expensive goods. The share of respondents who invest into the education of their kids, especially girls, is relatively small.

Research has demonstrated that remittances are predominantly used for purchasing consumer goods in migrant households, and in a lesser degree for paying for the health services and education. The positive impact of labor migration includes accumulation of initial capital for starting up a new business by some of migrants, and improvement of migrants’ qualifications which consequently increases the quality of the labor force in the countries of origin.

International labour migration of the 2000s has played a positive stabilizing role preventing social and political tensions and conflicts in both receiving and sending countries. To give only one example, today money earned by Uzbek migrants in Kazakhstan helps hundreds of thousands of households to survive in poor agrarian regions of the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. Emigration of the excessive labour force mitigates the situation in the local labour markets, preventing social tension and unrest.

However, labour migration, especially irregular one, has a negative impact as well. The “economic benefit” received by employers by illegal employment of migrant workers is that cheap workforce is used which does not require any social expenses. Migrant workers, thousands getting a relatively small amount of money, do not pay taxes, and there is economic damage to the state resulting from non-payment of taxes to the national budget (the overall figure of taxes evaded is high given the entire number of migrant workers); capital and workforce flow into the “shadow” economy.

Since labour migration into / via / from Central Asian countries has recently acquired international status, violation of the migrants’ rights is widely spread. Unregistered migrant workers suffer from exploitation, low wages and lack of proper working conditions and social protection.
Sending countries witness negative demographic consequences of long-term labour migrations since males, who are the heads of households, are usually the main migrants. Brain drain has a negative impact on national economies in the long-term perspective.

Remittances for Community and National Economies Development: a Goal for the Future

Research demonstrated that international labour migration and remittances become a strategy for survival for migrants’ households in the republics of Central Asia. The remittances are used for purchasing consumer goods in migrants’ households, however they are rarely used for starting small or medium business, and investing into community re / construction or other local social and economic needs. Improvement in living standards of migrants’ households is the most obvious positive effect of labor migration, and has a prospect of making a further social and political impact and becoming a strategy for development.

Remittances serve as an important contribution to reducing poverty in the sending countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with poverty rates at 44.4% and 60% respectively at the beginning of 2000s, according to UNDP. They play a positive sociopolitical role, contributing stability in the communities in the countries of origin and destination and in the region as a whole.

Remittances comprise the bulk of GNI — 25% and higher — in receiving countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and surpass annual Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance in these countries.

It is crucial therefore that the governments in sending countries regulate labor migration by developing a system that would allow using remittances for development purposes. The migrants should be encouraged to invest in small and medium business, and into social and economic projects in local communities.

Labor migration flows in Central Asia tend to increase and so do the remittances, therefore using them for community development rather than for individual or household consumption should become a new and important direction of activities for the Central Asian governments. In order to develop programs that would channel remittances to development in sending and receiving countries, further research is needed into the amount of remittances, the money transfers, and the role the remittances play in migrant households and communities.

International labour migration and remittances is a global trend. Central Asian Republics must develop their policies and legislation so that migration could serve the purpose of sustainable development in both receiving and sending countries.
References

Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium.


Ronald Skeldon

MIGRATION AND POVERTY

Migration and Poverty: Ambivalent Relationships

Migration can both cause and be caused by poverty. Similarly, poverty can be alleviated as well as exacerbated by population movement. Easy generalizations are impossible to make but it is likely that the relative impact of migration on poverty, and of poverty on migration, varies by level of development of the area under consideration. In some parts of the world and under certain conditions, poverty may be a root cause of migration, whereas in other parts, under different conditions, the poor will be among the last to move. Equally, in some areas, migration may be an avenue out of poverty while in others it contributes to an extension of poverty. As the majority of the very poorest countries in the world are to be found in sub-Saharan Africa, it appears likely that the relations between migration and poverty there will be different from those among the more dynamic economies of eastern Asia. As a working hypothesis, it can be proposed that poverty is more a root cause of population movement in sub-Saharan Africa, where migration is often central to survival, than in eastern Asia where migration is more for human betterment. However, here again the danger of overgeneralization looms large as there are important variations in such vast and diverse regions as sub-Saharan Africa and eastern Asia. Differences between Lao PDR and Taiwan Province of China and between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Congo make any attempts at regional generalization fraught with difficulty. This paper will focus primarily on the situation in Asia and the Pacific.

The situation is made complex because both terms, «migration» and «poverty», are difficult semantically: both are intuitively obvious but, in practice, have proved notoriously difficult to define and to measure accurately. In this paper, all forms of human population movement will be considered under «migration», although «population mobility» might be a more appropriate term: that is, both internal and international migrations and both short-term circular movements as well as more permanent migration will be included in the discussion. Under «poverty» a distinction between chronic, absolute poverty on the one hand and the more perceptual «relative deprivation» on the other will be drawn.

In the countries of Asia and the Pacific during the 1990s, poverty appears to have declined in Bangladesh, India, China, the Philippines and Thailand but increased in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and throughout the new republics of Central Asia (table 1). Little change in poverty levels in Indonesia and Nepal could be discerned over the same period. However, the figures for China, in particular,

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need to be taken with a great deal of caution. It is known that the restructuring has brought about the loss of large numbers of jobs in the state sector, a trend that can only continue after that country's accession to the World Trade Organization. For example, some 26 million workers have been laid off from state enterprises since 1998 and the real rate of unemployment in 2002 may be in excess of 20 per cent in some sectors\(^2\).

Uncertain though many of the estimates of unemployment may be, these pale in comparison with the difficulties inherent in the measurement of migration. Available data on international migration suggest that population movement is likely to have increased from all the economies under consideration (table 2). However, in several cases these figures either omit or severely underestimate the number of undocumented migrants. Any estimates of the numbers of undocumented migrants are likely to be suspect to some degree simply by the nature of the phenomenon. These may be based on the number of apprehensions on attempted entry or on arrests in country, with assumptions made on the number of those eluding the official net. For some countries, the number of undocumented migrants is substantial. For example, some 2.1 million illegal entrants to Malaysia were apprehended between 1992 and 2000 (Hugo, 2002, p. 14) and estimates of the stock of undocumented migrants in that country before the 1997 financial crisis ranged up to 1.43 million (ILO, 1998). The vast majority of these migrants came from neighbouring Indonesia.

Even more difficult is the estimation of the number of internal migrants. Data for the number of movers in Thailand, where poverty levels declined markedly during the 1990s, even taking into account the impact of the 1997 financial crisis, suggest that migration might actually have slowed in the 1990s. Preliminary figures from the 2000 census indicate that the proportion of the population which had moved in the 5 years before the census was lower than in 1990, or 13.9 per cent in 2000 compared with 16.8 in 1990 (Thailand, 2002). To draw the conclusion that a relative reduction in mobility might be conducive to a reduction in poverty would be deceptive, if not just wrong. First, it is well recognized that the population census only captures a part of total population movement, omitting most circulation and short-term migration. Studies in Thailand, following the 1990 census, showed that a change in the reference period used to define a “migration” from the three months of the census to one month in the National Migration Survey of Thailand increased the numbers of migrants by over one fifth (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995). Second, and more critically, it is known that the number of poor in Thailand increased from 6.8 million at the beginning of 1997 to 7.9 million at the end of 1998. These figures represent an increase in the proportion of the total population classified as poor from 11.4 to 12.9 per cent (UNDP, 1999, p. 129). Nevertheless, it would also be deceptive to conclude that the increase in poverty as a result of the financial crisis had caused the observed decline in five-year migration. A more likely hypothesis

is that the crisis stimulated an increase in precisely the types of mobility that censuses and general surveys are least able to measure: that is, in short-term mobility as people moved to seek alternatives to loss of jobs in the urban sector or loss of markets in the rural sector. Mobility could, in those years, have increased rather than decreased and been more a survival strategy than a pathway towards better opportunity.

Thus, any attempt to draw clear relationships from existing data between volume and patterns of migration on the one hand and poverty on the other, is likely to be problematic. This paper can only seek to raise in very broad relief the likely scenarios that are the result of poverty influencing migration and vice versa. Many of the points raised below are to be considered hypotheses requiring rigorous testing rather than statements of fact. Our empirical base and the ambivalent nature of the relationships between migration and poverty do not yet allow a more complete analysis.

**Poverty as a root cause of migration**

Migration is often seen simply as a flight from poverty: there are no opportunities available locally so people migrate in order to survive. Flight from a devastating famine would appear to be the classic example of this type of relationship, well illustrated by pictures in the media of emaciated people who have walked great distances to reach feeding stations run by international agencies and charities. Unequivocally, such cases exist but these are generally restricted to the poorest parts of the world, and primarily to parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In Asia, such cases, although still found in pockets across that vast area, have become less common given the rapid economic development over the last half of the twentieth century. Examples within living memory include the “Great Hunger” in China, 1959–1960, when millions moved in desperate attempts to find food, although millions more were prevented from moving by the authorities. The real impact of this last great famine in China on population migration has yet to be reported, although general discussions are included in Becker (1996) and Banister (1987). Other, more limited but more recent examples can be found in South Asia such as Orissa in India in 2001.

The survival migration of the poorest is likely to be mainly local, or regional at most, and primarily within country. In apparent contradiction to the logic of survival migration, the general finding of most studies of migration in non-disaster situations is that it is not the poorest who move but those with access to some resources, no matter how meagre these might appear. Migration always involves some costs of transportation and the abandonment of many of the few possessions the poor might have. The poorest of the poor cannot afford either risk or movement and the majority starves in situ. Even in the Great Famine in Ireland 1845-50, it was rarely the poorest who emigrated to North America. The more able-bodied among them could perhaps reach Britain but many of the rest perished. Emigration rates from the hardest-hit counties were often significantly less than from those counties not so affected (see Miller, 1985).
In a different continent in a different era, the majority of those who fled from China to Hong Kong after the victory of the communist forces in 1949 might have had a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” (the definition of a refugee) but over half claimed that they had moved for “economic reasons” (Hambro, 1955). They were not among the poorest in China at the time. This discussion is not to deny that poverty is an important cause of migration but to suggest that there are other factors at work. Except in particular areas and at particular times, it is not absolute poverty as such that is significant in accounting for migration but whether people feel that they are poor.

**Migration as the result of poverty**

Poverty as the root cause of migration and migration as the result of poverty might suggest the same thing but there are significant differences. Migration as the result of poverty shifts the focus to the issue of feeling poor: relative rather than absolute deprivation. Migration, either of outsiders into a community, or of natives going outside their community, establishes linkages between origins and destinations. These linkages spread knowledge about conditions in a wider world that can transform communities from conditions of «subsistence affluence» (Sahlins, 1974) to those of relative deprivation without any significant real change in the quantity of subsistence in the community. What changes is the less tangible quality of life when the number of potential migrants increases as a consequence of community members beginning to judge their own conditions relative to those of people living elsewhere. Thus, migration creates the conditions that lead to people feeling themselves to be poor, which in turn leads to further migration as they move in order to satisfy new–found aspirations. This process is perhaps at the root of most migration, giving the impression that poverty is the driving force but in reality is the product of a desire to better oneself against new standards rather than the result of absolute deprivation. Migration is thus both the creator and the product of poverty.

Most of those who can respond to the information coming into any community are the more innovative, the better–off and the better educated even if these qualities themselves are relative. In an isolated rural community, for example, the better educated might be those with just the most basic primary education among the many with no formal education at all. Migrants need not always, or even generally, respond to information coming into a community: they may be selected by labour recruiters or other representatives of an expansionary urban-based group. Again, recruiters are unlikely to select the weakest or poorest members of any group. Migrants are either a selected or self-selected group within any population. Thus, the general conclusion is that migrants from any community, and particularly the initial migrants, are among the most innovative and dynamic members of that community (see Skeldon, 1990). Whether their loss can contribute to poverty creation will be considered in a later section.
Migration as a Cause of Poverty

Nevertheless, there are ways in which migration can lead directly to an increase in the number of absolute poor. The clearest way is through forced relocation without adequate planning and support. In many cases, the forced relocation is essentially the product of development, mainly through the creation of lakes and reservoirs that are the result of the construction of dams, although displacement for roads and urban expansion is also important. For example, worldwide, it is estimated that between 90 and 100 million people were involuntarily displaced by infrastructural development projects during the last decade of the twentieth century (Cernea and McDowell, 2000, p. 2). In India alone, some 20 million people are estimated to have been displaced over about 40 years, the majority of whom became impoverished (Cernea, 2000, p. 12) while in China over a similar period, well over 30 million were displaced (Meikle and Zhu, 2000, p. 128). The Three Gorges Project, currently under construction on the Yangtze, is estimated to displace well over a million people.

Perhaps the key difference separating forced population displacement due to development policy from other types of migration is that the numbers moving and the timing of the movements are known. Thus, if poverty is indeed the result of the forced migration it is the fault of inadequate planning rather than of the movement itself. There is no necessary reason that the migration must lead to an extension of poverty although this often appears to be the result. There can be little excuse for a lack of adequate reconstruction and this particular relationship between migration and poverty appears to be one that is ideally suited to effective policy intervention.

A more difficult dimension of migration leading to an extension of poverty relates to the loss of innovative and educated community members: in essence, a “brain drain” whether at national or village levels. It has proven singularly difficult to demonstrate empirically a fall in macro-level economic indicators in the face of a marked exodus of the educated at the national level. Equally, the evidence for a decline in either agricultural production or productivity upon rural-to-urban migration at the village level is elusive. Much of the difficulty is derived from the fact that much of the migration may be circular in nature. Both the educated at the national level, and workers moving from village to town, either return at a later stage, or move to extend the resource base of their families by incorporating new resources elsewhere.

The so-called “brain drain” argument is difficult to sustain at the macro-level in East Asia. Tens of thousands of students left Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong for study overseas from the 1960s at precisely the time that these economies began to grow rapidly (Skeldon, 1997a, p. 108–115). It is difficult to see that these economies could have grown even faster than they did if the students had stayed home. Over time, increasing numbers returned and there clearly was a “brain drain” rather than a brain drain in these economies. This scenario, however, need not necessarily apply more
generally. The loss of relatively small numbers of the educated from marginal economies such as many in sub-Saharan Africa may indeed contribute to slower or even declining growth. Ghana, for example, has lost 60 per cent of the doctors trained in the 1980s and a total of about 60,000 highly skilled workers are reputed to have fled African economies during the last half of the 1980s (Harris, 2002, p. 87). The loss of large number of Russian technicians may also be a significant factor in the rising poverty observed in the Central Asian republics. While the assessment of the impact of the loss of the highly educated and skilled needs to be carried out on a region by region basis, a critical factor will always be whether there is something for the educated to return to in their economies of origin. Where there is little to return to, a brain drain is more likely to occur, but where origin economies are more dynamic, a brain gain may be the result.

At the local level, assessments of the impact of outmigration on production are equally problematic although few studies support the idea that there is a negative impact on farm production (Simmons, 1984, p. 171). An assessment in China has shown that the loss of labour due to outmigration can have a negative impact on income from cropping but has no impact on crop yields (de Brauw, Taylor and Rozelle, 2001). Where the impacts become intense in marginal areas and migration develops to such an extent that the reproductive capacity of a village is eroded, leading to ageing and declining populations, then pockets of deprivation may emerge even in the most developed societies. For example, the severely depopulating areas (kaso) in Japan present a challenge to policy makers to supply adequate services to ageing populations. Agricultural income in these areas was 70 per cent of the national average in the mid-1990s and they covered almost half of the total land area of the country but represented but 6.3 per cent of the total population (Skeldon, 2001, p. 46). In poorer economies, those left behind may be those most likely to experience «chronic poverty» (Kothari, 2002) with poverty thus a residual of migration.

Finally, in this section is the question whether migration concentrates the poor in destination areas, and primarily in the largest metropolitan centres of the developing world. Even if it is not the poorest who migrate from the villages, relative to city people in destination areas they are often poor and their concentration may be a drag on development. Here again, the evidence to support the apparent logic of this statement is far from conclusive. There is little evidence to suggest that migrants are over-represented among the urban poor, with migrants tending to have higher labour force participation rates than native-born in cities in the developing world. This statement should certainly not imply that the living conditions of all migrants in towns is satisfactory or that they do not appear among the ranks of the urban poor. Many of the occupations filled by migrants, and particularly those undertaken by poorly educated migrant women, are badly paid, insecure and often require work under appalling conditions. However, given that migration is generally not the principal component of urban growth in the developing world (natural increase is usually more important), and that migrants have higher rates of employment than the local urban-born, the
Poverty Alleviated by Migration

Implicit in much of the discussion thus far has been an underlying assumption that the relationship between migration and poverty should in some way be negative. Either that migration was the result of deprivation or that migration should lead to the impoverishment of certain areas. While these statements cannot be discounted in every case, there is a lack of empirical data to support them as general conclusions. The weight of the evidence provides support for a very different conclusion: that the movement of population can be a significant factor for the alleviation of poverty. The principal reason lies in the nature of the migration process itself. Migrants rarely move simply from A to B but their movement is a complex system of circulation between two, or among several, destinations. Also, migrants are rarely individuals operating in a social vacuum but are meshed into family, household and community networks. Migrants, rather than individual income maximizers, can be conceptualized as existing within a communal risk-minimizing strategy. Such an interpretation falls within the so-called “new home economics” approach to theories of migration (see, for example, Massey et al., 1993; Stark, 1991).

Migration can therefore be seen as a system linking origins and destinations in which flow not just people, but also money and goods. The incorporation of new destinations broadens the resource base of a household, perhaps allowing a more optimal deployment of labour as those underemployed during the slack part of the agricultural cycle can find work on plantation or in town. Gender differences can become important. In areas where males undertake most of the agricultural work, as in Latin America, for example, women can be released from rural households to access off-farm activities in town, and vice versa in areas where women dominate labour input into agriculture as in much of Africa. The diversification of resource base, labour input and gender role can all act to alleviate poverty where households are dependent upon a single resource at one location. In such diversification, however, there is always the possibility of the exploitation of migrants at destinations and the social disruption that can ensue upon separation of family members. These negative consequences need to be balanced against possible improvement in status of migrants who may acquire skills or pursue education at destinations. Here, in particular, there appear significant gender issues as women, by absenting themselves even temporarily from patriarchal structures, can improve their status (see Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). Temporary absences of men, by thrusting the women left behind into positions of responsibility to run the households, can also elevate their status and, indirectly or directly, reduce the incidence of deprivation.

Where the migration is essentially circular in nature, it is likely to be a support for the communities of origin but when migrants begin to spend longer away from home, over the long term, the outmigration may eventually act to
undermine the demographic and economic viability of the community. The resultant transformation need not necessarily imply an extension of poverty as more capital-intensive forms of economy may emerge. Even when migrants spend longer at destinations, they rarely cut off relations with their areas of origin: they go back at regular intervals and they send goods and money to relatives in their home country, village or town which introduces the critical issue of remittances.

Like so many components of migration and poverty, remittances are notoriously difficult to measure accurately. Unless specialized surveys are undertaken, estimates of the amounts of money and goods remitted by internal migrants within a country are impossible to make. While there are estimates of the volume of flows remitted by international migrants, it is recognized that these capture only those that flow through official channels: much is transmitted through informal channels through relatives or when the migrants return. What is indisputable is that the volume and importance of these flows are vast. In 1990, it was estimated that the observable volume of global remittances was $US 71.1 billion per annum, making it second only to oil in terms of value in international trade (Russell, 1992). Considering the global flows from developed to less developed countries only, the volume probably doubled from about $US30 billion in the late 1980s to more than $US60 billion a decade later (Martin and Widgren, 2002).

In Asia, the Philippines is the country of emigration par excellence with some 7 million Filipinos from a resident population of 78.7 million in mid-1992 living or working overseas. In 2000 alone, more than 800,000 workers were deployed overseas with more than $US6 billion in foreign exchange remitted back to the Philippines (Go, 2002). Remittances from overseas workers are also important for many other labour exporters such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. For the Pakistan of the mid-1980s, they represented about 9 per cent of GDP and were “an important factor in allowing Pakistan to sustain the highest growth on the South Asian subcontinent through most of the 1970s and 1980s” (Addleton, 1992, p. 123). In the state of Kerala in the 1990s, remittances accounted for 21 per cent of state income (Kannan and Hari, 2002, p. 200). Even Viet Nam, a relatively recent entrant into regional and global labour markets, had around 300,000 workers overseas in 2000, who were remitting some $US1.25 billion annually (Nguyen, 2002).

Although the important dimension of foreign exchange earnings is missing in remittances from internal migrants, these, too, are significant for communities of origin. The data from the National Migration Survey of Thailand showed that over one quarter of outmigrants had sent money or goods back to their households of origin during the 12 months prior to the survey (Osaki, 2002). The data also showed that the proportion remitting tended to increase with time spent away from home and that one third of those who had been away for more than 10 years were still sending money back home. Given that the number of internal migrants in any country vastly exceeds any numbers going overseas, the volume of money sent back to the rural sector from cities in the developing world is likely to be significant, even if amounts sent by overseas migrants are likely to be
greater on a per capita basis simply because, on average, they earn more. In China, studies suggest that households that send out internal migrants are able to increase the per capita income of those left behind by between 14 and 30 per cent (de Brauw, Taylor and Rozelle, 2001, p. 20).

More important than the actual amounts, however, are the uses to which the monies are put and the impact that the remittances are likely to have on the areas of origin of migration. Perhaps the critical issue in the migration and poverty equation is whether remittances can help to alleviate poverty. One perspective is that remittances tend to be used for conspicuous consumption rather than investment: for house construction or the sponsoring of weddings, and the like, rather than in improvements that are likely to lead to increasing agricultural productivity. A common use of remittances, nevertheless, is also to pay for the education of the next generation and that does appear to be a clear investment strategy.

However, a clear distinction between investment and consumption may be difficult to maintain in the context of the use of remittances. Expenditure on house construction, for example, can stimulate local building enterprise, thus generating employment and trade in materials. Even something as apparent an example of conspicuous consumption as wedding feasts generate demand for local foods, support local musicians, and so on. Spending money on a wedding is, in fact, one of the most important investments villagers can make to ensure the continuity of their community. Such investments may be critical in providing support for communities in more isolated areas where the state is either weak or has few resources available for investment. Thus, there are important indirect effects of remittance money in the villages. The general conclusion from studies of the use of remittances is that migrants tend to use their wealth wisely and the benefits appear to more than counterbalance costs (see, for example, Gunatilleke, 1986).

More difficult to assess is the impact of remittances on inequality. Given that those who move tend to be from the wealthier families in any community, the remittances logically flow back to those families exacerbating or at least reinforcing existing inequalities. Poverty can be measured by the proportion of wealth controlled by the various quintiles in any population and if the upper 20 per cent are increasing their “share” as a result of migration, and the lowest fifth decreasing their share, it could be argued that migration was indeed contributing to the intensification of poverty in a society. Yet again, the evidence is contradictory. In Pakistan, although inequalities increased between migrant and non-migrant households, the distribution of remittances appears to have spread benefits to a greater range of groups and areas that could effectively “undermine the centre” of traditional power (Addleton, 1992). Migration flows do tend to be generated out of specific “niches” or areas of origin. Hence certain micro-regions may benefit relative to those areas that send relatively few migrants, increasing regional as well as social inequalities (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung 2002). Nevertheless, data from Thailand show that though the per capita amount of remittances to poor households may be much less than to wealthier families, they have a much greater relative impact and help to alleviate poverty (Osaki, 2002).
Thus, migration may help to reduce absolute poverty among some while simultaneously acting to increase feelings of relative deprivation among others. Overall, people may be better fed as a result of migration but the feelings of deprivation may generate resentment. Migration has been shown to be a significant component in the development of particular social and revolutionary movements, a theme that remains under-researched (Skeldon, 1987). The results of those movements have led in the past to destruction that has extended poverty on a massive scale.

The final issue related to migration as a factor in the alleviation of poverty, and one that returns the debate to the macro-level, emerges from the nature of the migrants arriving at destinations, both domestic and international. It has been emphasized that migrants tend to be among the more innovative and better-educated members of any population. A small number of migrants are traders and entrepreneurs who are the brokers of economic exchange generating wealth not only for themselves but employment for locals at origins and destinations that can help to generate prosperity. Entrepreneurship, often associated with particular ethnic groups, the Chinese or the Jews, for example, is perhaps more a function of situations and linkages that are the result of migration than of particular ethnic characteristics. Entrepreneurs are the minority among the migrants, the “essential outsiders” (Chirot and Reid, 1997) who generate capital accumulation. Migration, both internal and international, is thus an integral part of the whole process of economic development which must underlie any attempt to alleviate poverty.

Conclusion: Policy Dilemmas

This discussion should have revealed the complexity of the relationship between migration and poverty. In most areas migration appears, on balance, to bring an improved probability of survival and often an alleviation of poverty. At the same time, exploitation and disruption can be an integral part of the transformations associated with the population movement. Amid the uncertainty of outcome, several policy-relevant propositions can be advanced. First, constant attention needs to be directed towards the protection of migrants, both male and female. Second, migration is not a new phenomenon even if there are certain novel aspects about the current situation: it has characterized all societies at all times. Thus, migration is not suddenly going to stop and cease being a characteristic. Governments need to learn to plan for it and attempts to control population movements within countries have invariably met with a distinct lack of success over anything but the immediate short term. Attempts to control movements across international borders have met with greater success but at huge cost both financially and often socially and politically. The issues of border control remain beyond the limits of this paper but policy makers need to address whether the restriction of movement is in the best interests of their own population as well as the populations of origin areas.

The weight of the evidence is that mobility enhances economic growth and improves the lot of most, but not all, of the population. Generally, spatially static
populations are likely to be economically stagnant populations. A paper presented by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to the Earth Summit 2002 argued that if the European Union, Canada, Japan and the United States allowed migrants to make up just 4 per cent of their labour force, the returns to origin areas could be in the region of $US160–200 billion a year, a sum far greater than any potential debt relief (cited in *The Guardian*, 26 August 2002). Migration may not be able to eradicate all types of poverty, and may even exacerbate some, but the alternative of attempting to limit or restrict migration is likely to be much less productive. The words of John Kenneth Galbraith appear to capture the essence of the whole relationship: “Migration is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It is good for the country to which they go; it helps to break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come. What is the perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good?” (cited in Harris, 2002, p. 119)

However, it is important to recognize that migration can involve costs, economic and social, as well as benefits. The challenge to policy makers is to facilitate the types of movement that are most likely to lead to an alleviation of poverty while protecting migrants from abuse and exploitation. This paper has attempted to draw attention to the range of possible outcomes. It is likely that the relationship between migration and poverty will be different in the dynamic economies of East Asia, for example, than in the more stagnant economies of sub-Saharan Africa. Within regions and within countries, there will also be variations. There can be no universal policy recommendation just as there is no single and simple inter-relationship between migration and poverty. While accepting a variety of outcome, this writer stands by a generalization made earlier that (Skeldon, 1997b, p. 3). More recent work of others appears to advocate similar approaches (see, for example, de Haan, 2002; Kothari, 2002), yet the immediate challenge remains the need to incorporate an appreciation of the potentially positive role of migration in poverty reduction programmes.

**References**


Table 1. Estimates of poverty in selected countries in the Asia-Pacific region, 1990–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>59.0</td>
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<td>83.0</td>
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Table 2. Official estimates of total number of foreign workers in selected Asian economies, 1996-2001

<table>
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<td>180,600</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ¹ Includes an estimate of foreign domestic workers only; there are no stock figures for the highly skilled; ² Includes estimates of undocumented workers; ³ Estimate of foreign experts only, primarily professionals, the highly skilled and teachers.

Source: Country papers presented at the Workshop on International Migration and Labour Market in Asia, Tokyo, Japan Institute of Labor and OECD, 4-5 February 2002.

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Northern regions of the Russian Federation were inhabited and developed mostly by means of state migration policy that has been encouraging resettlement of population by means of economic and administrative instruments. As a result, mining and fishing industries were developed in the regions bordering upon the Arctic seas. Fish-processing factories were producing fish products both to the national market and for export. Research institutes in the field developed new technologies, equipment and machinery.

After market-oriented reforms in Russia started in the early 1990s, new owners of privatized mining and fishing enterprises have made their choice in favor of exports of raw materials for higher export prices rather than process them locally. So, raw fish or raw wood from Russia flowed away to Norway, China and other countries and encouraged processing and manufacturing industries there. Simultaneously, research activities in the field were frozen resulting in rapid outdated of equipment in the factories and giving researchers no way out but to seek for jobs in other countries.

As an example, the author calculates that between 1992 and 2003 about 3,000 workers have lost their jobs in the fish-processing industry in Murmanskaya Province due to re-orientation of raw fish got out from Northern seas from Russian fish-processing factories to the factories in Norway and Sweden. Unemployed skilled workers of fish-processing industry moved away from Russia, “following raw fish”.

International cooperation projects on gas mining-transportation-liquation between the North European countries including Russia (Barents-Region) is a good example of how agreements on labour supply necessarily add to import-export agreements and provide new enterprises with skilled labour. Russia participates in these projects with its gas, technologies, and manpower.

On the other side, the Russian government policy can contribute to lessening unemployment in mining and fishing industries by long-term program aimed at reducing exports of raw materials (e.g. raw fish and raw timber) and encouragement of exports of manufactured goods instead, by using market mechanisms. Such strategy correlates with Russia’s long-term interests to diversify its export and lessen its dependency on incomes from oil/gas supplies.
According to our estimates, between 1970 and 2003 about 1.85 million (ex-) Soviet Jews and their relatives emigrated to countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU). Most of this movement (more than 1.1 million, or approximately 60 percent) was directed toward Israel. However, not all of these immigrants remain there. Of all FSU immigrants who came to Israel since 1990, by the start of 2003 the registered number of those who left Israel for more than one year and had not returned to the country was 58,400 (6%) (Tolts, 2003a, p.89).

Clearly this migration movement included a lot of people who had previously neither identified themselves as Jews, nor had they been seen by FSU authorities as such. Thus, estimating the size and worldwide distribution of the “core” Jewish population originating in the FSU is a rather complicated task.

Basis of the Estimate

Data on Jews from the Soviet censuses are based entirely on self-declaration of the respondents, who are regarded as “a good example of a large and empirically measured core Jewish population in the Diaspora”. (Schmeltz, 1995, p.481). Not only did the censuses not require documentary evidence for answers to any question, but in regard to ethnicity the census takers were explicitly given instructions that this was to be determined solely by the person polled — without any corroboration, and most scholars agree that the Soviet census figures on Jews (adults only) were very similar to the “legal” ethnicity as recorded in internal passports (see, e.g. Altshuler, 1987, p. 21–24; Gitelman, 1994, p.40).

The “core” Jewish population is the aggregate of all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews or, in the case of children, are identified as such by their parents. It does not include persons of Jewish origin who report another ethnicity in the censuses. A broader definition, that of the “enlarged” Jewish population, can also be empirically measured and includes Jews along with their non-Jewish household members (see DellaPergola, 2002, p. 807–808). In the

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1 This paper is part of a broader research project being carried out by the author at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Some sections are based on adaptations and updatings of Tolts 2004. I wish to express my appreciation to Sergio DellaPergola for his general advice. I am grateful to Evgueni Andreev, Robert J. Brym, Rafi Pizov, and Emma Trahtenberg for providing materials, information, and suggestions. I also wish to thank Judith Even for reading and editing an earlier draft. Responsibility for the content of the article is, of course, the author’s alone.

2 For children ethnicity was determined by parents. For more on ethnic counting in Soviet censuses, see, e.g.: Silver 1986, p. 70-97; Bondarskaya 1993, p.333-361.
Russian Federation this group is significantly larger than the “core” Jewish population, and the ratio between them is growing. It was estimated that the ratio of “enlarged” to “core” Jewish population was 1.5 to 1 in the late 1970s, 1.6 to 1 in the late 1980s and, based on the data of the 1994 Russian micro-census, 1.8 to 1. (Tolts, 2001, p. 112). However, even the “enlarged” Jewish population is smaller than the total population entitled to immigrate to Israel (aliyah) according to the Israeli Law of Return (this includes Jews, their children and grandchildren, and all respective spouses).

Although individuals of Jewish parentage who adopted another religion are in theory excluded from the “core” Jewish population, there is no relevant statistical information on such people in most of the FSU countries. At the same time, we know that a number of cases of conversion have been documented in special religious studies (See, e.g.: Deutsch, 2004). Moreover, in Russia and Ukraine a sampling of the Jewish population found that over 10% see Christianity as most attractive (Gitelman, 2003, p.51). It should also be mentioned that a study in St. Petersburg found that all Jews with two Jewish parents who converted to Christianity continued to identify themselves ethnically as Jews (Wiener, 2004, p. 196). Thus, because our estimates of the “core” Jewish population are based on census data, Russian/FSU numbers of this Jewish population category are obviously somewhat overstated.

According to the 1970 Soviet census, at the outset of mass Jewish emigration there were about 2.15 million “core” Jews in the Soviet Union. This figure has been used as the basis of our estimates.

Two Main Factors of the Dynamics

To evaluate any subsequent dynamics we must first estimate the main contributing factors — the negative balance of births and deaths, and accession of people of mixed origin to the “core” Jewish population in connection with the migration. Clearly the first factor partly offsets the second. All other possible factors, including the changing of ethnic affiliation of people of mixed origin remaining in the FSU, can not compete with these two in terms of their effect. There is probably only one large group of people of mixed origin interested in ethnic affiliation with the Jews, namely those who made the decision to emigrate, particularly to Israel. These people have been leaving the FSU very rapidly and they have joined the Jewish population abroad, particularly in Israel.

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3 According to the estimate based on the 1994 Russian micro-census which included in the “enlarged” Jewish population children of mixed couples who had not identified themselves as Jews and were living separately from a Jewish parent, the ratio between the “enlarged” and “core” Jewish populations was not much higher – 1.93 to 1 (Andreev 2002, p. 148).

4 For more on the demographic aspects of the Israeli Law of Return, see: Tolts 1999, p. 6–10.

5 Even if such data were collected they cover only a minority of the Jews. For example, according to the 2000 Estonian census data, only 19.8 percent of the Jews aged 15 and older were recorded as “followers of a particular faith”; of these, 11 percent stated Judaism as their religion and more that 7.5 percent declared different branches of Christianity as their faith (Statistics Estonia 2000).
From 1970 to 2003 the negative vital balance of this population may be tentatively guesstimated at about — 0.7 million (Table 1). Between the 1970 and 1989 Soviet censuses, the recorded number of Jews in the USSR fell by about 700,000. In the same period about 291,000 Jews and their relatives emigrated from the USSR. After subtracting the latter figure from the former, we found that approximately 409,000 of the total decrease had to be attributed to the negative balance of births and deaths. Of course, not all emigrants were “core” Jews. If we conservatively assume that only 10% were non-Jews according to the criteria of the Soviet census count, we arrive at an even larger negative balance of births and deaths — 438,000.

In our earlier direct estimates for the two largest FSU countries, we suggested that the negative balances of births and deaths were about –86,000 for Ukraine in 1989–2001, and about—134,000 for the Russian Federation in 1989–2002 (Tolts, 2005, p. 23, 25). Thus, for these two FSU countries together, if we continue this calculation based on the same assumptions, we estimate the vital balance in 1989–2003 at about minus 233,000. In all other FSU countries during this period this balance was also negative. (The two exceptions were Uzbekistan, where the number of Jewish deaths exceeded the number of births to Jewish mothers for the first time in 1990, and Tadzhikistan, where this occurred in 1992.) (Tolts, 2003b, p.192).

Table 1. Dynamics of the «Core» Jewish Population Originating from the FSU, 1970–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Number, Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>«Core» Jewish population in the Soviet Union, 1970</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital balance, 1970–2003</td>
<td>–0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession of people of mixed origin to «core» Jewish population in connection with migration</td>
<td>+0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>«Core» Jewish population originating from the FSU, 2004</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * “Effectively Jewish” births minus Jewish deaths. “Effectively Jewish” births are newborns who are identified as Jews. ** Mostly in Israel; on the discrepancy between percentages of Jews among immigrants to Israel according to Russian and Israeli definitions, see Table 2.

Sources: 1970 Soviet census; author’s estimates.

Although the balance of births and deaths among FSU immigrants in Israel is positive, not all of these immigrants are Jewish. As a consequence, in 2002, for example, of the 10,596 births recorded to mothers who immigrated since 1990 from the FSU only 7,603 were to Jewish mothers. The total number of deaths among these immigrants in the same year was more than 7,000 (Israel CBS 2003.

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6 Including all destinations for those who emigrated with Israeli visas, see: Altshuler 1987, p. 62; Florsheim 1989, p. 30. For detailed data on migration of Jews and their relatives from the FSU up to 2005, see Appendix 1.
Tables 3.13 and 3.14; Sicron 2003. Table 4). At the same time, in the USA and Germany, FSU immigrants had negative balances of births and deaths, although the precise size of these balances is unknown. Since these factors partly offset each other and are surely much lower than the negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in the FSU, we shall skip them in our rough estimates.

Vital decrease was partially offset by accession of people of mixed origin to the “core” Jewish population in connection with the migration. This accession may be tentatively calculated on the basis of the discrepancy between the percentages of Jews among the immigrants to Israel according to the Russian / FSU and the Israeli definitions.

Israeli official statistics are based on the Ministry of the Interior’s Population Register file, which defines “who is a Jew” according to the halakha (Jewish religious law). At the same time, “Jews” according to the official Russian/FSU definition comprised only those emigrants (aged 16 and over) who were designated as such in their internal passports. For children, who lacked passports, ethnicity was defined on the basis of their parents’ ethnicity. If the parents belonged to different ethnic groups, preference was given to the mother’s ethnicity, although even in the post-Soviet era non-Jewish ethnic affiliation was clearly preferred by the offspring of such couples (Volkov, 1989; Tolts, 1996).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Entire FSU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rosstat data</td>
<td>Israel CBS data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>64***</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Of all emigrants to Israel whose ethnicity was known; ** Of all immigrants who entered Israel according to the Law of Return whose ethnicity / religion was known; *** Second half of the year.

Sources: Rosstat data; Israel CBS data.

One consequence of the post-Soviet Jewish vital crisis and of rising mixed marriage has been the recent pronounced decrease in the share of Jews among the FSU immigrants to Israel, according to official Israeli data: 96% in 1990, 72% in 1995, 47% in 2000 and 43% in 2002. These proportions were almost the same as
those among the immigrants from the Russian Federation\(^7\). According to official Russian data, the proportion of Jews among all those who emigrated to Israel fell from 64% in the second half of 1992 to 53% in 1995, 27% in 2000 and 23.5% in 2002 (Table 2). The different definitions of Jewishness in Israel and the FSU explain the divergence in the respective percentages\(^8\).

Obviously some of the immigrants who were considered Jews according to their former Soviet internal passports (as well as in population censuses), that is, the offspring of a Jewish male and non-Jewish female, are counted as non-Jews by Israeli statistics, which define a Jew as someone born of a Jewish mother. Nonetheless, many more immigrants are counted as Jews in Israel than were registered as such in the FSU, and many of these had never identified themselves as Jews before. Based on the data above, the number of such immigrants may be tentatively guesstimated at about 0.15 million or even more\(^9\). This recognition of the Judaism/Jewish ethnicity of some individuals who had previously neither identified themselves nor been seen by FSU authorities as Jews, somewhat moderated the decline of the «core» Jewish population originating from the FSU, and added to the Jewish population in Israel.

Thus, at the beginning of 2004, according to our guesstimates, there were about 1.6 million “core” Jews worldwide who had originated from the FSU (see Table 1).

**Distribution by Country**

According to our guesstimates, at the beginning of 2004 about one-half of these «core» Jews were living in Israel, less than one-quarter remained in the FSU, and the rest were mostly in the USA and Germany (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>less than 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>less than 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: * Including other unlisted much smaller ex-Soviet Jewish immigrant communities; for Canada, see text.

**Sources**: Table 1 of this article; author’s estimates.

In the USA their guesstimated number of 0.3 million is only a small fraction of the total «core» Jewish population, which numbered just about 5.3 million

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\(^7\) For similar data for immigrants from Ukraine to Israel in 1996-1999, see: Riss and Klopshtock 2002, p. 348–350

\(^8\) For detailed analysis of differences between Israeli and Russian statistics of aliyah, see: Tolts 2002.

\(^9\) At the same time, the role of formal conversions to Judaism in Israel was rather minor. According to the most recent data, in 2002 and 2003, only 890 and 918 FSU immigrants, respectively, underwent conversions in this country [Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv). November 22, 2004. P. 1A].
(DellaPergola 2004, p. 502). Our figure for the «core» Jewish population in the USA originating from the FSU corresponded fairly closely to the number (252,000) of FSU «core» Jewish adult immigrants who arrived since 1970 and were registered in the National Jewish Population Survey in 2000–2001 (NJPS)\(^\text{10}\). After September 11, 2001, the USA ceased to be a major destination for post-Soviet Jewish emigration and, in 2002 and 2003, only about 2,500 and 1,600, respectively, were recorded as having been assisted by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)\(^\text{11}\). At the same time the recent newcomers from the FSU in Germany (more than 89,800) constitute approximately 88% of the registered members of the Jewish community\(^\text{12}\).

At the beginning of 2004, in the FSU the number of «core» Jews was estimated at less than 0.4 million, of whom 243,000 lived in the Russian Federation\(^\text{13}\) and about 90,000 in Ukraine. Thus, the remaining number of ex-Soviet Jews in Russia is now lower than in the USA, and in Ukraine it is about the same as in Germany.

In the West, after the USA and Germany, the largest, though much smaller, number of ex-Soviet Jews, now lives in Canada. According to an estimate based on the Canadian census, there were about 20,000 self-identified ex-Soviet Jews in 1996, not counting those few who lived in the least populated areas of the country (Brym, 2001, p. 35). This figure includes all Jews originating from the FSU regardless of their date of immigration to Canada (about 3,000 arrived before 1970). Given these considerations, it appears that about 25,000 “core” Jews who were born in the FSU and immigrated since 1970 lived in Canada in 2004. This figure includes their children who were born after emigration\(^\text{14}\). This updated figure is a maximum guesstimate because it includes some people who reported Jewish ethnicity along with a second ethnicity. All other diaspora ex-Soviet Jewish communities are even smaller.

In Israel at the start of 2004, of the country’s Jewish population of 5.165 million there were about 0.8 million Jews and their descendants originating from

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\(^{11}\) HIAS. Arrival Statistics. Available: http://hias.org/news/Statistics/arrival.php. In 2004 and 2005 respectively only about 1,100 and 900 FSU Jews and their relatives were assisted by HIAS.


\(^{13}\) Including those who appeared in the 2002 Russian census results as Mountain Jews, Georgian Jews, Central Asian (Bukharan) Jews and Krymchaks, as well as Jews (approximately 20,000) who were counted among people whose ethnicity was not recorded in the census. For detailed analysis of the 2002 Russian census data, see: Tolts 2004, p. 37-51.

\(^{14}\) Robert J. Brym, The University of Toronto. Electronic mails to Mark Tolts. November 19 and 21, 2004. This corresponded fairly closely to the reported number of Jews in Canada who were born in the FSU (27,790, including pre-1970 immigrants) according to the 2001 census (Csillag 2005).
the FSU who arrived since 1970. According to official Israeli data, there were at this time 671,800 Jews in the country who had immigrated from the FSU in 1990–2003 (this number includes their children who were born in Israel) (Israel CBS 2004, table 2.25). In the previous twenty years (from 1970 to 1989) about 178,000 immigrants arrived in the country from the Soviet Union (Israel CBS 2002, table 2). The loss of those who subsequently emigrated and/or died was somewhat offset by the positive vital balance of this group.

In 1970 there were about 12.6 million “core” Jews in the world. By 2004 this number had reached approximately 13 million (DellaPergola, 2004, p. 500). In the same period, the number of “core” Jews originating in the FSU fell by more than one half million, despite the sizable accession to this «core» Jewish population in connection with migration. In 1970 the share of Soviet Jews among world Jewry was 17% whereas, as a result of these dynamics, by 2004 we guesstimate that the share of “core” Jewish population originating from the FSU among world Jewry had decreased to about 12%. During this period a majority of these Jews changed their places of residence and now their greatest concentration is in Israel.

***

To sum up, the estimates (that used the 1970 Soviet census as a baseline) show that, by the beginning of 2004, worldwide there were about 1.6 million “core” Jews who originated in the FSU and their descendants, of whom about one tenth, mostly in Israel, had become part of the “core” Jewish population in connection with their migration. In 2004 in Israel there were about 0.8 million Jews and their descendants originating from the FSU (approximately half of the estimated worldwide number) who had arrived since 1970. Possibly about one fifth of these had previously neither identified themselves nor been seen by FSU authorities as Jews.

References


**Appendix 1. Emigration of Jews and Their Relatives from the FSU, 1970-2005, Thousands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Thereof to:</th>
<th>Percent of total to Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>U.S.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1978</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1988</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1988</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>6.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>147.8</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>320***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2003</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * Data for 1970-1988 include all destinations other than Israel for those who emigrated with Israeli visas; annual data for 1991-2005 cover only those who were assisted by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). ** Departures. *** Including emigrants who were not assisted by HIAS.

**Sources:** Tolts 2003b, p.177; Tolts 2005, p.26-27 [updated].
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The book series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World” was founded in 1998 in view of the fact that there was not a single scientific periodical in Russia dealing with international migration of population. Due to this reason the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University made a decision to establish a book series aiming to raise both theoretical and applied aspects of contemporary trends of international migration of population as well as its determinants and consequences. The Editor-in-Chief is Professor Vladimir Iontsev, the Head of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics. The Executive Secretary of the series is Irina Ivakhniouk, Senior Researcher at the Department of Population.

The volumes of the series are published biaannually. They can be either edited volumes or monographs. The series is in fact an active discussion on various dimensions of international migration in the world and in Russia in particular.

The first volume (1998) mainly consist of the papers of Russian scholars presented at the IUSSP General Population Conference at Beijing, China in October 1997. (Detailed information about the Conference is also presented.) These are the articles by Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamensky «Russia and the International Migration of Population» dealing with the entrance of Russia into the international community by means of migration and the allied problems — both for Russia and the world; and the article by Andrey Ostrovsky «Labor Migration from China to Russia’s Far East: Possibilities of Immigration Today and in Future» concerning the turn of labor migration into permanent immigration at the certain region.

The other articles of the first volume are devoted to a very topical for Russia aspect of international migration — “brain drain”: Igor Ushkalov — «Intellectual Emigration from Russia: the Factors, Scale, Consequences, Ways of Regulation», Irina Malakha — «“Brain Drain” in the Central and Eastern Europe». Besides, the issue included the digest of the well-known book by Julian L. Simon — «Economic Consequences of Immigration» (N.Y.: Blackwell, 1989). Reviews of noticeable publications of Russian and foreign specialists on international migration is an integral part of every issue of the series. Another important section of every volume is “Young Scholars’ Viewpoints”, where students and post-graduate students from the MSU and other universities are granted an opportunity to publish the results of their research in international migration.

The second volume (1999) included articles on a broad variety of themes related to international migration in Russia and in the world: Vladimir Iontsev, Aminat Magomedova — «Migration between Russia and other Former Soviet states (Historical Review)»; Irina Ivakhniouk — «The Experience of State Regulation of Labor Force Emigration (Case of Turkey)»; Andrey Kamensky — «Labor Force Export and the Impact of Migrant Workers’ Remittances on
Balance of Payment of a Sending Country»; Igor Ushkalov — «Emigration and Immigration: Russian Phenomenon». Apart from the Russian scientists’ articles the volume also includes contribution of Prof. Janez Malačič, (the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) — «Labor Market and International Migration Situation in Central European Transitional Economies». Starting from the second volume it has become a good tradition of the series to invite foreign colleagues to contribute because their papers can be hardly available in Russian.

The third volume (1999) presents the monograph of Vladimir Iontsev «International Migration of Population: Theory and History of Studying» dealing with the classification of main scientific approaches for the studying of migration. The analysis of principal concepts in the field of international migration that exist presently both in Russia and the world demographic science are presented. There is also a detailed analysis of international migration affecting Russia since the eighteenth century up to the present day, as well as a projection of possible future migration trends. The work includes a glossary of terms used in Russian-language demographic studies on migration. It is worth mentioning that this monograph contains a numerous bibliography of publications on international migration of population (1200 titles).

The forth volume (2000) presents a number of articles depicting both global trends in international migration of population and specific migration flows to and from Russia. The article by Prof. Sema Erder (The Marmara University, Turkey) «New Trends in International Migration and the Case of Turkey» presents the author’s view on migration picture of contemporary Europe and the changing place of Turkey within this picture. The appearance of new migration space in the Eastern Europe has encouraged new migration flows in the region. That is the subject of two other articles — by Irina Ivakhniouk — «International Labor Migration between Russia and Turkey» and by Evgeny Krasinets and Elena Tiuriukanova — «From-Russia–to–Italy Migration as a Model of Ethnically Neutral Economic Migration». Ethnic aspect of international migration is presented by the article of Israeli demographer Mark Tolts (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) — «Migration of Russian Jews in the 1990’s».

Among the book reviews presented in the forth volume one is worth to be stressed. That is the digest of the last publication of Igor Ushkalov — «“Brain Drain”: Scale, Reasons, Consequences» (Moscow, 1999) which has gained special emphasis because of the untimely decease of the author in November 1999. Igor Ushkalov was undoubtedly among the best specialists on international intellectual migration.

The fifth volume (2000) has one common theme that penetrates all the articles — the impact of international migration on demographic development. The situation in three former Soviet Union states — Russia, Ukraine and Armenia — is presented in the articles of scholars from the corresponding countries: Vladimir Iontsev — «International Migration of Population and Demographic Development in Russia»; Alexander Khomra — «International
The article by Mikhail Denissenko — «Replacement Migration» is analyzing the Report of the UN Scientific Project on Replacement Migration, in which the author had taken part. The article is trying to answer the question if the replacement migration could be a solution to declining and ageing populations. Besides, the paper by Michel Poulain, professor of the Louvain Catholic University (Belgium) — «The Comparison of the Sources of Measurement of International Migration in the Central European Countries» — can be evaluated as a contribution for promoting some common methodology in international migration studies.


The seventh volume (2002) is breaking up the chronology of the series due to the fact that it is timed to coincide with the jubilee of the Center for Population Studies at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University which includes the Department of Population as well. This volume is different from the others as it is presented by the annotated bibliography of publications on migration at the Center. It is titled Migration of Population: 35 years of Research at the Center for Population Studies of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University (1967–2002). (The author — Irina Ivakhniouk). This bibliography represents the scale and traditions of migration studies which have formed the theoretical background for developing the modern approach to investigation of the contemporary stage of Russia’s migration history.

The eighth volume (2001) deals with the problems of international migration statistics and registration, which have national peculiarities in every country, and this fact seriously impedes the comparative analysis of the world migration flows. The article by Olga Tchoudinovskikh «Present State and Perspectives of Current Migration Registration in Russia» analyzes the shortages of the Russian system of migrants’ primary registration that perform as an
obstacle for reliable migration estimates and studies. The article by Mikhail Denissenko «Emigration from Russia According to Foreign States Statistical Data» represents foreign states immigration statistics as an alternative, more exact source of estimation of emigration flows from Russia. A short contribution of George Tapinos «International Migration of Population an the Factor of Economic Development» contains valuable comments, very topical for contemporary migration situation in Russia and other former Soviet states. The article by Alexander Slouka «International Migration of Population and Demographic Development of the Western Europe» continues the theme which is meaningful for the editors — about the role of international migration in demographic development — started in the third and the fifth volumes.

The theme of the ninth volume (2002) is highly topical for Russia and the neighboring countries as well as for many other regions of the world — illegal immigration. The contributors to the volume are researchers and practical workers from Russia and other former Soviet Union states: Galina Vitkovskaya — «Irregular Migration in Russia: Situation and Policy of Counteraction»; Eugeny Krasinet — «Irregular Migration and Latent Employment in the Border Territories of the Russian Federation»; Elena Sadovskaya — «Prevention of Irregular Migration in Kazakhstan»; Lyudmila Shakhoto — «Illegal Migration: Factors of Growth and Methods of Solution»; Tatyana Kutsenko — «Illegal Migration and Irregular Employment of Foreign Citizens and Apatrids in the Russian Federation». Geopolitical position of the former USSR states and transparent borders between them have turned this vast territory into the corridor for transit migrants from Asia heading to Europe. All the authors stress on indissoluble relation between illegal immigration and irregular employment and on the importance of government control over illegal hiring of foreign labor force in the context of struggle against irregular international migration.

The tenth, jubilee volume (2002) is a collection of articles by distinguished experts in international migration from many countries. The papers deal both with theoretical issues of migration studies and migration overviews for certain countries and regions. The article of Douglas Massey (USA) «A Synthetic Theory of International Migration» is in fact an attempt to summarize existing migration concepts into a universal, general theory. Dirk van de Kaa (the Netherlands) in the article «On International Migration and the second Demographic Transition» emphasizes the role of migration in the analysis of demographic development and makes a serious theoretical step towards better understanding of the classical demographic transition theory. Different, but equally interesting views on contemporary skilled migration are presented in the papers of Reginald Appleyard (Australia) — «Skilled Migration in the Globalized World» and Irina Malakha (Russia) — «On “brain drain” in Russia during the second half of the 1990’s». A new theoretical approach to understanding of the latest trends in international migration flows is presented by Mary Kritz (USA) in the paper «International
Migration to Multiple Destinations» where she argues that not only developing countries but also developed ones are to be considered as both labor force importers and exporters. The contribution of Marek Okolski (Poland) — «The Incoming Civilisations, the Outgoing Civilisations on the Turn of the 20th Century. Reflection from the Perspective of Demography» is especially engaging by depicting the role of demographic processes, and migration in particular, in evolution of human civilizations, e.g. in the forthcoming replacement of the present European civilization (if current demographic trends in Europe last) by Asian civilization. The replacement is already taking place as a result of Chinese immigration. This theme is developed and detailed in the paper of Vilja Gelbras (Russia) — «Chinese Migration and Chinese Ethnic Communities in Russia».

Shifts in international migration trends in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet space are the focus of a number of articles: Janez Malacic (Slovenia) — «International Migration Trends in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990’s and ant the Beginning of the 21st Century»; Mark Tolts (Israel) — «Statistical Analysis of Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia»; Andrey Kamenskiy (Russia) — «Contemporary Russia in International Labor Migration»; Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhniouk (Russia) — «Russia in the World Migration Flows: Trends of the Last Decade (1992–2001)».

The eleventh volume (2003) is entitled “Migration and National Security”. It reflects an active discussion on security dimensions of international migration in the Russian society, in both academic circles and government, and in media as well. The article of Leonid Rybakovskiy — Demographic Security: Geopolitical Aspects and Migration is analyzing the role of international migration and reasonable migration management in countering demographic crisis in Russia that is by itself a threat to national security and sovereignty of the country. The same issue but from the perspective of foreign researchers is examined in the contribution of Graeme P. Herd and Rosaria Puglisi (UK) — National Security and Migration Policy in Putin’s Russia: a Foreign Perspective. The analysis of the role of migration in countering depopulation trends is topical both for Russia (article of Dalkhat Ediev — International Migration as a Way to Overcome Depopulation Trends in Russia) and Ukraine (article of Alexander Khomra — Migration of Population in Ukraine in 1989–2001: Input to Population Dynamics and Ethnic Structure). Paper of Irina Ivakhniouk and Ramazan Daurov — Irregular Migration and Security in Russia: Threats, Challenges, Risks is focused on “multilayer” nature of the problem; the authors mention political, economic, criminal, and social aspects. Economic and ethnocultural aspects of security are detailed in the paper of Svetlana Soboleva and Olga Tchudaeva — Foreign Migrants in the Russian Labour Market based on the results of the survey of migration in the eastern regions of Russia.

The twelfth volume (2004) is dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) and preliminary results of the 20-year Programme of Actions admitted at this
Conference, in the field of international migration. This volume was timed to the Russian National Population Forum “Present and Future of Population in Russia” held in Moscow on 3–4 November 2004. The paper of Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamenskiy (Russia) — International Migration of Population: Lessons of the Cairo Conference is based not only on the analysis of the ICDP Programme of Actions but also on personal experiences of the authors who were the participants of the ICDP. David Coleman (UK) in his paper Europe at the Cross-roads: Must Europe’s Population and Workforce Depend on New Immigration? questions the possibility to achieve certain objectives framed by the ICPD in the field of migration, and besides, he touches upon long-run effects of numerous migration to Europe. The article of Irina Pribytkova (Ukraine) — Modern Migration Studies: in Search for New Theories and Concepts is an attempt to summarize theoretical approaches and methodological principles in migration studies, with special emphasis on inter-disciplinary research. The paper of Sergey Ryazantsev (Russia) — Forced Migration in Russia: Ten Years Since Cairo deals with the most topical for Russia international migration issue in the 1990s. Articles by Liudmila Ponkratova (Russia) — International Migration of Population in the Far East of Russia: Transformation of Flows and Prevailing Trends and Svetlana Gribova (Russia) — Migration as the Element of the Integration Mechanism of Russia’s Far East Region into the Chinese Economy analyze important for Russia issue of Chinese labour migration. The paper of Elena Tiuriukanova (Russia) — Labour Migrations in the CIS and New Practices of Labour Exploitation based on concrete surveys, deals with a painful issue of migrants’ human rights protection that is specially emphasized in the ICPD Programme of Actions.

The thirteenth volume (2005) “International Migration from the Perspective of Young Scholars” is fully made up of contributions by Master students, Ph.D. students and young research workers from Russia and other CIS states specializing in international migration studies.

The fourteenth volume (2005) represents the papers presented at two workshops organized by the Council of Europe in collaboration with the Department of Population of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University: “Economic Migration in Russia – Legal Protection of Migrant Workers’ (Moscow, December 2003) and “Prospects of Labour Migration in Russia and Its Regions: Migrants’ Rights in the Context of Economic and Demographic Development’ (Saint Petersburg, July 2004). Over 20 papers analyze most topical issues of labour migration in Russia from the perspective of migration officials and experts, and from political, legal, economic, social, regional and ethnical points of view. Contributions by experts from European countries experienced in international labour migration management discuss the best possible ways for Russia to cope with increasing labour inflow, in particular by signing the European Convention on Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977).

The fifteenth volume (2005) is a collection of papers submitted to the Session on international migration trends at the XXV IUSSP Conference, 18-23
July 2005, Tours, France. The papers reflect most typical contemporary international migration trends, including globalization of migration flows, growing role of international migration in demographic development of receiving countries, qualitative shifts in the global migration flows, the increasing role of labour migration, expansion of irregular migration, feminization of migration flows, and dual role of migration policies.

The **sixteenth volume** (2006) is the Russian version of the fifteenth volume.

The **seventeenth volume** (2006) presents the monograph of Aminat Magomedova «*Economic and Demographic Aspects of External Migration in Russia*». The impact of international migration on economic and demographic development in Russia is regarded both from the historical perspective and from the viewpoint of modern migration concepts.

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