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Russia and the Contemporary World”*
Volume 10

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The articles (published in Russian and in English) can not correspond the Editorial Board’s point of view.

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¹ The articles of the present volume are arranged in alphabetic order.

INTRODUCTION

Every year millions of people cross state boundaries in search for new residence or job, for learning or training, for rest or treatment, escaping from persecution by political, national, ethnic, etc. reasons or from ecological disasters. These and other types of migration movements are often interpreted as “international migration of population” that nowadays is a phenomenon of global character involving all countries of the world including Russia. In fact, the fate of “everlasting exile” mythical Ahas-verus is not just a myth but the real destiny of many people wandering over the world in search for better life.

It is not by chance that arguments like “*the essence of our epoch is expressed by a nomad — a man who is wandering from one place to another*” or “*in the future society all people despite their culture will be migrating*” or “*the most important factor of integration that has been acting since the very beginning of humankind and that provides an opportunity to overcome various processes of alienation, is the continuing disposition of population to move*” are becoming wide-spread. This increasing mobility of population reflects as a mirror all the achievements and problems of contemporary world community: globalization of the world economy allied with growing freedom of movement of people, capitals, commodities and information, on one hand, and growth of poverty and exploitation of foreign workers, on another hand; strengthening of integration and development of “pole of wealth” by a few developed countries of immigration and “pole of poverty” by numerous developing states exporting “excessive” population; appearance and flourishing of new civilizations and decline of old ones; progress in world science, culture and education by means of “migration exchange” benefits of more developed states and intellectual and cultural pauperization of less developed countries resulting from “brain drain”; improvement of genetic fund of mankind along with spreading of mass epidemics (HIV/AIDS, C Hepatitis, and others), etc. The world is really in continuous migration movement²; this movement determines its future development, and it can't be stopped by any “iron curtains”. By this reason the better understanding of contemporary international migration trends with their pluses and minuses will impact effective development of the world as a whole and particular regions and countries.

However, correct understanding of any trends is to be rooted in relative theoretical basement. In this context the article by *Douglas Massey* in the present volume is of particular interest: it is an attempt to summarize a universal, synthetic migration theory, the necessity of which was stressed in 1970's by W. Zelinsky, the author of “mobility

² See, for example, Massey D. et al *World in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. New York: Oxford university press, 1998.

transition” theory. We would like to note that it was Douglas Massey who had made an important contribution to social capital theory, as well as theory of cumulative causation.

Non less interesting is the article by *Dirk van de Kaa* (the Netherlands), one of the authors of “the second demographic transition”³ concept. In his paper he emphasizes the role of migration in the analysis of demographic development and makes a serious theoretical step towards better understanding of the classical “demographic transition” theory.

A new view on skilled migration in the context of globalization and mutual benefits is presented in the paper of *Reginald Appleyard* (Australia), the author of numerous impressive publications on international migration. However, his point of view is disputed by *Irina Malakha* (Russia), the author of an article on “brain drain” in Russia. Her position seems to be more reasonable in case “brain drain” specifically but not intellectual migration in general is discussed.

A new theoretical approach for understanding of the latest trends in international migration flows is presented by *Mary Kritz* (USA) who is one of the authors of “migration systems” concept⁴. Her argument that presently not only developing countries but also developed ones are to be considered as both labor force importers and exporters, sounds cogent though it is disputable.

The paper by *Marek Okolski* (Poland) is especially engaging by depicting the role of demographic processes, and migration in particular, in evolution of human civilisations. This paper corresponds to our view on forthcoming — possible already in the second half of the present century — replacement of the present European civilisation (if current demographic trends in Europe last) by Asian civilisation. The replacement is already taking place, e.g. as a result of Chinese immigration. It is strange that Europe is concerned by potential threats of Muslim migration and practically ignores the challenge of Chinese migration that can bring cardinal consequences to Europe (and not only to Europe)⁵.

In this connection the paper by *Vilia Gelbras*, the leading Russian specialist in Chinese migration looks very topical. The author analyses migration from China to Russia in the context of future global development.

Changes in the Eastern Europe related to new trends in international migration flows in the region is a subject of an article by the well-

³ Kaa Dirk J. van de Europe’s Second Demographic Transition // Population bulletin, Volume 42, September 1993 (reprint, 1987).

⁴ See, for example, *International Migration Systems. A Global Approach* / Ed. by M. Kritz, L. Lim and H. Zlotnik. Oxford, 1992.

⁵ The distinguished American economist and demographer Paul Demeny is one of few Western scholars who broaches this question in: Demeny, Paul *Prospects for International Migration: Globalization and its Discontents* // Journal of Population Research, 2002, № 1, Vol. 19, pp. 65–67. A book by Pierre Trollet is also worth mentioning: *Trollet, Pierre La Diaspora Chinoise. Que sais-je?* Paris, 2000.

known scholar from Slovenia *Janez Malacic* who has already contributed to our series (see volume 2). This paper calls up with an article by *Andrey Kamenskiy* (Russia) dealing with labor migration in Russia.

Mark Tolts (Israel) is developing the topic he has started in the fourth volume of this series. He is focusing primarily on problems relating to statistics and registration of international migrants.

The paper by *Vladimir Iontsev* and *Irina Ivakhniouk* (Russia) deals with peculiarities of international migration in Russia during the 1992-2001 decade. It describes new Russia's place and role in the current migration flows, analyses myths and errors in this field in Russia that are often rooted in insufficient theoretical background in understanding of principles of international migration.

Better understanding of international migration trends are of crucial importance for contemporary Russia that is becoming more and more involved in global migration processes. To approach to this understanding is the purpose of the present volume that is unique by its contents and jubilee by term. *Unique* – because contributors to the volume are mainly well known specialists in international migration from many regions of the world: USA and Australia, the Netherlands and Israel, Slovenia and Poland, Russia⁶, that is rare for this kind of editions, and as to publications in Russian language it is the only one. *Jubilee* — due to figures 10 and 5 (five years have passed in September 2002 since the beginning of publication of the series) as well as jubilee events the publication is timed to coincide with⁷.

During five years of existence the scientific series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World” has pub-

⁶ Unfortunately, scholars from Canada, Great Britain, France and Italy who have expressed their interest to contribute to the book, did not send their papers due to various reasons. The Editorial Board intends to include the papers by these authors in the following volumes. For example, the 11th volume that is to be issued by the beginning of December 2003 deals with international migration in the context of national security.

⁷ First, the publication is devoted to the forthcoming 250-year anniversary of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University. Second, 18-20 September 2002 within the frames of that anniversary festivities International Conference “Demographic Education in the 21st Century in the CIS, Baltic States and East Europe” devoted to the 80th anniversary of Professor D. Valentey and the 35th anniversary of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of MSU. It is worth noting that the Conference has paid special attention to migration within the system of teaching demography (See, for example, abstract of the paper presented at the conference: *Ivakhniouk I. and Iontsev V. Migration of Population in the System of Demographic Education* // In: Demographic Education in the 21st Century in the CIS, Baltic States and East Europe. Papers and abstracts of the International Conference, Moscow, 2002, pp. 134-135). This idea was recently stressed by A. Simmons and V. Piche in: *Simmons A., Piche V. Teaching Migration and Globalisation* // GENUS, LVIII (№ 3-4), 2002, pp. 109-134.

lished the articles of over 20 well known and young Russian scholars, specialists in migration from Ukraine, Belarussia, Armenia and Kazakhstan; scientists with world-known name like George Tapinos (France) or Michael Poulain (Belgium) as well as all the contributors to the present volume (for more detailed information please refer to “Information for Foreign Readers and Contributors” Section).

Another tradition of our series is to attract in publications along with distinguished specialists also quite young authors (students, post graduate students, trainees). We suppose to continue this tradition and we are interested to receive new contributions from our young colleagues, from other countries as well. Moreover, one of the nearest volumes will be fully composed of papers by young researchers of international migration (up to 27 years old).

Publication of this volume was supported by the UNFPA Moscow Office and the idea was approved personally by Mr. Sjaak Bavelar, the UNFPA Representative in the Russian Federation. We are pleased to note that arrival of Mr. Bavelar in 2002 resulted in growth of activities of the UNFPA in Russia: topical surveys, of reproductive health and AIDS in particular, are carried out; development of the system of demographic education is supported. These efforts are extremely important for improvement of demographic situation in Russia and as a result for the progress of the country.

Vladimir Iontsev, Editor-in-Chief

SKILLED MIGRATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Introduction

Globalization — described recently as having rendered almost all goods, services and activities subject to benchmarking and competition; forced businessmen to be more competitive; and neutralised the advantages of incumbency and local dominance (Gallop, 2001, p. 87; Eslake, 2001, p. 21) — is one of the most polemic issues of our time. International conferences have been greatly disrupted by protesters who argue that its influence has created a wide range of disadvantages, especially for people in developing countries. One Australian trade union leader argued recently that the globalization process had made the CEOs of multinationals among the most powerful citizens in the world, their companies able to “buy and sell the national economies of all but the largest countries” (Burrow, 2001, p. 19). On the other hand, the influential American economist Alan Greenspan contends that it is the degree of unbridled fierce competition within and among economies today — not free trade or globalization as such — that is the source of unease that has manifested itself, and was on display at Seattle (Greenspan, 2000).

The new world order, characterised at a UN expert group meeting in Bolivia in 1993 as growing interdependence of major economic powers and the adoption of global market strategies to promote economic growth (United Nations, 1998, p. 3), has been seen by others simply as the latest phase in a long historical process. It is not a “monolithic, unstoppable juggernaut”, writes Stalker (2000, p. 10), but rather a complex web of inter-related processes, some of which are subject to greater control than others. Indeed, Holton (1998, p. 204) described globalization as a “set of intersecting processes” that falter as much as they advance, and have limits set by counter-trends and movements within the global field. Eslake (2001, p. 18) also sees it as a process, not an ideology, “...simply the logical extension of the tendency towards specialization and trade”. It is driven by improvements in transport and communications technologies; changes in individual tastes and preferences; changes in government policies in the direction of removing barriers to the movement of goods, services and capital across national boundaries; and changes in the strategies of corporations that have increasingly emphasised the pursuit of scale and reduction in operating costs.

While some of the “intersecting processes” of contemporary globalization are subject to more control than others, international migration is the process most likely to provoke intervention. Governments, argues Stalker (2000, p. 10), are less willing to block flows of trade or finance, but take more resolute action when it comes to people. Thus the impact

of globalization on migration policies, and on the volume, direction and composition of migration flows, has become a strongly-debated issue in contemporary migration literature (Appleyard, 2001, p. 14). Because global firms require international labour forces for many of their operations, globalization has the power to transform migration systems in a “massive shake-out” of societies and economies, even though it is difficult to separate its economic significance from its cultural impact (Findlay, 2001, pp. 126–127).

An urgent task for the study of globalization and migration is to understand the international labour system of the new economy. This article therefore attempts to identify and assess the impact of globalization on the migration of one highly-relevant type of migrant — highly skilled workers, especially those on short-term contracts.

Highly-skilled and Professional Migrants

Early migration typologies separated only permanent from short-term movers. Refugees were later added as a category but on the grounds that, unlike “normal” migrants, their movement had not been initiated solely by economic opportunity. In due course, typologies included illegal workers, asylum seekers and professional transients. The latter were defined as professional or highly skilled workers who move from one country to another, often as employees of international and / or joint venture companies (Appleyard, 1991, pp. 22–23). The category has increasingly been refined to cope with the wide range of circumstances and situations under which they now move in increasing numbers across the globe (Keely, 2001, pp. 261–263).

Explanation of changing volume and direction of the different types of migrants focussed initially upon application of the demographer’s well-known concept of transition. Zelinsky (1979) initiated the research with his seminal paper at the IUSSP conference in Vienna. Although modestly claiming that his mobility transition model was nothing more than a heuristic device designed to identify the relevance of transitional sequences in economic and social change, the concept was taken up by several scholars and applied to specific migration flows. While recognizing, as had Zelinsky, that migration intakes are subject to government regulations, Appleyard (1992) nonetheless argued that numbers and composition can be explained by the receiving government’s stage of modernisation, each stage providing different roles for each type of migration. Professional transients played an important role at early stages of modernisation, especially if the receiving government encouraged foreign investment to establish factories and infrastructure that created jobs for local workers.

Further refinement of the migration transition model occurred during the 1990s — not uncoincidentally with the surge in globalization. Pang Eng Fong (1993, p. 300) noted that rapid economic growth had ex-

panded not only trade and investment, but also labour flows, and argued that migration in this causal process was an independent variable linked to a country's development status. And while he added many caveats to the refined model (1994), others have given clear legitimacy to the theory. Kim (1996, p. 303) even added a predictive dimension, arguing that increasing economic integration will lead to migration transition in many Asian countries.

On the other hand, Findlay (2001, p. 129) has argued that the transition thesis is fundamentally flawed because it fails to identify the conditions linking migration events to other aspects of power relations that govern the advance of globalization. He argues for theorisation through a transformationalist approach, seeing globalization, as does Stalker, as an essentially contingent historical process that has been structured within a hierarchy of unequal relationships. And Skeldon has argued that it has been inability to cope with the dynamism in new contemporary migration flows that has led to a shift away from narrowly focussed models to more qualitative, even introspective, interpretations (2001, pp. 109–125).

So important has the original, albeit refined, category “professional transient” become in international migration that the “highly-skilled” category has been dichotomised into five separate sub-categories: senior managers and executives; engineers and technicians; scientists; entrepreneurs; and students. Mahroum (2001, p. 29) shows that push and pull factors for one group (scientists) might be predominantly personal aspirations and scientific curiosity, whereas for an engineer it might reflect only salary conditions or labour market conditions in other countries. In similar vein, Khadria (2001, p. 48), while recognising that the distinction between permanent and temporary has lost its prominence, identifies a clear paradigm shift: a geo-occupational and temporal shift in terms of brain drain becoming more demand-determined; a shift in the objective of policy intervention; and a shift in the strategy of intervention.

In India, e.g., the boom in the IT (information technology) sector has seen the “globalization” of Indian talent and skills, with geographical boundaries no longer effective constraints to the migration of skilled persons. Migrants in higher occupational groups now tend to rely less on kin-based networks than on networks involving colleagues and alumni as globalization of the highly-skilled market relies on massive network investments (Meyer, 2001, p. 91). Indeed, Iredale (2001, p. 16) believes that “industry-led” migration has become the most significant motivation, and applies to situations where employers are the major force behind selection and migration of skilled workers.

These major changes in the determinants of at least one type of migration are related directly to the growing importance and influence of globalization and go well beyond internationalization. It implies a higher plane of organization, one at which discrete national entities are dissolv-

ing; leading Stalker (2000, p. 2) to predict that all major political and economic decisions will be ultimately transmitted globally. In this context, most governments now go out of their way to facilitate the entry of highly-skilled migrants who themselves are attracted by opportunities to capitalise on their skills by moving to a new employer or transferring between affiliates of transnational corporations.

New Decision-makers?

Stalker further argues that the modern era of globalization is eroding the authority of the State and the significance of national borders. For some time, governments have been retreating from areas previously considered their exclusive prerogative, notably promoting free trade and removing restrictions on international movements of capital. Keely goes further; hypothesising that the temporary movement of international personnel with high level skills is now altering political decision making about international migration. This trend has been strongly influenced by the restructuring of firms away from manufacturing, including heavy reliance on intellectual property. Their activities have contributed to the internationalizing of staff and, equally important, to the creation of global outlooks. Nor is there any doubt that many firms involved in global business tend to think on a multi-states level, their executives arguing that immigration policies should actively facilitate, and certainly not obstruct, the movement of personnel. The 1994 Cairo Population Conference clearly recognised, and concluded, that as national economies and enterprises expand into international markets, governmental views towards international migration have emerged as important and, in some cases, urgent policy issues (United Nations, 1997, p. 2).

These new policy issues are being addressed at a number of levels, especially through international bodies and organizations. National policies and bilateral and multilateral agreements such as through the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mutual Recognition Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, are becoming important in facilitating the flow of highly-skilled labour. Iredale acknowledges that while State and regional agreements serve as “lubricators” to speed up desired industry-motivated movements, flows are being driven largely by industry and market requirements (2001, p. 9).

The internationalization of professions has played an important role in this process through the recognition and accreditation of qualifications by regional blocs. Bilateral agreements (EU and NAFTA) now facilitate the flow of highly-skilled labour that is being driven largely by industry and market requirements. And while nation states are deeply involved in this process, professional inclusion/ exclusion is no longer defined by national bodies alone. International agreements and bodies such as General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the World Trade

Organization (WTO) have also played important roles in the internationalization of professions as have the increasingly global activities of professional associations. Of equal, if not greater, importance has been the growth of skilled labour markets that are relatively free of national controls and therefore constraints to international movement. The most obvious example is IT which has become a highly-dynamic and fluid industry and led many governments to soften their attitudes towards immigration, especially on a temporary basis. In some instances, claims Iredale (2001, p. 10) certificates of some very large companies are perceived as more valuable than university degrees.

Iredale concludes that as a result of these developments, the “internal labour markets” of transnational corporations are now largely uninhibited by the workings of government. Further, regional groupings of States have become more involved in regulating migration. The original version of the EU included free movement of goods, capital, services and people, and while the people component has had a chequered history (Keely, 2001, p. 269), EU governments have been changing their legislation to make it easier to attract highly-skilled labour drawn largely by industry and market requirements. In France, the 1998 law on immigration created a special status for scientists and scholars, and in the Netherlands foreign highly-skilled workers benefit from a thirty per cent discount on income tax for a period of ten years (Mahroum, 2001, pp. 31–32). These types of changes in both action and attitude in the EU towards the immigration of highly-skilled workers has led to changing legislation with the flexibility to cope with both globalization and changing demographic trends in the region.

NAFTA, on the other hand, is an example that, according to Keely (2001, p. 270) falls between the EU and agreements in developing countries. US trade negotiators had little desire to include wholesale provisions about labour mobility in the NAFTA agreement, although there were provisions allowing for very limited classes of skilled labour with a special visa designation for temporary entrance.

By and large, discussions about the movement of labour, at least at the “high end”, have been increasingly introduced into discussions on trade, thus encouraging an international regime not for migration in general, but for “pieces” of it: one for high skills, one for refugees, and so on (Siddique and Appleyard, 2001, p. 3). Indeed, Keely is of the view that we are in the initial stages of a shift in immigration policy-making towards the trade arena in which some States and firms seek to fold temporary migration of workers into the international trade regime, especially as part of the emerging regime of trade in services (Keely, 2001, p. 264). This situation may also influence the mode and outcome of international trade negotiations.

During the last twenty-five years, countries comprising the APEC (Australia, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,

Taiwan, Thailand and the United States) region have experienced significant rates of economic growth and structural changes, as well as an increasing degree of economic integration in the form of trade and foreign investment. Impact on the structure of production and distribution of employment has been especially significant. Stahl (2001) expects that further movements toward trade liberalization will augment these structural changes and further increase the degree of economic integration. While low-skill migrants comprise a large proportion of the total number of labour migrants in the region, the numbers of highly-skilled and professional workers moving throughout the region has been increasing at a rapid rate. Stahl shows that the finance, insurance, real estate and business services industries have experienced very rapid growth in occupations classified as professional, technical and related workers. But supply of such workers has been insufficient to keep pace with structural changes that are giving rise to these “shifting patterns of labor demand” (p. 370). This demand, especially for highly-skilled workers, is driving fundamental changes in the immigration laws of countries in the APEC region.

In his study on Hong Kong, Findlay (2001) showed that migration flows during the 1980s and 1990s were not only linked inextricably to trends in global markets, but rooted in the changing regional division of labour. Indeed, he concluded that migration trends in Pacific Asia as a whole cannot be analysed separately, and that migration transformations need to be understood in relation to global linkages.

Information Technology

In 1993, Castells concluded that the productivity growth that had been largely responsible for driving forward the global economy had depended increasingly on the application of science and technology to economic life. Microelectronics, informatics and telecommunications had not only stimulated the global economy but changed the basis upon which business was conducted. Even more fundamental than the shift from industry to services had been the development of the “information economy”. Microsoft, Sun Microsystems and Apple have not only created new MNEs, but also enhanced the capacity of other multinationals to operate across geographical and political boundaries (Holton, 1998, p. 55).

There is no doubt that as many firms have restructured towards services and away from manufacturing, there has emerged the so-called “light economy”. This has clearly contributed to the internationalizing of staffs and the creation of global outlooks, especially in the service sector. The finance sector, in particular, has responded dramatically to technological innovation and competition as the fundamental drivers of globalization, and had significant implications for the pattern of employment in the finance sector worldwide.

Thus, globalization of human capital through international migration is no longer about global physical presence only. It is about global applicability of skills across various fields of specialization. Khadria (2001, p. 45) argues that this marks the main characteristic of emigration from India to developed countries where the emphasis has shifted away from professions in specific occupations (doctors, scientists) towards IT which embodies more generic skills. It also includes students whom he describes as “semi-finished human capital”, pursuing higher education both onshore and at offshore universities. In this development, IT professions have emerged as the most sought after category of employment-related migrants from India. This change can be explained by the three types of paradigm shifts noted above: occupational and temporal; objective of policy intervention; and strategy of policy intervention.

The intake of H-IB foreign professionals in the United States has been especially large; of the 461,000 in the US in September 2000, half were in computer-related occupations. In FY 1999, India was the main country of origin for H-IB visas (55,047), followed by a distant United Kingdom (6,665), China, Japan and the Philippines. Half the Indian H-IB workers had been born in India, the median age was 28 years, and forty per cent were already in another status before being employed as H-IB's.

In the United Kingdom, not only did the number of work permits for immigrants from India double between 1995 and 1999, but 54 per cent of those accepted were for work in the computer industry. The “massive skills shortage” in the UK was calculated by EITO (European Information Technology Observatory) as likely to be a shortfall of 620,000 IT professions in 2003.

Stahl (2001, p. 370) also shows that shortages of highly skilled and professional workers in the APEC region have been the driving force behind fundamental changes in immigration laws. Indeed, Singapore's active recruitment of Indian IT professionals was strongly defended recently by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew: “Unless we change our mindsets, we will be out of this race” (Chandra, 2000, p. 40).

While the globalization process has clearly had significant impacts upon the organization and delivery of information, including the shifting of personnel across boundaries, there is also evidence that client / company interface will be increasingly by “virtual” presence meetings where the interaction will seem “real”. Glen Morris, Managing Director of the knowledge exporter, Meinhardt Australia, predicts that advances in IT will make knowledge transfer “quick and seamless”, reducing the need to shift people across boundaries (Morris, 2001). Transfer of knowledge / services, he declares, will be web-based and widely linked to Internet sites, using standard knowledge transfer systems involved for each industry. In this scenario, service providers from

any part of the globe will be considered as normal, although he readily acknowledged that the “human touch” will continue to remain important in the provision of services.

Conclusion

There is no doubt concerning the multi-faceted and significant influence of globalization on the volume and direction of highly-skilled migrant workers since the early 1990s. It has facilitated labour mobility in a manner traditionally associated with the mobility of capital, and therefore challenged the relevance of many long-standing restrictions in the immigration policies of governments. Many governments, eager not to miss out on the benefits they perceive that globalization endows, have therefore deliberately relaxed restrictions on the entry of foreigners (for short periods) who have skills in IT and related professions. Some governments have also increased efforts to attract professional migrants for permanent settlement.

Many firms involved in a global business now tend to think on a multi-states plane, their executives arguing that immigration policies should actively facilitate the movement of personnel. Multilateral agreements such as through EU and NAFTA are also facilitating the flows of highly-skilled labour, and international agreements and bodies such as GATS and WTO, as well as professional associations, have contributed to the “internationalisation” of professional qualifications. Furthermore, there is sound evidence available to support the view that we are in the initial stages of a shift in immigration policy-making towards the trade area.

Information technology in particular has made a major contribution towards the internationalising of staffs and the creation of global outlooks. Highly-skilled workers in this sector now dominate the short-term professional category intakes of developed countries. New opportunities provided for IT entrants from countries such as India have given rise to reconsideration of brain drain, and a focus on brain exchange or brain circulation.

The typologies used by scholars of international migration have been re-examined and re-defined in an attempt to explain the new trends. The original “professional transient” has been reclassified into many sub-categories in a paradigm designed to understand specific shifts in both policy intervention and strategy intervention. These have been necessary to try and explain what one scholar has described as “a massive shake-out” of societies in the globalization process.

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CHINESE MIGRATION AND CHINESE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN RUSSIA¹

The contemporary Chinese migration to Russia, unlike other countries of the world, is the phenomenon of 1990's only. It has its own history as it took place before 1917 and during a short period of time in Soviet Russia. Later on, the size of Chinese population in Russia has been sharply declined by force. Migration over the border has been stopped. The 1989 Population Census in Russia enumerated only 5,200 persons of Chinese nationality (Statistical Yearbook of Russia, 2000, p. 64). They were not living in compact settlements, but assimilated with local population. During decades Chinese migration to Russia was out of question. In fact, it has started after the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Beijing which initiated the process of "normalization" of relationship between Russia and China. That was the starting point of the contemporary stage of Chinese migration to Russia. Since then it has become numerous, and politically and economically meaningful. Therefore it has attracted the attention of politicians and scholars.

I systemized the results of my research of the theme in the monograph (Gelbras, 2001) which deals with Chinese migration and the Russian-Chinese relationships, and their impact on the development of Russia. It was the first fundamental publication on this subject in Russia. The book also presents the attitude of the Russians towards Chinese immigration in the latest years. In particular, the monograph summarizes the results of the 1998–1999 survey which has covered around 760 Chinese migrants in Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Ussurijsk. In the course of this survey the great economic and political role of Chinese communities has been revealed. These ethnic communities has become the subject of my particular scientific interest in the latest years. In this paper I would like to present the results of my research as well as to give the general view from Russia on the contemporary Chinese migration in the global scale.

Definitions

It is always reasonable to define the exact meaning of the terms. Russian mass media and scientific literature use simultaneously three terms to define of ethnic groups staying in another country: *diaspora*, *ethnic commune* and *ethnic community*. Many authors use them as synonyms, however, there are reasons to doubt whether this is correct.

These reasons are becoming especially obvious when we compare different types of migrant ethnic groups in contemporary Russia. There

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are a lot of them: the flows of refugees, forced migrants, immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union as well as from other countries have caused increase in the numbers of Azerbaijanians, Armenians, Afghans, Chinese and Vietnamese people, etc. living in Russia and the appearance of their stable ethnic unities. Though individual interests and aspirations of migrants could vary, every ethnic unity has specific features resulting from their purposes and role in the receiving society.

In my opinion, the characteristic feature of a *diaspora* is its orientation for return to the land/country of ancestors. This feature was clearly seen in the behavior of the Jews, Germans, the Crimean Tatars in Russia in the latest years. The members of a *diaspora* do not necessarily live in compact settlements, they can be spread throughout the country. Moreover, this term does not necessarily deal with migrants. *Diaspora* can include a part of local population who for this or that historical reason have found themselves far away from their mother-country (the country of their ancestors) and who are dreaming of returning there. Turkmeshketins is a good example.

The term *ethnic commune* deals with an ethnic group whose main idea is to keep their ethnic, religious, cultural, etc. identity safe. Compact settlement of the members of an ethnic commune is typical. They are eager to protect themselves from the influence of surrounding host society and to form an independent social unit. Old Believers, Mormons, Gypsies normally form ethnic communes.

An *ethnic community* is a specific type of ethnic unit aiming both at preserving its ethnic identity and at strengthening its position by gaining broader stand in the host country. Members of an ethnic community use any means to enforce — more or less openly — their common economic and, if possible, political positions in the receiving society. Moreover, they are not concerned with the interests of the host society, on the contrary — they are interested in finding out the weak sides of the surrounding life and use them for the benefit of the community. This term is very suitable for characteristic of migrants' communities from China (Chinese people and Koreans), Northern Korea, Southern Korea, Vietnam.

Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish *diasporas, ethnic communes and ethnic communities* from each other in real life. This needs the development of the system of characteristic features, detailed knowledge of particular ethnic groups, etc. and it is worth being a subject to a specific research.

It is obvious that these structures (groups) are developing. First, they pass through the stages of birth, growth, change and dying away under the influence of internal and external impulses. Time of existence of these structures is various for different ethnic groups. In contemporary Russia, for example, Chinese communities have appeared only in the 1990's, and in various regions of Russia they are at different stages of development. In some countries of the world China-towns exist already

for centuries without any noticeable internal and external changes. However, in Thailand, the Chinese people have assimilated in the local society to much greater extent than in any other country of Asia, America or Europe.

Second, some ethnic groups for rather long period of time have got “mixed” characteristic features: in some aspects they are similar to diaspora, in some other features — to commune, in others — to community.

At last, an ethnic group can gain the features of a diaspora, a commune or community only under certain conditions. One of these conditions is the size of an ethnic group. For instance, before 1990’s the Chinese people who lived in Russia did not form neither diaspora nor commune; they also had nothing in common with the Chinese community which exists in Russia now. They have become the citizens of the USSR, later — the citizens of Russia. With the beginning of migration from China to Russia, these “Russian Chinese people” started to play a significant role in the formation and the development of Chinese communities. For example, in the Irkutsk Chinese community there exist two organizations: “Chinese Society” and “The Chinese Rights Protection Association”. They were both founded by the “Russian Chinese people”.

In China the term *shetuan* is used for defining overseas communities of compatriots. It is difficult to translate it with a single word. The first hieroglyph *she* can be translated as commune, community, unit, association. The second hieroglyph *tuan* means group, circle, organization. The multi-meaning word is convenient for use: *shetuan* can be translated both as a community, and as a commune, and as a compact settlement. It depends on the context.

Recently, in China the combination of words *huaqiao huaren shetuan* became widely used. It means: community of huaqiao and Chinese, i.e. community of Chinese residents in a certain country and Chinese “new” migrants of the latest decades. The appearance of this term means in fact the admission of the large scale of Chinese emigration.

It is remarkable, that on the one hand, the official Beijing can’t ignore the growth of the number of Chinese migrants in other countries. However, on the other hand, it is not ready to admit the fact of massive emigration from the country as a new developing social phenomenon. Therefore the Chinese people living in other countries are never defined as migrants. In China the term *migrant (yimin)* is used exclusively in the context of internal mobility of population. But it is used very seldom. More often the combination of words *vai chu wu gong renyuian* is used. It can be translated as “people left for earnings”. This situation results from the fact that the system of “fixed employment” which has existed in China for decades is just starting to collapse and free mobility of population is not a norm of social life yet.

As for departures of Chinese people from the country they are usually designated as “trips with private purposes”. The term migration


is not used. Moreover, the attempts to use this term are cut short as they are in contradiction to the official propaganda of unique achievements of the stable economic development and unprecedented improvement of living standards in contemporary China. In fact, there is an obvious progress in economy, however, it has caused social instability for the huge mass of population due to uneven growth of well-being. It is hardly possible to imagine that millions of people are eager to choose a hard lot of a migrant when their own country is succeeding. The situation in China is likely to force plenty of people to seek for better life abroad. Therefore, the combination of words *huaqiao huaren shetuan* is an indirect admission of increasing emigration from China.

Chinese Migration in the Context of the New External Economic Strategy

In spring 2000 the 3rd Session of the All-Chinese Assembly has declared a new external economic strategy of China. It has gained popularity as the slogan “To go outside”.

The increasing Chinese migration and the activities of Chinese communities all over the world are likely to become the instruments of implementation of this strategy.

One of the goals of the strategy “To go outside” is to provide the expansion of Chinese labor force at the international labor market. The estimates of Chinese economists argue that while China is providing around 1/3 of the global labor force nowadays its share in the international labor market is not more than 2–3%. Chinese policy-makers regard 10% as a satisfactory share. In order to imagine the scale of the forthcoming — direct and indirect — re-division of the world labor market it is useful to consider Chinese statistic data.



Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1998, 2001; Almanac of China’s Economy, 1995, 1996.

Since 1998 chinese statistics of departures is being published in *Statistical Yearbooks*; the data for the period 1994 afterwards is in-

cluded. A year later *Statistical Yearbooks* included information on the number of “trips with private purposes”. Besides, data on “trips with private purposes” has been published in “Tourism” Section in *Almanac of China’s Economy* since 1995. The data on the number of border-crossings for 1994-1998 in the two sources has had multi-million difference. However, the Chinese Statistical Office did not comment this confusion. Starting from 1998 the *Almanac of China’s Economy* was based on official data of Statistical Office, and the differences both in current and in previous years were eliminated. Diagram 1 demonstrates the data from *Statistical Yearbooks* by bold line and the data from the *Almanacs of China’s Economy* by thin line.

It is worth mentioning that in the latest years the number of persons leaving China legally “with private purposes” is increasing for more than 30% annually. In 2000 the number of “trips with private purposes” was 5.6 million. If we base our estimates on the data of Statistical Office, in 1994 the number of “trips with private purposes” was less than one third of the total number of departures, while in 2000 it was more than a half. Besides, due to the age structure of Chinese population, for several decades the share of population in the age group 16–65, i.e. labor force cohorts, will exceed 70%. This means that China’s human resources are enormous. The state was unable to use them efficiently during the last decades. It is unlikely to make good use of them in the coming years as well. Therefore, emigration process will be expanding.

The main features of today’s Chinese migration are: 1) the existence and development of the Chinese overseas ethnic communities are supported by the Chinese government; 2) the Chinese communities are directed towards implementation of the China’s official external economic strategy; 3) the Chinese ethnic communities in different countries of the world tend to become closely interrelated under the auspices of Beijing.

After 2001 the Chinese State Council *Huaqiao* Department strongly intensified its regular contacts with Chinese overseas communities for the purpose of coordinating their activities and interrelations for the sake of assistance to the economic progress of the country. The State Council *Huaqiao* Department is likely to become a sort of headquarters managing the Chinese migration on the global scale and using Chinese communities as the structural element for realization of the new strategy “To go outside”.

If this is true, it means that the stage of spontaneous growth and development of Chinese ethnic communities in Russia and other countries of the world is over. Another stage — characterized by well-organized and directed management of their activities from Beijing — has started. Therefore, Chinese ethnic communities in Russia will be to a greater extent oriented at the expansion of their business activities in the interests of China’s economic development.

The strategy “To go outside” is expected to solve a number of problems which are exceptionally topical for China’s economy. First, to provide new markets for goods and commodities produced in China. Second, to promote import of raw materials for Chinese industries. Third, to enforce the growth of investments and technological innovations (The Strategy and Practice of Openness..., 2000).

Russia has a special place in China’s plans as it is one of those few countries where all of the above-mentioned problems can be solved.

Russia is a relatively big market for Chinese consumer goods. They are delivered mainly by Chinese migrants and Chinese companies which are acting in Russia as “shadow” business. In Russia these kind of “businessmen” are called unofficial, circular traders, or “chelnoks”. In China the attitude towards this sort of trade has diametrically changed over the last ten years from contempt to respect. Now it is called “people’s trade”. According to official data, the value of the “people’s trade” with Russia is around USD 10 billion per year, so it is comparable to the official trade value between countries — USD 10.6 billion (Verlin, 2002, p. 64). There exist other figures — 3–5 billion, but the exact figure is not the core of the question. In this context the attitude of the government towards this sphere of business is significant as it determines political decisions. The essence of these decisions is: Russia could be and should be an even bigger market for Chinese goods. In order to reach this goal the Chinese government is ready to support the “people’s trade” and the penetration of big Chinese companies and enterprises into Russia.

From the point of view of the Chinese government this direction of economic activities could be advantageous in different facets. On the one hand, the commodity flows of the “people’s trade” are presented mainly by low-quality goods produced by small enterprises. They are located in agricultural regions and employ tens of millions of local labor force. On the other hand, the “people’s trade” concerns relatively small businessmen and firms that use circular migrants to deliver goods. In the Eastern Siberia and in Russia’s Far East large-scale circular commercial migration provides a source of earnings for hundreds of thousands of Russian and Chinese people.

In case the Chinese government supports resettlement of only 1% of the total number of 200–300 million China’s unemployed, this measure could seriously complicate social situation in Russia. Until recent time Russia was not the “Promised Land” in the eyes of the Chinese people who made a decision to organize their living abroad. However, the situation can change, especially if the government interferes.

In other words, the world and Russia are the witnesses of the turning point — the development of new conditions and motives for the global growth of Chinese migration and strengthening of Chinese ethnic communities in other countries. Under these new circumstances the studies of Chinese migration and Chinese communities should not ignore the analysis of the Chinese government position on this subject.

The Numbers of Chinese Migrants in Russia

There are a lot of different evaluations of the numbers of Chinese migrants in Russia. The most often mentioned figure is 2–3 million. However, these estimations are very poorly supported or not supported at all. In my previous works — based on the study of various sources — I have come to a conclusion that the total number of Chinese migrants in Russia is within 200,000 – 450,000 persons (Gelbras, 2001, p. 40). This estimation was made in 1998-1999. The question is, how significant were the changes since then. To answer this question let us use the data from two official sources: police and frontier service. Police, or the Department of Internal Affairs is responsible for registration of population at the place of residence. The Federal Frontier Service records all the persons arriving to Russia and leaving it.

Table 1. Migration of Population in Russia, 1998–2000 (thousands)

Year		Total	including	
			former Soviet Union states	other countries
1998	Arrivals	3095,5	494,8	18,7
	Departures	2774,3	133,0	80,3
	Net migration	321,2	361,8	-61,6
1999	Arrivals	2856,7	366,6	13,1
	Departures	2672,7	129,7	85,3
	Net migration	184,0	236,9	-72,2
2000	Arrivals	2662,3	350,3	9,0
	Departures	2420,6	83,5	62,2
	Net migration	241,7	266,8	-53,2

Source: Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 1999, p. 37; Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 2000, p. 65.

I put aside the analysis of general results of migration in Russia during these three years and concentrate only on the data related to Chinese migration. The Chinese migrants are recorded in the section “other countries”. The outflow of migrants was registered in 1998: business activity of many of them was ruined by the financial crisis in Russia. It is difficult to say to what extent this data refers to Chinese migrants in particular. However, we can assume that during these years the citizens of China only arrived to Russia and on the contrary, the citizens of any other countries except for China departed from Russia. In this case we can conclude: 1) the number of persons arriving to Russia from the non-former Soviet Union states is decreasing every year; during two years it decreased twice (!); 2) if only Chinese people arrived to Russia and none of them left, their total number increased by several tens of thousands only. This means that my estimation of the number of Chinese migrants in Russia for 1998–1999 did not change afterwards. The assumption of the unusual situation was aimed at proving that during the three years either there were no changes in the scale of Chinese migration or there happened an unprecedented growth of irregular migration, and in this case total re-estimation of the volume of Chinese migration to Russia is required.

Now let us turn to the statistical data based on the information from the Frontier Service. Its advantage for our analysis results from the fact that the frontier control records full information about border-crossers, including their citizenship, so we can focus on Chinese citizen only.

Table 2. The trips of Chinese citizens across the Russian boundary by purposes, 1998–2000 (thousands)

Year		Purpose of a trip						Total
		Busi- ness	Tou- rism	Pri- vate	Permanent residence	Tran sit	Serving staff	
1998	Arrivals	190,2	198,5	19,5	0,01	8,8	56,0	473,1
	Departures	175,5	185,5	29,7	-	4,0	56,5	451,2
	Net migration	14,7	13,0	-10,2	0,01	4,8	-0,5	21,8
1999	Arrivals	184,6	178,8	24,3	0,01	1,7	58,2	447,6
	Departures	177,0	172,5	33,1	0,01	1,1	57,1	440,8
	Net migration	7,6	6,3	-8,8	-	0,6	1,1	6,8
2000	Arrivals	239,8	172,2	29,6	0,02	2,7	49,5	493,8
	Departures	239,5	165,5	33,5	-	1,3	50,4	490,8
	Net migration	0,3	6,7	-3,9	0,02	1,4	-9,9	2,9

Source: Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 1999, pp. 106, 108; Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 2000, pp. 109, 111.

According to the Federal Frontier Service over two years — 1999 and 2000 — 941,400 Chinese citizens arrived to Russia and 931,600 departed from Russia. Thus, only 9,700 Chinese citizens from those who have legally crossed the boundary, have stayed in the country. Therefore, this data also confirms that the estimates for 1998–1999 are still true and there are no reasons to talk about multi-million Chinese migration to Russia.

The persons who arrive to a country for any reason and with a visa can become migrants. For example, a trip with tourist visa can be used for private trade and delivery of goods. If the company is registered in the host country it can invite the staff, and the staff can invite the family-members, and so on. It may be noted *inter alia* that the role and proportion of trips declared as tourism has changed. While in the previous years visa-free tourism was the main channel for irregular migration, now the overwhelming majority of Chinese tourists leave Russia within authorized terms. For example, in 2000 only 0.17% of the total number of tourists who have visited Primorsky Krai (Russia's Far East administrative unit neighboring to China) tried to stay in Russia and only 82 persons (0.03%) managed to do so. From the total number of 177 tourist agencies in the Primorsky Krai 33 companies were called to account for neglecting of regulations concerning the stay of foreign citizens in Russia. In 2000 around 154,500 Chinese tourists arrived to the Primorsky Krai; only 15 persons from this number did not leave the country on time (0.01%).

Hence: 1) the overwhelming majority of Chinese migrants arrive to Russia legally, and the main problem is to find out whether they have real passports and visas; 2) visa-free tourism is still used — though to

a smaller scale — by Chinese people for irregular migration to Russia; 3) the scale of Chinese migration to Russia, as for the beginning of 2002, is not the reason for alarm.

Therefore, there are no serious reasons to revise my estimates of the number of Chinese migrants in Russia yet. Their maximum number is not more than 400,000 persons. It is a tremendous growth in comparison to 1989, but it is not disastrous. However, there is a border sector that can't be efficiently controlled. It is the Russian–Kazakhstan border which is longer than the Russian–Chinese one, and it is open in fact. It is impossible to estimate how and to what extent it is used by Chinese citizens for illegal migration to Russia.

However, the principal question is not the number of Chinese migrants in Russia but Russia's economic losses resulting from the activities of the Chinese ethnic communities.

Chinese Ethnic Communities

The main conclusion of my research is: the Chinese ethnic community in Moscow has developed into an independent economic and social organism and it has a complex structure which provides its active functioning. Having at its disposal community's independent press, financial system, various companies, hotels, hostels, warehouses, etc. the Chinese ethnic community manage to play a noticeable role in the economic life of Moscow and affect the activity of Chinese ethnic communities in other regions of Russia. The latter are rapidly developing in accordance with the Moscow community pattern.

The research has shown the appearance — within the Chinese ethnic community in Moscow — of the firms dealing with invitations and visa support for the Chinese people who would like to immigrate to Russia or to other countries using Russia as a transit stage. These firms use aggressive advertising campaign. They have a long list of services for Chinese migrants providing them with necessary papers for arrival and legalization in Russia — invitations, entry visas, multiple visas, immigration papers, residence permits, working permits, company registration, driving license, etc. In practical terms this means that those Chinese migrants who have enough money can arrive to Russia when they wish, stay there as long as they wish and have their business in the country on the “legal basis”. However, the Chinese firms dealing with this business are mainly not transparent for Russia's tax authorities. Though the expenses for formal registration and permission procedures are high, these companies are not formally involved in financial activities (their profit-and-loss accounts are zeroed when displayed in a tax inspection). It can be supposed that the “hidden intention” of such kind of firms is illegal activity. We managed to get confirmations of that by means of in-depth interviews with Chinese migrants and Russian employees in Chinese companies.

Nowadays Russia is facing new challenges to its sovereignty. Chinese immigration to Russia may generate a swarm of problems due to Chinese “shadow” firms, and Russian companies involved in similar activities, as well as corruption in Russia’s official structures.

In Chinese papers published in Moscow we could easily find hypes of companies who openly offer smuggling of Chinese migrants to Schengen zone, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Latin America. The interviews with Chinese migrants highlighted the existence of stable channels for smuggling of Chinese migrants through Russia. We even got the names of people who managed to move illegally or “half-legally” from Irkutsk to the USA and other countries with the help of “tourist agencies”. According to information from the frontier service, the average price for illegal moving from China to Europe is USD 20,000 per person, however, the number of those who would like to be moved is not decreasing (Udmantsev, 2002).

The new situation dictates the need for fundamental investigation of business activities of Chinese migrants and the Chinese communities, especially as the Vietnamese and Korean communities tend to follow the same pattern.

Over the last two years on a huge territory from Vladivostok to Irkutsk the Common International Migration Information & Analyzing System (CIMIAS) was installed. Its function is to record arrivals and departures of all the foreigners visiting Russia at all border control posts in the region. The fulfillment of a personal immigration card is compulsory for everyone who is entering Russia. Thus, the groups of Chinese citizens who cross the frontier up to ten times a month were revealed. It became obvious that CIMIAS needs to be improved in order to provide information on the activities of migrants on the territory of Russia. The development of the system of personal “migration stories” is on the agenda now.

The Chinese communities in Russia are expanding their activities in the financial sphere. The Chinese bank “Elos” (and a number of “underground banks”), exchange offices, currency remittance bureaus are operating in Moscow and other big cities of Russia. Several years ago Chinese commercial migrants preferred to transfer the major part of their earnings to China. Money was being transported by migrants themselves, or with the help of tourists, or staff of the Chinese air company, or diplomats, or diplomatic couriers. Intermediary rate was 5% or more. Later on other schemes were implemented. One of them – the popular traditional system *fei qian* (flying money). In this case a migrant gives rubles or dollars to the firm which is in fact the clandestine bank, and his partner or relative in China takes the equivalent sum in yuans.

In this context we are to touch upon a special financial theme: the mechanism of financial operations between Chinese trading companies operating on the Russian markets and suppliers of goods from China. In

the course of the research the principal scheme of this mechanism was exposed. It is the following: the earnings of trade companies destined for investments or expansion of the business are accumulated in the Chinese communities by means of “underground banks”. Then, through the system of intermediary companies (mainly Russian) raw materials — timber, non-ferrous metals, Siberian pine cones, etc. — are procured, purchased and forwarded to China. After realization of these commodities, money is partially transferred to those Chinese suppliers of consumer goods who work with the Russian market. This scheme is beneficial for all the participants of the circle, both Chinese and Russian. Formally many chains of the scheme are legal, with the exception of Chinese “underground banks” and Russian companies engaged in unofficial procurement of scarce materials, e.g. timber, non-ferrous metals, etc. The result of these operations is the damage for Russia’s natural resources and economy.

The United Nations Nature Protection Program has officially expressed its preoccupation with the future of the forests in the Russian Far East Region, as to *Reuters*, 27.02.2002. According to the Program’s estimate, this region can be fully deforested already in five years due to illegal cutting down, which is at present 1.5 million cubic meters per year. Illegal trade with timber brings big revenue — up to USD 450 million per year. Two thirds of this revenue make the profit of foreign operators, mainly of Chinese or Korean origin. Intent attitude of Chinese businessmen to the Russian timber is partially explained by the 5-year moratorium for deforestation in China.

The existence of such kind of schemes is the evidence of a great role of Chinese ethnic communities in business activities of Chinese migrants, as well as Vietnamese migrants who often act as their partners. Ethnic communities succeeded in accumulating huge financial resources, this turns a prejudice to Russia’s economy.

An important source of financial inflow for Chinese ethnic communities is tourism. Strict control over tourist business in Russia in the latest years (in the frames of struggle against irregular migration) has made tourist agencies interested in the situation where all their clients depart from Russia strictly according to visa terms. With this purpose after arrival of a tourist group to Russia a representative of a tourist agency withdraws the passports of clients for the period of their stay in Russia.

Many Chinese tourist agencies operate in Russia on the basis of “shadow” schemes. The normal price for 5-days tourist trip to Russia including visits to Moscow and Saint Petersburg is USD 1,500–2,000. While travelling in Russia tourists everywhere, if possible, are served by Chinese agencies: they travel by buses or automobiles which belong to Chinese firms, stay in Chinese hotels, eat in Chinese restaurants, enlist the services of Chinese guides, etc. If a tourist intends to buy something in Russia he must address to the leader of the group to change yuans for dollars or rubles.

In this way tourist agencies try to minimize expenses related to the services of Russian firms and, on the contrary, to maximize the incomes of Chinese companies, that more or less successfully avoid taxation. Therefore, the money spent by tourists in Russia mainly stay in Chinese communities or return to China. As a result, Chinese tourist agencies earn huge capital and increase financial assets of the Chinese ethnic communities in Russia.

Chinese Ethnic Communities and Labor Force Deficit in Russia

On the one hand, the research of Chinese ethnic communities has highlighted negative aspects for Russia, however, on the other hand, it has stimulated discussion of the perspectives for attracting Chinese labor force to the country. Russia is likely to become a country of immigrants. For many experts this idea is already trivial. The question is how the migrants could and should be attracted. Many experts are sure that Chinese migrants will prevail in the total number of labor migrants in Russia. They can successfully compete with migrants from other countries due to their numerous number, unpretentiousness, easy acceptance of discomforts, hard-working, eagerness to sacrifice for the sake of the future well-being. Janna Zayonchkovskaya argues that by the middle of the 21st century the share of immigrants in Russia's labor force will be over 20% and the number of Chinese migrants will be 10–20 million.

However, the above mentioned understanding of the present problems related to Chinese migration to Russia brings us to the conclusion that the impending inflow of Chinese labor migrants could be a complicated process with equivocal consequences. Here I do not mean the massive inflow of people belonging to different civilization and culture (though it is also very important) but first of all a specific role of Chinese migrants as an instrument in the strategic plans of the Chinese government. In other words, that will not be a “normal” labor migration. Its specificity is resulting from, first, many of these migrants arrive to Russia with conviction that they are settling on primordial Chinese territories, and second, part of them are hired by Chinese companies doing business in Russia. Consequently, thinking of the perspectives of Chinese migration should necessarily exceed the frames of “purely” immigration analysis. I will give some comments below.

The majority of Chinese migrants who have already arrived and are still arriving to Russia can not occupy the vacancies at the Russia's national labor market. They do not know Russian; they have no qualifications. They do not have skills and desire to be employed in any industries except for trade and restaurant business. Besides, according to Russian regulations Chinese migrants (like migrants from other countries) employed even in these spheres feel the lack of rights and are fully dependent on employers, Chinese communities authorities, local

officials, police, and so on. Revision of legislation and restriction of absolute power of officials faces strong resistance. It needs time and good will to eradicate corruption and overcome xenophobia.

Nowadays there are three basic ways to attract the Chinese (as well as Korean, Vietnamese and other) labor force to Russia. The first one is wide usage of tenders, the second one is related to contracts with foreign organizations and companies on attracting labor force to be used in construction, agriculture, timber cutting and other industries, the third one is teaching and training Chinese (and other foreign) students in Russian universities and other professional and higher schools. All the ways are already used for a long time. However, in Russia their scale is limited.

In case of the first two ways temporary workers have very limited contacts with their ethnic communities; as a rule they leave Russia after the contract is fulfilled. These ways allow the realization of certain economic projects without growth of the number of immigrants. These ways are appropriate for the present situation when the lack of labor force is relatively low. However, demographic trends and acceleration of economic growth will change the situation. The inflow of foreign labor force will definitely increase.

It seems that the most reliable way to provide “efficient immigration”, i.e. immigration that can positively affect economic and demographic situation, is to involve foreign students in teaching in Russia. High cost of education in China and its low quality have generated the idea of preferable overseas education in the Chinese society. The flow of Chinese students to foreign universities is increasing every year.

In this context Russia could take more active part in attracting Chinese students by means of wide-scale advertising campaigns, for instance. In case of success, at least two problems could be solved. First, rise in incomes of Russian university staff and prevention of future mass unemployment among teachers and professors in Russia which is inevitable due to decrease of young age groups of population. Second, foreign graduates of Russian universities and professional schools with good knowledge of Russian language and Russian realities could be effectively employed in the host country. Everybody who prefer staying in Russia should be granted with appropriate rights including Russian citizenship. It is clear that fundamental reorganization of educational institutions is necessary to reach this purpose. In this connection it is interesting to find out the plans of Chinese students who are staying in Russia at present time.

In order to understand the perspectives of this way of attraction of immigrants we have conducted a survey of Chinese students in one of Russia’s biggest universities. Some results of the survey can be used for a reliable estimation of whether teaching and training of Chinese students in Russia could be promising and forward-looking in reality.

**Table 3. The plans of Chinese students
after graduating from Russian universities (in %)**

To get Russian citizenship and stay in Russia	2,4
To get permanent residence permission in Russia	7,3
To leave for another country	41,5
To return to China	48,8
Total	100,0

It is worth noting that the number of students who wish to stay in Russia after graduating from the university is four times less than of those who prefer “to leave to another country”. The reason is that nowadays Russia is not attractive for intellectual Chinese young people. This is the negative result of staying in “Russian realities” for years of studying. Meanwhile, they are not eager to return to China. Russia, with its low price for higher education is usually regarded as a sort of starting point for further migration to more developed countries.

However, over the years other factors can gain momentum, for example, those related to fertility. It is obvious that overwhelming majority of students are still single. Those who are married prefer to live in Russia with their family members. This fact can affect the duration of their staying in Russia for a number of reasons. For example, lack of limitations for the number of children is important for them. This reason can be fully understood only by those people who are not free in their decision about fertility issues in their own country.

Chinese students in Moscow (or in that particular university) are not descendents of poor families. The majority of them are studying for the State’s account. Nonetheless, they usually work. Combination of work and study gives the students a chance to learn different aspects of life in contemporary Russia.

While looking for a job, Chinese students are always involved in the activities of the Chinese ethnic communities. They are the most educated and intellectual part of the community who know Russian language, and they provide translation and comments of Russian legal documents, obtain different permissions, get in contact with local administration, etc. 19% of the students participate in social and public activities of the community, publish newspapers; almost 36% are engaged in Chinese consulting companies dealing with legal and administrative organization of business; 21% of them provide consulting on business expansion over Russia. In fact, the students are engaged in the development and implementation of many business schemes which are rooted in the Beijing official strategy, including irregular ones.

The survey among students and the research of the Chinese ethnic communities in Moscow have brought us to the conclusion that in *logical terms* teaching and training of foreign students, Chinese students in our particular case, aiming at providing optimal structure of immigrant inflow to Russia is economically reasonable; however, in *practical terms*

it is difficult to realize it. In order to implement this idea in practice, it is necessary not only to improve Russia's higher education system but to change fundamentally its economic situation and "social image". The students — both Russian and foreign — must have an opportunity of legal earnings. This could result from sustainable economic development which would increase wages and narrow down the sphere of "shadow" earnings.

Conclusion

Thus, the Chinese strategy "To go outside" is likely to cause fundamental changes in immigration processes in the majority of more or less developed countries in the upcoming years. The development of "collective" regulations concerning international migration and world labor market will almost certainly be on the agenda. Special research is needed to outline the expediency and essence of these regulations. It would be great if this research is conducted as a joined project of experts from involved countries. For Russia, with its longest boundary with China, such a research is of particular importance. One of the main subjects of further studies of Chinese migration should be Chinese ethnic communities due to their significant role in contemporary – and to a broader extent in future life of Russia.

Translated into English by Irina Ivakhniouk

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RUSSIA IN THE WORLD MIGRATION FLOWS: TRENDS OF THE LAST DECADE (1992 – 2001)

Introduction

The article dwells on international migration trends over the last decade. During this period Russia demonstrated significant shift in both scale and character of migration flows. The authors pay primary attention to the analysis of definitions and concepts that are a matter of disagreements among Russian “migration community” and is also typical for international migration literature in the world as a whole. The brief historical overview of international migration in Russia is given in order to demonstrate that it is not a completely new phenomenon for the country. Moreover, many current problems related to migration of population in contemporary Russia are rooted in migration history of the imperial period.

The authors also give their estimation of the present stage of migration studies in Russia, its theoretical “failures” that have generated myths and errors concerning international migration in Russia in the last decade and, in turn, has resulted in bankruptcy of its migration policy.

Special attention is paid to Russia’s place and role in the modern international migration vortex with specificity of migration flows from the former Soviet states (defined in Russia as “new foreign states” in contradistinction to the “old foreign states”, or traditionally understood foreign countries) that are presently becoming the basic component of demographic dynamics of the country.

In the conclusion governmental attempts to develop effective migration policy are analyzed and recommendation in this field in view of mid-term and long-term perspectives of international migration trends in Russia are given.

Conceptual Definitions of International Migration in Russia, its Classification and Registration

There is hardly any other economic or socio-demographic phenomenon that carries so many different definitions and classifications by the beginning of the 21st century as migration.

Earlier, as a rule, it was possible to allocate more or less definitely two approaches: so called “narrow” understanding of migration as *movements to a new place of residence* and “wide” understanding of migration *the variety of spatial population mobility*. However, now we are to conclude that the term *migration* is getting a certain universal “collective” character, and authors who use it have in their minds sometimes absolutely different scale and character of population

mobility at its different stages. In our opinion, to avoid any misunderstandings the term *migration* when used in scientific analysis should always be added with amplifying adjective: seasonal, circular, non-return, temporary, permanent, economic, voluntary, forced, legal, illegal, ecological, political, ethnic, labor, tourist, etc. migration.

The existing variety of definitions often mix up characteristics of population mobility in general and migration in particular and results in either over-expanded interpretation of this phenomenon or — vice versa — in limitation of it with only one of the attributes, or sometimes — in equation of migration and mobility, voluntary illegal migration — and forced migration, economic migrants — and refugees, etc. This jumble is misrepresenting the essence of migration.


When speaking of the variety of definitions of migration of population it is necessary to emphasize that it mainly concerns *international migration* which is characterized not only by diversity of categories and by existing differences in its interpretation and registration between the countries, but also by a number of principal interstate attributes (state border, border control, degree of “openness” of a country to the external world, labor market policy, integration or isolation trends, etc.). Strangely enough, but it is difficult to find clear, well-shaped definitions of international migration of population in literature. For example, there is no definition of international migration even in capital work by Eduard Pletnev “International Migration of Labor” (Moscow, 1962), as well as in many other books of Russian and foreign authors¹.

In our opinion, *international migration of population is the movements of population through international borders related to change of permanent residence and citizenship caused by various reasons (economic, family, ethnic, political and others) or to temporary stay in the country of arrival of long-term (over one year), seasonal (less than one year) or circular (daily) character, as well as to episodic trips for business, rest, treatment, etc.* The main distinctive attributes of international migration of population in comparison with internal migration are: state border, its crossing and the corresponding state control at the border (both from country of departure side and from country of arrival side) as well as control over staying in the country of arrival, mainly related to employment, studying or training.

This detailed definition of international migration of population corresponds to the realities of the contemporary world which is characterized by the variety of types and forms of international migration and their interrelationships (see Scheme 1).

Correspondingly, *international migrant is a person who moves across state border with the purpose of change of residence, work or other actions (study, rest, business, etc.) permanently or for a certain period (from 1 day to several years).*

¹For more detailed analysis please refer to: Vladimir Iontsev, 1999, Chapter 1, pp. 15–55.



Scheme 1. General classification of spatial population mobility

The search for common approach to definition of migration and the main related categories is essentially important. Divergences in definition result in distortion of scale of the process. When terms *foreign population* or *immigrants* are used as a conceptual basement for qualitative estimation of international migration of population, the conclusions concerning numbers of migrants and dynamics of international migration can vary significantly. In fact number of immigrants can change not only as a result of new immigration but also due to natural increase (positive dynamics) or naturalization (negative dynamics). It is not casually that in some countries of immigration (USA, Canada, Australia) number of *foreign-born population* but not *foreign population* is used for calculation of the total number of immigrants for certain date.

It is important to understand that number of migrants and number of migrations (scale of migration flows) during the same period of time can differ because one migrant can move across the boundary several times within this period of time.

To provide better reflection of international migration by means of statistical registration and its analysis it is crucially important to take into account that the essence of international migration and structure of its flows change in the course of time. Definition of international migration and its classification should be changing correspondingly. While exception of *tourist* trips from international migration statistics recommended by the United Nations half a century ago was reasonable and understandable for that moment, nowadays the essence of tourist trips in many regions of the world has dramatically changed. The actual purposes of people arriving to this or that country with tourist visa can differ from recreational or cognitive ones. Frequently, the “tourists” category hide business-migrants, circular “shuttle migrants”, irregular labor migrants, etc. For example, the major part of Russian “shuttle migrants” or “chelnoks”² make their business trips with tourist visa and are fixed by statistics as “tourists” though they are economic migrants by nature. The appearance of such categories as “scientific tourists”, “educational tourists” who are in fact circular migrants also demonstrate heterogeneous nature of contemporary “tourists”.

For this reason the inclusion of tourist migration in the general analysis of international migration of population looks reasonable. Accordingly, estimation of total number of international migrants should be changed: by our calculations, in 2001 it exceeded 900,000 persons!

As to exclusion of frontier workers from the list of international migrants that is traditional in many countries is also unreasonable. Who are they, if not migrant workers “who are hired in a country that is not a country of their citizenship” — and this is the essence of definition of labor migration?

² Definition and analysis of this type of economic migration in Russia in the 1990’s are presented in the corresponding section of this paper.

Exclusion of above mentioned categories from definition of international migration and – correspondingly – from migration statistics often misrepresents its actual scale and provokes its underestimation.

As to the terms *emigrant* and *immigrant* though they are associated exceptionally with international migration but criteria of their definition in the countries remain various. For example, in Germany immigrants are considered as persons who cross the border with an intention to settle in the country; in Japan — as nationals and foreigners who arrive from abroad; in Russia — as persons who arrive in the country for a period over one year; in the USA — as persons who enter the country with the purpose of permanent residence and future receiving of US citizenship, etc. The mid-1970's research of the United Nations aimed at unification of the definitions *immigrant* and *emigrant* has found seven principal national criteria of these definitions: three of them were based on duration of stay in the country of arrival, the others — on purpose of arrival (UN Demographic Yearbook 1978, pp. 70–78).

Probably, this can explain the fact that in existing modern classifications of main categories of international migrants *immigrants* and *emigrants* are practically absent. In our opinion, they should be interpreted as *non-return* migrants who arrive to a country or depart from a country only.

The situation is even worse in Russia where the “terms game” and the absence of well-organized statistical registration obviously do not provide better understanding of current international migration and development of reliable migration policy. For instance, in the ILO, IOM and UNHCR joined report prepared for the 1994 UN Population Conference in Cairo and based on official Russian sources foreign population of Russia is estimated as over 27 million persons as all non-Russian (by ethnicity) population of Russia was considered as *foreigners!* (Migrants, refugees... 1994, p. 23–28). Is it a result of statistics defects or inadequate understanding of the term *foreign population*? Of no less surprise is the Goscomstat (Russia's National Committee on Statistics) data on numbers of arrivals to Russia from non-former Soviet states that vary from 400 to 18,000 persons during the same year in different official publications. The problem is far over scientific discussion on the terms and definitions. It is the problem of the official position of the state towards foreign citizens who come to Russia with various purposes and for various periods of time. It can be also a problem growing from national policy which needs careful treatment of any terms.

Special attention should be paid to registration and statistics of international migration. The lack of common approach to principal definitions is resulting in incomparability of statistical data.

Difficulties in international migration studies are also resulting from different nature of data sources and different systems of registration

of foreign and local population in the countries. For example, in Russia, as in many other countries, there are no population registers that are a reliable source for analyzing natural and migration movement of population in many other countries (Bilsborrow et al., 1997). Meanwhile, countries have miscellaneous principles of registration of foreign population, imported labor force, asylum-seekers, etc. that are in respect of various institutions (in Russia the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Statistics Committee and the Federal Frontier Service collect data on international migration, and this data varies).

Besides, in 1996 in Russia a new migration registration system was introduced. It includes two types of registration of migrants: according to the place of permanent residence (permanent registration) and according to the place of temporary residence (temporary registration). The fact that since 1997 migrants from the former Soviet republics are in many facets equated with internal migrants makes additional confusion for the international migration picture. Besides, as O.Tchudinovskikh argues, “according to new rules ‘migrant’s statistical forms’ are not to be filled for temporary residents despite duration of their stay in a region and number of re-registrations” (Tchudinovskikh, 2001, p. 35).

The 2002 Federal Law “On citizenship” in Russia is making the issues concerning registration of migrants from the ex-USSR states even more complicated as it fails to reflect specific migration situation at the post-Soviet territory where it is necessary, on one hand, to register persons arriving to Russia from the “new foreign states” as international migrants, and on the other hand, to take into account close migration links that have existed between these republics in the Soviet period.

Not having the opportunity to commit our point of view on definitions and classification of international migration in a brief article (for details please refer to: Iontsev, 1999, chapter 1; Introduction in Demography, 2002, chapter 12, Mkrtchyan, 2001; Tchudinovskikh, 2001), we have focused on several, the most disputable issues. Uncertainty in these questions of principle interferes with the theoretical analysis of international migration.

Historical Overview of International Migration in Russia

The view on international migration from historical position is appropriate in the context of the present article because without knowledge of the past it is often very difficult to understand the present and to argue about the future³. In many respects international migration trends in Russia at the crossing of the 20th and the 21st centuries, especially their ethnic facets, are deeply rooted in Russia’s history.

³ For detailed migration history of Russia please refer to: Iontsev, 1999, 2001; Pybakovskiy, 1991; Kabuzan, 1998.

It is necessary to note that international migration history in Russia is to be separated into two dimensions: besides migration exchange with countries of Europe, America and other regions of the world there have been numerous migration flows to marches of the Russian Empire, and during the Soviet period — to the neighboring republics (as well as from these republics to the center of the country). After 1992 the former Soviet republics have become sovereign states, while population movements between Russia and them has turned into international migration. The reasons for mass migration between Russia and so called “new foreign states” are hidden in former migration flows which have been formally considered as internal migration flows within the single country. This is one of principal peculiarities of the last decade.

The start of numerous international migration in Russia in its contemporary understanding is related to the epoch of Peter the Great when the country has received the first inflow of foreigners. The policy of attracting foreign specialists, scientists, wealthy businessmen from Europe initiated by the Emperor has greatly stimulated economic progress of Russia. During Peter’s epoch the official policy which has been called in the 1960’s “brain gain” has first arisen. During Ekaterina II’s rule (the second half of the 18th century) immigration has become of mass character. Foreigners were invited to settle at the sparsely populated lands along Volga River. In 1763 in order to urge on the process of settlement the special “Office for the Guardianship of the Immigrants’ Needs” was founded; in fact it was the ever-first governmental migration service. The amount of only Germans who have moved to Russia during these years exceeded 300,000 persons.

In the 19th century the German community in Russia was growing due to continuing immigration and natural increase: according to the first Russian population census of 1897, number of ethnic Germans was about 1.8 million people (77% of them were peasants).

At the Far East in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century there was a lot of immigrants from Korea and China who escaped famine and natural disasters in their countries. Great number of Koreans moved to Russia after 1910 when Japan has annexed the territory of Korea. In 1915, in the Far East the number of Korean immigrants was over 60,000 persons; by 1925 it exceeded 150,000. Koreans intended to move to Russia for permanent residence and to integration in the Russian society. The portion of immigrants in the population of Russia’s Far East at the beginning of the 20th century was around 15%.

As to Jewish people, they appeared in Russia not as a result of immigration but as a result of division of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austro-Hungary when eastern Polish lands populated by Jews were included in the Russian Empire. It was fixed by 1885 Vienna Congress. At the beginning of 1776 the number of Jews in Russia was

estimated as 7 persons (!) while in Poland they were over 577,000 persons (Iontsev, 1999, p. 190).

The total net immigration to Russia since the beginning of the 19th century till 1916 was slightly over 4 million persons; it has significantly affected development of certain regions — Povolgie (Volga Region), South of Russia, Far East.

During the Soviet period immigration to the Soviet Union was primarily of political character. In the starting years of the Soviet regime hundreds of foreigners who truly believed in the socialist idea arrived to the Soviet Union. Granting of Soviet citizenship to them was simplified as much as possible. In the period of 1936–1939 thousands of Spanish citizens who tried to escape from the fascist regime came. At the beginning of 1950's over 120,000 Armenians from Syria, Iran and Greece arrived. In the 1960's thousands of Greeks escaped to the USSR from the “black colonels” junta in Greece. However, later, after settlement of democratic regimes in these countries the major part of “political immigrants” has returned to their motherland. Net immigration to the USSR during the socialist period was around 1 million persons.

Labor migration was also developing in the 1970's within the frames of the socialist community. By the beginning of the 1990's the number of foreign workers from Vietnam, Bulgaria, Cuba and other countries was over 200,000 persons (Iontsev, 1992, p. 28).

As to emigration from Russia, it was not numerous in the period between the beginning of the 18th century and the second half of the 19th century, much less than immigration. The situation changed at the end of the 19th century when deprivation of land and ravage of the peasants on one hand and repressive policy towards ethnic minorities on the other hand have caused sharp growth of emigration from Russia. During 1899–1913 about 2.4 million persons have emigrated from the Russian Empire to the USA alone (among them: 41% — Jews, 29% — Poles, 9% — Lithuanians and Latvians, 7% — Finns and Estonians, 7% — Russians, 6% — Germans and others). Simultaneously, labor migration from Russia has developed, and this relatively short period of time before the World War I has been unique in Russia's migration history by scale of temporary labor migration. Up to 300,000 Russians annually arrived to Germany alone for the period of 10.5 months or less during 1910–1913; they amounted 70% of the total number of foreign workers in the German agriculture.

These facts give reason to argue that the Russian Empire in the very beginning of the 20th century has been an active participant of world migration processes being, in particular, one of the principal suppliers of European countries and America with cheap unskilled labor force.

In the Soviet period, Russia has experienced several waves of emigration stipulated mainly by political reasons; its total value was about 4.5 million persons. The most dramatic loss for Russia was the first wave

first wave of emigration (1917–1925) caused by World War I, the 1917 February and October revolutions and civil war when Russia has lost the greater part of its intellectual elite: professors, engineers, military experts, physicians, writers, musicians, etc. When staying in the Western countries these people and their descendants have made a significant impact in the development of the world science, culture and art.

After 1925, when the “iron curtain” was erected legal departure from the USSR has become practically impossible and emigration has become an object of ideological prosecution. Nevertheless, according to some estimates, during the period 1926–1938 about 250,000 persons managed to leave the country. The Second World war was a specific period when over 4.2 million Soviet citizens were taken away by force to Germany and some other European countries (2.7 million of civilians and 1.5 military men). About 620,000 of them have not wished to return to the USSR.

In the 1970’s an outflow of emigrants who departed with Israeli visa has started. During 1971–1986, 360,000 persons (80% of them were Jews) have emigrated to Israel, as well as to the USA and partly to Canada where they could easily get the refugee status.

So, even the very brief review of the history of migration exchange between Russia and other countries gives reason for concluding that for a long period of time Russia has actively participated in various types — return and non-return, and in various forms — voluntary, forced, illegal, of the world migration movements, that have been primarily stipulated by economic or political reasons.

As to history of migration between Russia and its present neighbors — new independent states, it is a matter of specific analysis. Only a decade ago these states have been the territory of a common country — the Soviet Union, or earlier — the Russian Empire. Regarding the Union as a federal structure we can speak about migration between Russia and other Soviet republics (in pre-Soviet period they were a part of the Empire) as they were formally separated by boundaries. We understand this migration as “external” migration⁴ for Russia, however, in this context it is not a synonym of international migration (see Scheme 1).

Since the beginning of the 18th century until the 1970’s the most important feature of migration flows in this region was continuing long-term centrifugal trend of population movements from the center of Russia to the colonized border regions. During pre-Soviet period (1796–1916) the total number of population who have moved from European

⁴In this context the term “*external*” migration corresponds to ethno-sociological approach in studying migration: “migrations outflows from the areas of compact settlement of certain ethnic groups can be considered as external migrations, non depending of either administrative or state borders are crossed or not” (Arutiunyan et al, 1998, p. 87).

part of Russia to its border regions exceeded 12.6 million, among them 7 million (80% of them were ethnic Russians) have moved to the territories that are now the “new foreign states” (Population Encyclopedia, 1994; Kabuzan, 1996). During the Soviet period centrifugal trends of migration flows were continuing, however, along with them return centripetal tendencies have appeared, and after the second half of the 1970’s they have changed migration balance of Russia with other republics from negative to positive and turned the general vector of inter-republican migration flows to Russia. However, the total migration balance of Russia with other republics over the Soviet period was negative — Russia has “lost” about 4 million persons.

Inter-republican migrations in the Soviet epoch were characterized by variety of forms of migration flows starting with “planned” migration and finishing with “forced” migration. The economic “half-voluntary — half-forced” migration was dominating, when Russian (mainly ethnic Russians) specialists and workers were sent to assimilate virgin lands in Kazakhstan, or to construct and equip industrial units in the Baltic and Caucasus republics, or to develop weaving industry and aluminium processing in Central Asian republics. Besides, forced deportations of Koreans from the Far East to the Central Asia, Germans from Volga region to Kazakhstan, Tatars, Chechens, Ingushs and other peoples from regions of their traditional residing in the 1930’s and the 1940’s have greatly influenced migration processes in the future.

Table 1. Net migration between Russia and other Soviet republics, 1989–1991, thousands

Republics	1989	1990	1991	1989–1991
Ukraine	2.1	-4.2	-66.1	-68.2
Belarus	-4.6	23.3	-4.7	14
Moldova	2.0	0.9	2.5	5.4
Lithuania	1.1	5.0	4.4	10.5
Latvia	2.5	3.9	5.8	12.2
Estonia	0.6	3.3	4.2	8.1
Georgia	10.8	14.5	28.7	54
Azerbaijan	37.7	52.0	20.7	110.4
Armenia	8.6	1.4	4.1	14.1
Uzbekistan	41.6	65.9	35.9	143.4
Kirghizia	5.0	21.2	17.7	43.9
Tadjikistan	6.7	40.3	17.6	64.6
Turkmenia	4.6	5.1	4.5	14.2
Kazakhstan	43.9	54.5	29.6	128
Total	162.6	287.3	104.9	554.8

Source: The Population of Russia at the Crossing of the XX and the XXI Centuries: Problems and Prospects. M.: MAX Press, 2002, p. 255.

Approximately since the end of the 1960’s migration outflow of the Russian population from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and later from other republics has started. They were purely ethnic by nature. The reason was

Table 2. Net Migration between Russia and former Soviet States 1992–2002, thousands

Countries	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1992-2002
Ukraine	-110.0	17.3	139.0	89.0	87.1	68.7	54.6	22.4	39.1	12.5	16.2	435.9
Belarus	-21.3	-11.4	15.6	10.1	2.4	-1.5	-5.3	-7.6	-3.0	-4.7	-2.0	-28.7
Moldova	9.9	4.5	12.0	10.4	11.0	7.9	6.0	4.8	9.4	5.9	6.2	88.0
Georgia	46.2	65.0	62.2	43.7	34.5	21.7	18.1	17.1	18.4	8.3	6.2	341.4
Azerbaijan	50.7	43.1	43.4	37.8	35.4	25.5	18.3	12.0	11.7	3.4	3.9	285.2
Armenia	12.0	27.9	44.6	31.3	22.4	16.4	14.4	12.4	14.4	4.5	5.7	206.0
Uzbekistan	86.4	70.6	135.4	97.1	36.6	31.7	36.6	36.6	37.7	22.9	23.5	615.1
Kirghizia	49.8	86.7	56.5	18.3	10.4	7.4	5.7	6.7	13.7	9.4	12.1	276.7
Tadjikistan	66.7	62.9	41.9	38.5	29.9	20.7	16.4	10.3	9.9	5.8	5.1	308.1
Turkmenia	12.0	6.8	17.4	17.2	21.4	15.2	9.0	6.8	6.1	4.1	4.3	120.3
Kazakhstan	96.6	126.9	304.5	191.0	134.5	207.8	183.2	113.5	107.0	50.0	41.8	1556.8
Lithuania	11.7	17.0	6.9	2.8	18	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.4	59.4
Latvia	23.2	23.7	25.0	13.7	7.4	5.1	3.0	1.5	1.4	1.0	0.7	105.7
Estonia	21.8	12.8	10.2	7.7	5.0	2.9	1.2	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.2	62.6
Total	355.7	553.8	914.6	608.6	439.8	430.1	361.8	237.0	266.8	123.7	124.3	4416.2

Source: The Population of Russia at the Crossing of the XX and the XXI Centuries: Problems and Prospects. M.: MAX Press, 2002, p. 257.

related to gradual replacement of Russian staff in the spheres of management, science, services, etc. by locals who have got education by that time in their republics as well as in Russia's universities and professional schools. By the end of the 1970's centripetal migration flows to Russia have become dominating. Russia's migration balance with nearly all the republics that have earlier received Russian migrants has become positive. For example, in 1979-1988, from Kazakhstan alone over 700,000 persons moved back to Russia, and over 800,000 persons — from all republics of Central Asia. (It is necessary to note that in 1980's along with return migration of Russian population from many republics the outflow of local peoples has started. The main regions of mass emigration of local population were Caucasus republics, Central Asia, Moldavia. The main receiving region was Russia, and to a less extent — Ukraine and Baltic republics (see Table 1).

Thus, after being the sending region for over three centuries Russia has become a receiving region. Migration inflow to Russia dramatically increased in the 1990's: national unrest and civil wars provoked flows of refugees and forced migrants. This situation made some authors contend that international migration in the 1990's in Russia was primarily "of forced character".

Modern Stage of Migration Studies in Russia

Russia's rich migration history gave rise to good traditions in its studies and development of theoretical concepts.

In this connection we would like to quote the distinguished Russian economist of the beginning of the 20th century professor of the Moscow University A. Tchuprov as we share his point of view on development of new theories and concepts: "If one takes any new theory apart he will find out that in the process of constructing a new conceptual building the role of a constructor is usually merely putting already existing materials in order and combining them in a new way. Concepts of people can't be formed immediately; they usually become shaped through generations; new concepts primarily either develop previous ones, or oppose them, or they are a compromise. In any of these cases a new theory carries features of former theories. Historical succession of ideas is especially important for human sciences" (Tchuprov, 1911, pp. 1-2).

The first stone to the "basement of Russian conceptual building" of migration was put by eminent Russian scientist Mikhail Lomonosov in his books "Ancient History of Russia from the Beginning of Russian Nation ... until 1074" (1758) and "On Reproduction of Russian Nation" (1761). Lomonosov has analyzed the role of Slavic tribes migrations in formation and development of the Russian nation and state, the reasons for international migration in Russia (that are typical for many other countries also) and gave reasonable recommendations on how it should be managed. For example, he was the first to realize that emigration

can't be restricted by administrative bans alone: "Emigration can't be locked by force" (Lomonosov, 1986, p. 143). He figuratively called emigrants as "alive dead bodies" and considered them as a loss for Russian nation together with "illnesses, disasters and murders". In order to compensate that loss Lomonosov proposed to attract foreign citizens "by means of appropriate measures" (*ibid.*, p. 144).

We would like to emphasize that Lomonosov was one of the first scientists who had defined international migration as a demographic process; he had offered two combinations of demographic processes: *emigration — mortality* and *immigration — fertility*, that have opposite impact on growth of population. This approach has been developed only in the 20th century by M. Ptukha, W. Zelinsky, L. Bouvier and others.

The boom of scientific discussion on international migration in Russia took place in the second half of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century in the works of N. Borodin, K. Vobliy, A. Kaufman, A. Velitsin, A. Isaev, etc.⁵ The main issue of discussion was related to so called "yellow danger" — Chinese migration to Russia's Far East. This discussion was renewed in the 1990's when the "Chinese factor" has revived, and serious investigations of its scale, role and consequences have been made, especially by V. Gelbras and V. Dyatlov.

In general, during the 1990's a lot of publications on international migration in Russia have been issued: over one thousand articles, hundreds of scientific reports, dozens of monographs and edited volumes. Regretfully, the major part of them were of descriptive character, without fundamental conceptual basement. For example, there are several dozens of works on labor migration, however, none of them can be compared in analytical dimension with Eduard Pletnev's monograph (Pletnev, 1962) where he is not only explaining interrelation between international labor migration and movement of goods and capital but is also developing the "world labor market" theory.

A lot of researches, articles and monographs are dealing with forced migration in Russia, however, there is very slow theoretical progress in this field — the publications are based mainly on emotions but not on analytical interpretation. To a certain extent it is true regarding illegal immigration. The works on "brain drain" are characterized by much higher level of understanding, first of all due to researches of I. Ushkalov, I. Malakha (1999, 1999a), O. Ikonnikov (1993).

The results of Russian scholars' researches, namely M. Denisenko, O. Soboleva, O. Staroverov in migration modeling are impressive (though priority of Western scholars in this field should be recognized). For example, in 1993 O. Staroverov offered a very interesting idea to combine micro and macro approaches in migration studies.

⁵ See, for example, Velitsin A.A. Germans in Russia. Saint-Petersburg, 1893; Vobliy K.G. Over-Atlantic Emigration, Its Reasons and Effects. Warsaw, 1904; Kaufman A.A. Resettlement and Colonization. Saint-Petersburg, 1905.

It is worth mentioning valuable researches in international migration in Russia headed by G. Vitkovskaya, M. Denisenko, Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, A. Kamenskiy, E. Krasinets, I. Malakha, L. Rybakovskiy, A. Topilin, E. Tiuriukanova, O. Tchudinovskikh in the 1990's. Some of these publications are included in the list of references.

Historical review of population development in Russia and its migration history in particular, is presented in books of V. Kabuzan (1996, 1998). In these books we can find evidences of migration processes role in formation of the Russian nation that are valuable for the analysis of current migration trends.

At last, classification of conceptual approaches in migration studies made by V. Iontsev (1999) is to be mentioned. His classification includes 17 conceptual approaches (economic, sociological, demographic, migratory, geographical, systematic, typological, methodological, etc.) consisting of over 45 scientific theories and concepts. That classification is based on 8 dimensions (conceptual approach, theory, main authors, migration type, migration form, analytical level, object of studying, summary of a theory). Now it is in the process of improvement and replenishment, for example, "economic model of urban-rural migration" of M. Todaro and "social capital theory" of D. Massey et al. are added.

According to this classification, economic approach in interpretation of migration is dominating. At the same time migratory approach is promising, especially "mobility transition" concept of A. Zelinsky, "three-stage migration process" of T. Zaslavskaya and L. Rybakovskiy, and "migratiology" of B. Khorev, V. Iontsev and M. Denisenko. The latter is presenting in fact an attempt to formulate an independent science on migration and corresponds with ideas of W. Zelinsky, D. Massey, L. Rybakovsky and others.

Nevertheless, despite vast number of publications on international migration in the 1990's a theoretical break-through in interpretation of contemporary international migration trends did not happen. Partly it can be explained by the necessity of a certain period of accumulating empirical data before theorizing; partly — by misunderstanding of the nature of the "new foreign states" phenomenon.


Anyhow, insufficient conceptual interpretation of contemporary trends and peculiarities of international migration of population in Russia has produced a number of false interpretations, or "myths" about current international migration situation in the country that have become of official character in Russia⁶.

⁶ For example, *The Report on Human Development in the Russian Federation in 1999* / Ed. by Y. Fedorov. Moscow, UNDP, 1999; Zh. Zayonchkovskaya Paper "Migration Policy" for the draft of The Russia's Development Programme up to 2010. The Center for Strategic Research, 2000; The Concept of the State Regulation of Migration Processes in Russia (Draft). Moscow, 2002.

Another reason for appearance of such myths is related to the fact that during rather long period of socialist regime Russia has been relatively isolated from increasing migration movements in other regions of the world for political reasons. This reality has made Soviet scholars to concentrate on studying internal migration trends and possibilities of managing the internal migration for achievement of most rational distribution of population over the country for the sake of accelerated economic growth. As a consequence, when reality has changed and Russia has been involved in various international migration flows in the 1990's the development of new conceptual approaches to the analysis of this new migration situation has been impeded by steadiness of former views.

Nonetheless, despite specificity of current migration situation in Russia, e.g. resulting from the phenomenon of so-called “new foreign states”, it is becoming more and more corresponding to the contemporary global trends of international migration. Conversion of inter-republic boundaries (within one country) into inter-state borders in spite of their “transparency” necessitated understanding and interpreting migration flows as of *international* ones. Incomprehension resulted in failure of official attempts to manage migration processes and in inconsistent position of the government towards inflow of forced migrants, mainly ethnic Russians who would like to reside in Russia, as well as other flows, namely of labor migrants.

The first myth is related to equation (identification) of previous inter-republic migration movement between Russia and other Soviet states within the frames of the USSR and — international migrations between new independent states in the post-Soviet epoch. This results in wrong approaches in developing of priorities hierarchy in the official migration policy, as well as in wrong conclusions like “international migrations at the post-Soviet territory are freezing” (Zayonchkovskaya, 2000). Such conclusions are usually based on comparison with the scale of former internal migration in the USSR (however, it's a well known fact that internal migration is much more numerous than international migration, especially in big countries) or on non-return migration balance.



Source: Data of the Russian Federation National Statistics Committee.

Table 3. Migration of Russian and Foreign Citizens in Russia, by purpose of travelling (excluding CIS, thousands)⁷

Purpose of traveling	years									
	1990	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Departures of Russian citizens abroad,	4202	8589	9244	8506	7887	9396	8510	8494	9881	10461
thereof for:										
permanent residence	104	114	105	110	99	85	80	85	62	59
business	1082	2759	2283	1696	1600	1539	1415	1480	1611	1951
tourism	1200	1577	2522	2555	3422	4084	3251	2580	4252	3972
private	720	2965	3024	2925	1448	2397	2522	2885	2867	3172
other reasons**	1096	1174	1310	1220	1318	1291	1242	1464	1089	1307
Arrivals of foreign citizens to Russia,	3098	5386	3315	5313	5498	6493	6285	7105	7419	7086
thereof for:										
permanent residence	1,2	2,4	3,3	2,4	2,4	3,6	3,2	2,9	9,0	7,2
business	1094	2204	1267	2186	2274	1972	1876	1823	1997	1960
tourism	1080	1543	915	1787	1716	2290	1904	1924	2215	2052
private	295	836	412	544	721	1139	1453	2265	2239	2059
other reasons**	628	801	718	794	785	1088	1049	1090	959	1008
Total	7300	13975	12559	13819	13385	15889	14795	15599	17300	17547

Note: * Figures in brackets take into account migration exchange with CIS and Baltic countries. ** Transportation staff (sailors, pilots, etc.); *** Transit migrants and transportation staff (in 1995 — 84,000 and 710,000 correspondingly).

Source: Data of the Russian Federation National Statistics Committee.

⁷ *Note:* Data of Goskomstat can differ data of other Russian official sources (for example, as to Federal Frontier Service, 2259 foreign tourists arrived to Russia in 2002, in contrast to 2527, as to Goskomstat).

If we take into consideration migration for permanent residence alone, we do see the decline from 880,000 persons in 1994 to 72,000 persons in 2001. However, if we include all types of migration flows in the analysis (including non-return migration as well) we will watch the seven-times growth of gross migration of Russians and foreign citizens between 1987 and 2001 — up to 40 million (see Diagram 1 and Table 3).

The second myth deals with the idea that contemporary international migration in Russia is in fact the repatriation of Russians from the former Soviet republics. In this context all the Russian-speaking population of the former USSR is considered as Russians. Repatriates are associated with forced migrants, and it is not always true. While we recognize problems related to forced migration (especially when it is understood in a broader sense), however, in our opinion not forced migration but *economic* migration is becoming more and more dominant in Russia, as well as in global international migration trends. Disappointing clumsy actions of official institutions who were “responsible” for migration in Russia failed to be a coordinated strategic migration policy as they were targeted exclusively at forced migrants, and even in this narrowed context they were not successful.

After 2002, when management of migration processes was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs attention has become focused on illegal migration and other forms of migration movements have been “forgotten” again. Properly speaking it is *the third myth* that has been developed in the world after September 11, 2001 tragedy in the USA⁸. Since then the complex of international migration movements has been concerned in the light of illegal immigration, and the latter — as migration of terrorists and criminals only. This can become a very dangerous delusion that will result in restriction measures of migration policy and consequently it will provoke increase in illegal migration as it always happens when legal ways of migration become closed. Overwhelming majority of illegal immigrants are obviously aimed at job-seeking in a country of arrival, therefore, illegal immigration by its essence is economic phenomenon and it needs not so much restrictive measures as regulating policy aimed at legalization.


One more myth is related to the problem which is becoming highly disputable for Russia: demographic crisis. Some authors tend to overvalue the role of international migration in managing Russia’s demographic crisis. Again they use samples from the Soviet past when by means of migration policy depopulation trends in certain regions have been eliminated. Current demographic crisis in fact needs extremely serious attitude; it is an object of separate section in the present article.

⁸ See, for example, articles on international migration policy after September 11, 2001 in “International Migration Review”, vol. 36, No: 1, 2002.

Global Trends of International Migration of Population and Russia

The last decades of the 20th century have witnessed dramatic shift in global migration trends that are resulting in formation of a new stage of migration history of the mankind. The most significant of these trends are:

- **Globalization of migration trends** is characterized, first, by involving practically all the countries of the world in migration flows, especially after the population of the former socialist countries have got an opportunity to participate in world migration movements, and second, by unprecedented growth of the international migration scale and formation of the so called “nation of migrants”. The United Nations 2002 estimates for international migrants in the world is 175 million persons (as a total of foreign-born population). This figure demonstrates triple increase in comparison with 1950. This figure does not include international tourists whose number exceeded 650 million in 2001 in comparison with 69 million in 1960, and also long-term, seasonal, circular and illegal migrants. So, total number of persons who are involved in international migrations in this or that form is probably close to 1 billion (depending on illegal migrants estimate) (Iontsev, 2001, p. 20).



Source: **International Migration 2002. New York, UN, 2002.**

Diagram 2 based on UN data shows the second position of Russia among receiving countries. Though Russia's national statistics data is

different from the UN criteria of *foreign-born persons*, the total number of immigrants to Russia between 1992–2001 — 10.7 million persons (among them: 6.5 million of officially registered as “arrived for permanent residence”, 1.2 million of refugees, 3 million of non-status immigrants⁹) — also confirms Russia’s second position in the world hierarchy of receiving countries.

- **Qualitative shift in the structure of migration flows** means the growth of the percentage of skilled professionals among international migrants. This trend is closely related to probably the most painful phenomenon in international migration, “brain drain”, i.e. *non-return migration of highly skilled specialists — scientists, engineers, physicians, etc. (including potential intellectuals such as students, post-graduate students, trainees)*. *The policy having a special purpose to attract skilled personnel from other countries is widely used by developed countries, first of all by the USA.*

It is worth noting that in Russian or foreign literature there is no common understanding of the term “brain drain”. It can be mixed up with international intellectual labor migration, or with internal outflow of intellectual workers from the scientific and educational sphere to business and commerce. In the western literature “brain drain” is insistently presented as the process of mutual benefit for all participating parties.

However, according to the UN estimation only financial losses of developing countries from “brain drain” exceeded 60 billion USD in the last three decades. In the 1990’s it has become a great concern of CIS and East European states. There are the estimates of Russian and foreign experts concluding annual losses of Russia resulting from “brain drain” can be around 50 billion USD if so called potential losses are taken into consideration (Ushkalov, Malakha, 1999, p. 86)¹⁰.

- **The growing role and scale of economic migration** is the most stable and long-lasting trend of international migration. It has gained crucial impulse with expansion of capitalist economy and commercialization of labor. The world labor market is developing by means of export and import of foreign labor force. In 2001 the total number of labor migrants is estimated as over 40 million (120 million with family-members) compared to 3.2 million in 1960.

A distinguished expert on migration W. Bohning argues that nowadays international migration is one of principal issues of globaliza-

⁹ Non-status immigrants are not illegal migrants. This category has appeared as a result of “transparent” borders between former Soviet states when people who moved to Russia in the beginning of 1990’s succeeded in living and working there for years, however, due to poor legislation couldn’t obtain the Russian citizenship

¹⁰ For detailed analysis of “brain drain” in Russia please refer to an article of Irina Malakha in the present volume.

globalization that affects economics and labor force in over 100 countries (see Stalker, 1994).

In global labor migration flows Russia is both a sending and a receiving country. During the last decade it has received over 1.8 million legal labor migrants while about 1 million of Russian citizens are working in other countries. Besides, in the 1990's Russia was "producing" millions of circular petty-traders, who were international economic migrants by their nature.

- **Growth of illegal immigration** is closely related to globalization. Though illegal migrants can include asylum-seekers, criminals and plotters the essential characteristic of this type of international migration is its obvious labor motivation. Migrants can arrive to a country of destination either legally (as tourists, by invitation, etc.) or illegally (with false documents, illegal cross of a boundary). However, in both cases their purpose is job-seeking. It is very difficult to estimate the real number of illegal migrants. Indirect methods can give some approximate figures which usually differ greatly. Thus, in the USA number of illegal immigrants is estimated between 2 and 15 million, in Europe — between 1,3 and 5 million, in Japan — between 300,000 and 1 million, in Russia — between 400,000 and 7 million.

The growth of illegal immigration is explained by different factors. As to Russia and its nearest neighbor-countries, the main reasons are: relatively more stable economic situation in Russia, "transparent" borders, wide opportunities for illegal work in the shadow sector, etc. However, the most significant reason for the growth of illegal immigration everywhere is cheapness and lack of rights of illegal migrants. This is a heavy stimulation for employers despite restrictive legislation against them.

It may seem a paradox, but not only employers but also the State benefit from illegal immigrants as they can be regarded as "net taxpayers" who pay different taxes while they do not receive any social payments and allowances.

In Russia illegal migration is demonstrating sharp growth since the end of 1980's. At first it was mainly illegal transit migration, and Russia was considered as a "staging post" on the way to the Western Europe, USA and other developed countries. In the latest years the structure of illegal migration in Russia is changing: along with growth of transit migration, irregular labor migration, primarily from the CIS states is dramatically increasing. The most numerous in-flows of irregular migrants come from Ukraine, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, as well as from China and Vietnam. They are accumulated in construction sector, commerce (enclave market) and other industries.

- Increase in the scale and geography of forced migration is related to the current stage of human development filled with political tension, wars, ethnic conflicts, and ecological disasters. During the last decade of the 20th century number of forced migrants related to UNHCR jurisdic-

tion (totally 27.3 million persons in 1995) increased 1.5 times in Asia, four times in Africa, ten (!) times in Europe.

As for Europe, disintegration of Yugoslavia, long-lasting conflict between Serbs and Albanians, “ethnic cleanings” in Kosovo, NATO military operation in Yugoslavia have provoked huge waves of forced migrations. The picture was embellished with refugees from regions of civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan, Rwanda, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Somalia as well as the former USSR states. Europe had never faced such a scaled forced migrations since World War II: between 1989 and 2000 European countries have received about 5 million forced migrants (Ryazantsev, 2001, p.62).

Russia is heavily affected by forced migration problems. After the collapse of the USSR it has become the epicenter for millions of forced migrants from former Soviet republics. Their total number is close to 3 million persons.

There are a lot of attempts to use the “refugee channel” by economic migrants who would like to improve their living standards. However, international conventions on refugees and national legislation in different countries definitely declare that persons who leave their country in quest of better living conditions or better job can’t pretend for refugee status. This statement is of principal value for Russia where even official concept on migration approves the status of so-called “economic refugees” as a part of forced migrants. This mistake results from misunderstanding of *forced* and *voluntary* forms of international migration.

• **The increasing role of international migration in demographic development** is resulting from the growing gap in demographic potential between developed countries and developing ones. In its turn, the gap is determined by different phases of demographic transition. In the context of the global tendency of decrease in population growth rate the developing regions are at the initial stage of this decrease while in the developed countries rate of natural population growth is often negative. For this reason the migration potential in developing countries remains high while developed countries are dependant on immigrants inflow to withstand local population ageing.

Thus, international migration is becoming a non-alternative factor of demographic development in ageing developed nations. In the 1990’s, nearly 88% of the total population growth results from net migration (compared to 36% in the 1960’s and 48% in the 1970’s). In many European countries where population growth rate is negative (Germany, Italy, Russia, etc.) immigration is the only source of the increase of population size. In the USA the “share” of migration increase in the total population increase is about 40% (1 million persons a year), in Australia — 50% (250,000 persons a year). The impact of immigration on population growth is also important for Canada, Israel and other countries.

Moreover, international migration affects not only the size of population but also its structure due to younger age structure of migrants. Whether “replacement migration” could be a solution to population ageing or not but to compensate population loss in labor-active age groups Europe (European Union) is to import 12.7 million immigrants annually until 2050!

Increasing participation of women in international migration is also important from demographic point of view. S. Castles argues that feminization of migration will be one of principal trends in international migration for the nearest 20 years (Castles, Miller, 1993). By the end of 1990’s portion of women among migrants in developing countries exceeded 50% (in the world in a whole — 49%). In labor migration flows from Philippines, Indonesia, Peru, Eastern European countries share of women prevails (over 60%).

Trafficking in migrants which mainly concerns women is making gender analysis of international migration especially topical.

In Russia, natural decrease of population in 1992–2001 was -7.7 million persons. For 44% (3.4 million persons) it was compensated by net migration. However, demographic situation in Russia can be characterized not as depopulation like in European countries but as demographic crisis. It can hardly be reversed by international migration. Unlike many developed countries of the world where migration is compensating natural decrease resulting from depopulation and provides population growth, in Russia international migration is not sufficient to reverse deep demographic crisis (which is much more versatile phenomenon than depopulation).

- **Dual character of migration policy** summarizes all the above mentioned trends. On the one hand, tightening of immigration policy and the entering regime has become an immanent feature of foreign policy in many developed countries. On the other hand, integration processes stipulate development of such regional unions as EU, NAFTA, etc. where liberalization of labor force movements is realized to a certain extent. Globalization and regional integration are reshaping world labor market: regional unions are getting benefits from effective labor redistribution.

Duality of migration policy is clearly seen at the *international level* (as confrontation of purposes and efforts of international organizations and national interests of certain countries), at the regional level (as combination of liberalization of migration regime by means of “transparent” borders within regional unions and restriction of migration policy towards migrants from “outside” countries) and at the national level (as contradiction between demographic and economic interests, on the one side, and reasons for political and social security, on the other side).

In this context Russia could be a good example. It has become the center of vast migration region, and in the nearest future the perspectives

of its demographic and economic development will be highly dependant on migration inflow. The CIS common labor market could be a logical decision when common language, close systems of professional training, cultural and labor traditions are taken into consideration. However, that “natural” trend is hampered by nationalist orientation for achieving ethnically homogenous nations in the Caucasus states, Central Asia and even Ukraine, and by the absence of encouraging migration policy in Russia that is resulting in inconsistent programs and lack of coordination between declarations and practice. As to official Russia’s statistical data, during the last five years number of legal migrant workers originating from CIS states is exceeded by number of foreign labor force originating from non-former Soviet states (China, Turkey, Yugoslavia). However, mass inflow of illegal labor migrants from so called “new foreign states” demonstrates high potential of labor migration in the region. Legitimate field for this migration and rational usage of migrants’ skills can be provided by reasonable strategic migration policy that would impede “the triumph of atavistic nationalist hatreds over economic logic” (Demeny, 2002, p. 73)

International Migration of Population in Russia in 1992–2001

Immigration and emigration: Russia after 1992

As it was mentioned above, we understand immigration as arrivals of foreign citizens with the purpose of permanent residence and, as a rule, citizenship of a country of arrival. Correspondingly, emigration is departure to another country for permanent residence and, as a rule, citizenship of a country of destination. Only these two migration flows will be analyzed in the present sub-section.

Data on arrivals and departures for permanent residence apart from other forms of international migration in Russia obviously distinguishes the roles of the “new foreign states” and “old foreign states” as sending countries and receiving countries. The sources of permanent immigration to Russia are the former Soviet states: after disintegration of the USSR ethnic Russians who have found themselves as oppressed ethnic minorities moved to Russia, and since mid-1990’s this migration flow was embellished with movement of local nationalities who were pushed by economic recession. At the same time emigration from Russia was primarily directed towards developed countries — Germany, USA, Israel, Canada. As their immigration policy was strongly ethnically determined, emigration from Russia, at least until the end of the 1990’s was clearly of ethnic character. Besides, in the first years after disintegration of the USSR “ethnic emigration” from Russia took place to the new sovereign countries: Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Kazakhs, Georgians, Estonians, etc. have preferred to return to the countries of their origin. However, this outflow soon dried up. Russia’s

net migration resulting from migration exchange with ex-Soviet states between 1992 and 2002 was +4.3 million persons. Population movements were bilateral; however, the ratio of those who arrived to Russia from former Soviet Union states to those who left was 4 : 1.

Immigration to Russia. Strictly speaking, immigration to Russia from the “new foreign states” could be analyzed only after 1992 when sovereign countries at the territory of the former Soviet Union have appeared and inter-republic administrative boundaries have got the status of international borders. However, the process of return migration of the Russian population from neighboring republics was going on since the second half of the 1960’s.

Before 1992, return migration of ethnic Russians was caused primarily by economic reasons; it was a sort of “re-emigration” of those Russian specialists who — half-voluntarily, half-forcedly — moved from Russia to Soviet republics in accordance with “Communist party appeals”, or university graduates’ assignment, for realization of large-scale federal industrial projects, etc. in the 1950’s —1960’s. When they have faced growing pressure at local labor markets from the side of indigenous population, in the Caucasus and Central Asian republics in particular, they partly returned to Russia (a certain amount of them moved to Ukraine and the Baltic).

After 1992, the situation changed dramatically: international borders between newly independent countries have changed the nature of population movements. At the same time social policy of the state in all of these new countries except for Russia was directed against aliens. Slogans of ethnic superiority of indigenous populations being popularized by new political leaders for their political self-establishment have resulted in the splash of ethnic intolerance and open nationalistic conflicts, as well as in ousting of “strange” population from local labor markets, and finally — in mass migration outflows to the places where these people hoped to find guaranties at least of ethnic security.

Over the period of 1992–2001 about 6.4 million persons arrived to Russia from ex-Soviet states. Among them there were 70% of ethnic Russians (see Table 4).

“Transparent” borders between Russia and other ex-Soviet republics, existence of multiple familial, emotional, professional and other connections were strong motives for return migration of Russians. However, impeding factors arose. The lack of legislative basement of interrelations between countries, in particular the lack of guaranties of basic civil rights succession for persons who wish to move from one former Soviet state to another, lastly, the absence of clear official position in Russia towards ex-Soviet citizens who were arriving into the country — all these factors have become obstacles for many potential would-be migrants.

As to “Population Encyclopedia”, in the beginning of the 1990’s over 38 million persons (among them 25,3 million ethnic Russians and 12,7 million other Russia’s nationalities) lived in other former Soviet

Table 4. Dynamics of external migration in Russia in the 1990's (thousands)

Direction of migration flows	Years											
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
In-flow — total	913,2	692,2	926,0	923,3	1146,7	842,1	633,6	584,6	498,8	369,6	359,3	193,4
including:												
from former Soviet Union (FSU) states	912,0	690,9	924,3	920,0	1142,4	839,7	631,2	581,0	494,8	366,7	350,3	186,2
from non-FSU states	1,2	1,3	1,7	2,4	3,3	2,4	2,4	3,6	3,2	2,9	9,0	7,2
Out-flow — total	729,5	675,5	673,1	483,0	337,1	339,6	290,0	235,6	213,3	215,0	145,7	121,1
including:												
from former Soviet Union (FSU) states	625,8	587,1	562,8	369,2	231,7	229,3	191,4	151,2	133,0	129,7	83,4	62,5
from non-FSU states	103,7	88,4	110,3	113,8	105,4	110,3	-98,6	-84,4	80,3	85,3	62,2	58,6
Net migration:	183,7	16,7	252,9	440,3	809,6	502,5	343,6	349,0	284,7	154,6	213,6	72,3
thereof:												
from former Soviet Union (FSU) states	286,2	103,8	361,5	551,7	910,7	610,4	439,8	429,8	361,8	237,0	266,8	123,7
from non-FSU states	-102,5	-87,1	-108,6	-111,4	-102,1	-107,9	-96,2	-80,8	-77,1	-82,4	-53,2	-51,4

Table 5. Emigration from Russia to non-FSU states by ethnic groups, 1993 — 2002

Ethnic groups	1993		1994		1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000	
	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%
Russians	21.3	18.7	24.1	22.8	28.8	26.1	29.2	29.5	29.8	35.3	29.3	36.4	34.5	40.4	25.8	41.5
Germans	47.5	41.7	47.1	44.6	51.3	46.5	38.6	39.1	30.0	35.5	28.3	35.2	28.0	32.8	22.6	36.2
Jews	14.0	12.4	13.6	12.8	12.8	11.6	12.5	12.6	9.5	11.4	7.3	9.3	9.0	10.7	4.5	7.2
Others	31.0	27.2	20.6	19.8	17.4	15.8	18.3	17.8	15.1	17.8	15.4	19.1	13.8	16.1	9.4	19.1
Total	113.8	100.0	105.4	100.0	110.3	100.0	98.6	100.0	84.4	100.0	80.3	1000	85.3	100.0	62.3	100.0

Source: Data of the Russian Federation National Statistics Committee.

republics (Population Encyclopedia, 1994, p. 414). According to estimate of I. Ushkalov, nearly 50% of them had real intention to immigrate to Russia (Ushkalov, 1999a, p. 84). These people could be added to population of Russia in case of encouraging official policy of the Russian government.

The role of mass migration of population to Russia in the 1990's (1 million a year on average) can hardly be undervalued – it has become a significant factor of current political, economic and demographic development of the country. It is a *political* gain for Russia to perform as a country of immigration that welcomes millions of compatriots who have found themselves in “forced emigration”. *Economically* Russia can benefit from inflow of additional labor resources, who are mainly skilled workers and specialists trained and taught in Russian universities and professional schools in the past, so that they can be a partial “compensation” of economic losses caused by “brain drain”. As to unskilled and low-skilled migrants they can be directed at Central Nechernozemje, Northern territories, or Siberia, i.e. regions that are currently losing population. *Demographic* benefits are most obvious. Total demographic crisis and negative dynamics of population size (-7.7 million persons of natural decrease in 1992-2002) can be an obstacle to economic progress of Russia. The fact that the natural loss of population was half-compensated by net migration has given such an importance to international migration in Russia as it has never had before.

Emigration from Russia. Emigration from Russia is steadily high in comparison to Soviet period — average 100,000 persons per year (see table 6). At the very beginning of the 21st century it has gradually declined to around 60,000 persons per year.

Overseas demographers' predictions of mid-1980's and the beginning of the 1990's of possible mega migration from the former USSR did not come true (the estimates varied from 1.5 to 50 million persons by 2000). However, these predictions probably had some basis. Under the circumstances of economic depression, unemployment, food supply crisis and the violation of civil rights according to nationality, people started to emigrate. Despite the tenfold growth of annual emigration from Russia — from 10,000 in 1987 to 104,000 in 1991 — to non-former Soviet Union states (in the context of a total emigration leap from post-Soviet states — from 39,000 to 452,000 correspondingly), the exodus did not reach into the millions. In particular, its failure to hit those proportions was due to many European countries restrictive migration regulations, which amounted to a sort of “iron curtain” for many former Soviet citizens and would-be migrants. The restrictions were quite natural or understandable for those countries to defend their social stability under the circumstances.

Exclusions were made for some groups of ex-Soviet citizens whose ethnicity allowed them to emigrate to those few countries that

offered an open immigration policy towards people of specific ethnic groups. First of all, to Germany which received in 1992-2000 about 550,000 emigrants from Russia, or 60% of all émigrés from Russia (approximately 900,000 persons). The second country of destination was Israel, which received around 180,000 persons, or 20% of Russia's emigrants. The USA with its large Jewish Diaspora that accepted Russia's Jews is also worth mentioning. In total, these three countries — Germany, Israel and the USA — received 92% of Russia's emigration as of 2000 (Iontsev et al., 2001, p. 317).

However, its structure and direction during the last 3-4 years demonstrated significant changes caused by essential shifts in the overall migration picture in and around Russia. By the end of the 1990's Russian emigration has covered other countries – Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, etc. The change of ethnic structure of emigrants concerns mainly the growing percentage of Russians while the share of Germans and Jews is declining. In 1993-1995, almost half of emigrants from Russia were ethnically German and around 12% were Jews, whereas in 2000 the proportion of Germans fell down to a third. At the same time, emigration of ethnic Russians increased 1.5 times in comparison with 1993. In 2000, 40% of emigrants were Russians, significantly surpassing Germans and almost quintuple the number of Jews (See Tables 5).

It is worth noting that according to Russian national statistics even in emigration outflow to Israel the share of Russians was twice higher than that of Jews; while to the USA — four times higher. Emigration of Russians to Germany has also increased: in 2001 they were 35% of the total number of emigrants from Russia to this country.

There are several reasons for the growth of percentage of Russians in emigration outflow. First of all, migration potential of ethnic groups who gain immigration preferences (Germans, Jews, Greeks, etc.) is running low. On the other hand, for the constantly growing number of prosperous Russians (who nonetheless wish to change the country of their permanent residence), immigration to the country of destination as business migrants — investors, entrepreneurs, or property owners — is becoming prevalent (despite few reliable statistics, we can still assume – from information from immigration agencies — that no less than half of the above-mentioned growing numbers of ethnic Russians took this form during recent years).

Besides, temporary migration by the Russian citizens to Europe (education, business, labor, tourism) is in fact “pregnant” with emigration: graduates of European universities sometimes choose to stay and work in their countries of education, labor migrants enjoying successful employment start applying for permanent residence permits, “tourists” often turn out to be illegal labor migrants, business trips can be in fact a way of a search for possibilities of future emigration, etc.

Emigration negatively affects Russia. Loss of population (within 10 years about 1 million persons emigrated to non-former Soviet states only) is a serious but not the worst result. Much more painful is the fact that emigrants are mostly high-skilled specialists, scientists, talented artists, writers, musicians, etc. that is fraught with damage of intellectual and spiritual potential of the nation as well as with economic, technological and cultural stagnation of the society. According to information from the Rector of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University V. Sadovnichiy, the outflow of specialists with university diploma was over 100,000 persons within the last two years. This confirms that “brain drain” and its ruinous effects for Russia at the beginning of the new century remains a topical issue. Human capital loss is becoming a real threat to existence of some branches of fundamental science and technical progress in Russia as well as to its national security.

Besides “brain drain”, emigration from Russia is closely related to outflow of capital. Putting aside the problem of illegal outflow of capital from Russia as it is a separate complicated issue, we can very approximately estimate (as there is no statistical data on this subject) the scale of financial losses. According to our calculations, during the last decade about 300,000 families emigrated from Russia for permanent residence. Every family took away 100,000 USD on average (financial accumulations, money made by selling the apartments, summer residences, furniture, etc). Consequently, by the most modest estimations, about 30 billion USD “emigrated” from Russia in parallel with population outflow. Here we do not take into account that immigrants-investors, for example, who are the most favored category in many countries’ immigration codes, are to invest 150,000—250,000 USD in the economy of the receiving country.

Economic migration¹¹

Disintegration of the USSR and new sovereign status of the Russian Federation has principally changed its role in economic migration flows (labor migration, business migration, “chelnok” migration, etc.) Despite “transparency” of state boundaries labor exchange with ex-Soviet states has got international character. At the same time Russia became open for the rest of the world; this resulted in labor migration movements from and to the country (from China, Turkey, North Korea, Vietnam). This processes have determined Russia’s place at the world labor market as a sending and a receiving country.

Labor migration to Russia. In the 1990’s labor migration flows on the territory of the former USSR Russia have been directed primarily at Russia. In a list of reasons economic factors prevail. Russia looks

¹¹ As the present volume includes an article of A.Kamenskiy “Contemporary Russia in International Labor Migrations” we find it possible not to give full analysis of labor migration in this paper but focus on its most significant trends.

economically more attractive than the majority of neighboring countries. According to Goscomstat national statistic data gross national product per capita in Russia in 1996 was 6,742 USD; it is twice higher than in Ukraine (3,325 USD), thrice higher than in Moldova (2,100 USD), and five times higher than in Tadjikistan (Labor Migration in Russia, 2001, p. 82). Average wages (in USD equivalent) in Ukraine is 2.1 times less than in Russia, in Kazakhstan — 1.7 times less, in Kirghizstan — 3.8 times, in Moldova — 4.5 times, in Armenia — 6.6 times, in Azerbaijan — 9.4 times, in Tadjikistan — 30 times.

However, it is only one dimension of the problem. Another decisive motivation for labor migration is situation at the national labor market. Russia's labor market is in the process of reshaping in accordance with new economic conditions. So, there is lack of balance between labor demand and supply. High demand for low-skilled manual labor in agriculture, construction industry, transports is not covered by national labor resources. Russian citizens ignore these jobs due to low salary, non-prestigiousness, hard working conditions. Over 800,000 vacancies are registered in employment offices over Russia (Labor Migration in Russia, 2001, p. 83).

It can be concluded that nowadays in Russia side by side with unemployment there exists high demand for foreign labor to occupy low-paid manual works in production industries. Currently 39.3% of migrant workers in Russia are occupied in construction, 12.5% — in mining and manufacturing, 11.4% — in agriculture, 12.1% — in commerce (Socio-Economic Situation in Russia, 2001).

In 2001, 283,728 foreign workers have been registered in Russia (see Table 6). When compared to total number of national labor resources (about 70 million) it looks not so significant. However, in some regions foreign labor is an important element of local labor market, e.g. in the Central Region, in the Far East Region, in Western Siberia (these areas accumulate about 70% of registered labor migration to Russia).

In the last years, number of the foreign labor receiving regions in Russia is increasing. While in the beginning of 1994 labor migrants were employed in 23 out of 89 Russia's administrative regions, in 2000 – in 83 regions (Labor Migration in Russia, 2001, p. 92).

Official figure of annual employment of foreign labor force in Russia — slightly above 250 thousands persons on average — is reflecting the real situation to a little extent only. It is “the peak of an iceberg”: it is just stating the fact of foreign labor force presence at the national labor market, however, it does not give the idea of the scale of this presence. Economic system which exists in the modern Russia with its huge segment of shadow economy provokes large-scale illegal migration to Russia. Migrants who come to Russia in quest of jobs can find

Table 6. Foreign labour force in Russian Federation, 1994–2001

	1994		1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
	persons	%	persons	%	persons	%										
Total including	129000	100	281081	100	292236	100	241488	100	242292	100	211361	100	213293	100	283728	100
<i>from former Soviet States</i>	70800	54.88	134423	47.82	145628	49.8	114044	47.23	111081	45.85	94720	44.8	108800	51.0	148629	52.4
Belorussia	5790	4.49	11123	3.96	10277	3.52	987	0.41	-	-	-	-	7	0.0	17	0.0
Moldova	3692	2.86	6713	2.39	9462	3.23	9881	4.09	10469	4.32	8619	4.08	11925	5.6	13302	4.7
Ukraine	55079	42.70	94242	33.5	98696	33.77	76636	31.73	73717	30.42	62856	29.74	64141	30.1	91917	32.4
Azerbaijan	426	0.33	1331	0.47	2200	0.75	3183	1.32	4011	1.66	2826	1.34	3336	1.6	4415	1.6
Armenia	1687	1.31	6092	2.17	7150	2.45	6893	2.85	7472	3.08	5167	2.44	5514	2.6	8457	3.0
Georgia	915	0.71	7015	2.50	8090	2.77	6689	2.76	6297	2.6	5214	2.47	5173	2.4	4972	1.8
Kazakhstan	1007	0.78	2069	0.74	2165	0.74	1816	0.75	1802	0.74	1662	0.79	2885	1.4	3606	1.3
Kyrgyzstan	142	0.11	695	0.25	1184	0.41	1259	0.52	728	0.3	549	0.26	871	0.4	1721	0.6
Tadjikistan	572	0.44	1497	0.53	2027	0.69	3112	1.29	3296	1.36	4135	1.96	6210	2.9	10020	3.5
Turkmenistan	16	0.01	99	0.04	305	0.10	382	0.16	324	0.13	281	0.13	204	0.1	134	0.0
Uzbekistan	1474	1.14	3547	1.26	4108	1.41	3236	1.64	2965	1.22	3411	1.61	6091	2.9	10058	3.5
Baltic States	2959	2.29											1831	0.9	4836	1.7
<i>from other countries</i>	58200	45.12	146658	52.2	46608	50.2	127444	52.8	131211	54.15	16641	55.2	102662	48.1	130278	45.9
Turkey	12068	9.35	36168	12.9	39043	13.4	33186	13.7	35697	14.7	26708	12.64	17847	8.4	20915	7.4
China	20301	15.74	26423	9.4	24043	8.2	22227	9.2	23318	9.6	24256	11.48	26222	12.3	38611	13.6
Republics former Yugoslavia	3516	2.73	16021	5.7	18613	6.4	16864	7.0	14096	5.8	9771	4.62	8020	3.8	10187	3.6
North Korea	5862	4.54	14897	5.3	10416	4.3	9383	3.9	10110	4.78	8700	4.1	20137	7.1

Source: Data of the Federal Migration Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russian Federation.

workplaces in the shadow sphere much easier — they will not be asked registration and other papers there. Production of the shadow sector of Russia's economy is estimated in a quarter of GNP, and employment — in 15-30% of the total labor force (Radaev, 1999, p.10).

Shadow employment is wide spread among both indigenous population and migrants. However, among migrants the number of irregular workers is many times higher than the number of officially working migrants. According to experts, the number of irregular migrants in Russia is about 4.5 million (Krasinets et al., 2000, p. 82). The overwhelming number of them are labor migrants, if not by status then by nature, because despite the purpose of their arrival to Russia (transit to the West, forced migration, illegal labor migration) in search for means of subsistence they always seek for job opportunities, quite often — in informal sector.

After 1996, a tendency of re-orientation of labor migration inflows from legal to illegal forms is obviously seen. It is a result of worsening financial situation of many industrial enterprises that have hired foreign workers before and also of tightening regulation for employment of migrant workers in the regions where unemployment among local population increases.

Labor migration from Russia. Combination of two reasons that have emerged almost simultaneously in Russia — on the one hand, sharply worsening economic situation followed by decline in standard of population living, on the other hand, legislative guarantees for free departure from the country and employment out of the country — stipulated labor migration outflow from Russia in the 1990's. In 2000, according to official data from Department of international migration of the Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy, about 150,000 Russian citizens have been working in other countries. However, this amount is poorly corresponding to the actual size of labor migration from Russia and can be regarded as a sort of “starting point” for its analysis as official statistics produces data on only two channels of overseas employment: (1) labor migrants who are employed in other countries in accordance with inter-governmental agreements on construction & equipping projects; (2) labor migrants who are employed with the help of licensed recruiting agencies.

So, this data does not reflect the majority of labor migrants who have contracted their jobs independently — by means of personal contacts, foreign labor agencies, Internet, etc. Besides, naturally, official statistics does not include migrants who are employed in other countries illegally. According to experts, the total amount of Russian citizens working abroad is close to one million persons.

While putting detailed analysis of Russia's participation in international labor migration flows aside, we can argue that it has dual consequences for Russia's economy and society. Certainly, individuals and

their families benefit from better jobs and good earnings. So does the society to where they return with new experience. However, labor migration from Russia has evident negative effects related to specific situation in this country:

1. When neglected by the home country temporary labor migration often turns into non-return migration. It often concerns high-skilled migrants who manage to succeed while working abroad. “Brain drain” is a very painful phenomenon for many industries and branches of science. Surely, the main reason for Russia’s science crisis is related not to the fact of emigration of scientists and specialists. Vice versa, outflow of researchers is a result of catastrophic reduction in financing. Anyway, Russia’s loss of significant part of its scientific potential could be irreplaceable.

2. The most part of Russian labor migrants are staying abroad illegally (invalid visas, absence of work permits, non-regulated relations with employers, etc.). For this reason they are out of frames of any social and legal guaranties and can’t be properly defended by the Russian state in case of their rights’ oppression. As to the State, this situation results in its negative “reputation” of an illegal migrants supplier. For future labor migrants it means suspiciousness of the receiving country when looking for a job or applying for visa. Cases of visa refusals for Russian citizens, for example, for those who would like to be employed within the frames of international youth employment programmes like Work & Travel, Work & Study, Au Pair are numerous. The refusals are caused by usual practice of young Russian citizens disregarding regulations of staying and employment in a country.

3. Large-scale labor outflow from Russia can negatively affect national labor resources in the nearest years. Under current demographic trends and existing population structure a sharp decline of labor-active age cohorts is to start in 2007–2010. The elder age groups (born during after-war compensation rise in fertility) who are to leave labor-active age cohorts will be twice more numerous than the number of young age groups born during 1990’s. In case of successive development of Russia’s economy lack of labor force will impede economic progress and labor export will contradict economic and demographic needs.

Migration of Russian “chelnoks”

Among various categories of economic migration that have appeared in Russia at the beginning of the 1990’s circular migration of petty-traders, or “shuttle-traders” (known in Russia as “chelnoks”) was the most large-scaled and it has had the greatest impact on the social situation in the country. For this reason we highlight this phenomenon in our analysis.

Development of petty-traders migration was in fact the forced reaction of population on destruction of existing economic system and mass decrease of employment in the formal sector. Thousands of people

who have lost their jobs or have been seeking for any alternative opportunities to earn their living have chosen specific type of commerce when a seller periodically leaves his country to buy commodities and provide their transportation and comes back to sell them in Russia (Tchoudinivskikh, Zhulin, 2001, p.4).

Circular petty traders migration was a spontaneous result of demopolization of foreign trade business and abandoning of severe control over travelling to foreign countries. It has occupied a niche, which continuously existed in the Russian official foreign trade and was related to its inability to cover the demand of population for imported consumer goods. In fact, “chelnoks” migration has saved the consumer goods market in Russia.

According to some estimations, by mid-1990’s around 30 million people in Russia were engaged in “chelnok” business: either they regularly crossed the boundaries for goods or provided functioning of wholesale and retail trade with these goods over the territory of Russia. The annual volume of such kind of trade reached 15 billion dollars; it largely exceeds the volume of official export/import operations with corresponding countries.

The appearance and rapid development of “chelnok” migration was resulting from combination of prerequisites: existence of high consumer goods deficit, retiring of former employees in the state-controlled sector who were seeking for alternative sources of earning for life in the condition of economic crisis, legislative and economic innovations that provided the right for free international movements and free buying/selling of hard currency.

Geographically the trips of Russian “chelnoks” were focused primarily on the countries with liberal entry regimes and mass production of cheap consumer goods. First trips were aimed at East European countries — Bulgaria, Poland, Romania — where visa-free regime with Russia was still in force. While at the first stages Russian people could not change national currency for dollars they had to bring some Soviet consumer goods to East European countries — vodka, watches, caviar, small electrical household appliances — for sale and then spend local money on garments, underclothes, cheap lingerie, shoes, etc. in order to sell them in Russia.

In the beginning of the 1990’s, Russian “chelnoks” invaded Turkey. The Turkish Government who was supporting all new forms of promotion of Turkish exports approved mass “baggage-tourism” from Russia. Special decrees of the Government provided support for export-oriented private companies and created a basement of smooth mechanisms for commercial operations of Russian circular migrants on the territory of Turkey, including placing of orders, forms of payments, documentation, taxation, etc. (for details please refer to Ivakhniouk, 2000, pp. 8–20).

In 1992, after the Russian-Chinese Agreement on visa-free entry for tourist groups was signed, Russian “chelnoks” disclosed the advantages of China. Cheap low-quality Chinese goods that were usually produced by illegal factories flooded the Russian markets, especially in the Far East and Siberia. Noteworthy, a lot of Chinese citizens also participate in circular commercial migration between Russia and China, independently or in co-operation with Russian “chelnoks”.

Mass migrations of Russian “chelnoks” have had great impact on economic development of both Russia and other participating countries. “Chelnok” migration has stimulated production of consumer goods especially for huge Russian market, and entailed development of “attendant” services — international charter & cargo transportation, small-scale wholesale and retail companies, etc. They were the source of enlarging employment of population. However, on the other hand, this kind of business was always tending to spontaneity, “half-legality”, escape from taxation. Added to low quality of imported goods these factors were resulting in direct and indirect economic losses both for Russia and exporting countries. Therefore, governmental institutions of the interested countries enhanced regulation of Russian “chelnok” business. Compulsory official documentation of all the deals became strictly controlled, taxation of small-scale lots of imported goods was restricted, export of currency in cash was limited.

Gradually “chelnok” migration was decreasing. It has played an important role in accumulation of start capital and basement for development of “civilized” small-scale and middle-scale business. “Chelnoks” — individuals unable to compete with them directed their attention towards internal commercial migration.

However, “chelnok” migrations are an important element of Russia’s economic and migration experience. “Chelnoks” were the most mass flow of international migration from Russia to non-former Soviet Union countries. Short-term commercial trips to Turkey, Poland, and China were a sort of “business school” for people who did not have any business experience before. They stimulated economic manner of thinking, active civil position under the circumstances of the collapse of the State. Despite difficulties and moral (and often material) losses the individuals who have gained “chelnoks” experience get adjusted to new economic conditions of market economy, and new forms of employment in particular, much easier.

Besides, “chelnok” circular migration often stimulated development of temporary labor migration to the countries, which were of “particular interest” to Russian “chelnoks”. (Some authors consider “chelnok” migration itself as labor migration [see, for example, Labor Migration in Russia, 2001] but this is hardly true, as Russia remains their country of residence and work). For example, in Turkey “Russian Chelnoks Boom” has caused a demand for Russian-speaking personnel in shops, hotels,

shops, hotels, restaurants, etc. During a very short period of time Istanbul and other big cities in Turkey received tens of thousands of young Russian migrants who were pushed away from their native country by economic crisis and employment difficulties. Job range they managed to occupy was mainly limited to service industry — interpreters, salesmen, waiters, tourist agents and charter airlines employees, dancers, delivery boys, etc. However, illegality, or half-legality is quite a widely spread feature of this migrants' category employment.

Russia as the Euro-Asian center of transit illegal migration

Integration of Russia in the world migration flows has been followed by various consequences, sometimes unforeseen ones. One of them is related to Russia's geopolitical location. For this reason Russia has become a "corridor" for numerous overt and covert routes for transit migrants from Asian and African countries to Europe.

The attractiveness of Russia as a transit "staging post" for migrants (mainly illegal) is determined by the relatively "transparent" borders within the post-Soviet territory. Furthermore, some CIS states have signed agreements on visa-free entry with third countries and the Russian legislation regulating foreigners' entry, residence and employment on the territory of Russia is poor. Other important factors are Russia's geographic location, which stands between Asia and Europe, and the disorganization of the domestic labor market, with a significant informal sector, where irregular migrants most often derive their income. According to Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics, at the present time there are around 300 000 transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Turkey and Ethiopia "stuck" in Russia. Furthermore, there is a significant flow of migrants who illegally penetrate Russian borders trying to reach EU countries.

The presence of illegal / irregular transit migrants in Russia is incompatible with the national interests of the country. Many of these migrants are involved in crime and the places of their concentration become sources of "exotic" infectious diseases, drug addiction and prostitution.

It is admittedly unfortunate that, until now, Russian official structures did not manage to control properly the arrival and staying of transit migrants in the country. After entering with a transit or tourist visa (or crossing the border illegally) they often get lost in the vast spaces of Russia. At the same time, their departure towards the intended countries of destination is quite strictly controlled on Russian frontiers. By prohibiting the illegal exit of those migrants who have violated the terms of their visas or had used forged documents, etc. the Russian frontier services are in effect turning Russia into a "settling tank" for illegal migrants.

Migrant smuggling (and trafficking in migrants) is a serious, well-organized business in many countries. According to a number of

estimates, the overall annual profit from the smuggling of migrants in the world is 5-7 bln. dollars. Nowadays it became widespread in Russia as well, being stimulated by its extremely high profitability. Along the borders of Russia, especially on the Russian-Chinese, Russian-Kazakh and Russian-Ukrainian borders, there exist numerous well-organized channels for migrant smuggling. (90% of illegal migration to Russia comes from Kazakhstan, where there are almost 7 600 km of practically open border.) A hasty agreement on visa-free entry for citizens of the PRC to Russia at the beginning of the 1990s opened a “floodgate” of Chinese migration, which — as a consequence of huge differences in demographic potential on both sides of Russian-Chinese border — has brought many labor migrants to Russia as well as people whose ultimate goal is to reach Western Europe via Russian territory.

Over the past five years, the number of those detained at Russian borders has increased almost tenfold. This figure includes citizens of thirty countries with which Russia shares no common border. In 1999–2000, the Russian Federal Frontier Service, together with law-enforcement agencies, exposed about 400 criminal groups specializing in moving irregular migrants. This activity of the Russian law-enforcement agencies is primarily aimed at protecting Russia’s interests and its national security while simultaneously safeguarding the interests of those transit migrants’ target countries. It would be logical to assume that common interests need common efforts (in the framework of information exchange, international agreements counteracting illegal migration, etc.). If European countries are interested in preventing illegal migration “from afar” — as they should be — then they should become the initiators of international programs and agreements in this domain, of joint scientific projects in international migration in all its forms.


International migration in Russia and its demographic development

Deterioration of demographic indices in Russia in the 1990’s characterized first of all by accelerating decline of population as a result of negative natural increase has become an issue of academic and political debate on whether pessimistic predictions of demographers about possible twofold decrease of Russia’s population within the nearest 50 years (Population of Russia 2000, p. 141) can come true and what can be done to prevent such demographic catastrophe.

Diagram 3 and Table 7 demonstrate population decrease in Russia in the 1990’s analogous with the war period of 1941–1945. However, in the first period it was resulting from large-scale war and war-conditioned military human losses.

Between 1992 and 2001, natural decrease of Russian population was 7.7 million persons (over 900,000 persons annually in the latest years). Steady negative population increase is observed in 77 out of 89 Russia’s administrative regions.

**Diagram 3. Natural and Migration Increase
in Russia, 1897 - 2001**



The present deep demographic crisis is to be evaluated wider than just decline in numbers of people. The crisis is related to negative trends in all demographic indices: fast decrease in fertility, decline in number of marriages and growth of divorces, life expectancy decline, splash in mortality rates, relatively high infant mortality, high emigration rate, including “brain drain”, and as a result – steady decrease of population size, deterioration of population quality, crisis of a family and accelerating population ageing. While the 1990’s economic and political reforms have played an important role as prerequisites of the demographic crisis, in the nearest future demographic trends can be a serious obstacle for realization of economic programs. Social expenses related to the population ageing can become a heavy burden for the budget while some regions will simply become deserted.

Under such conditions migration inflow may seem “panacea” for improvement of demographic situation and maintenance of the population growth. In fact, net migration to Russia in 1992–2002 was 3.4 million persons; it has half-compensated natural population decrease (Table 7). However, the role of migration in managing demographic crisis should not be overestimated.

Predictions of the authors of Russia’s annual demographic review show that in order to return to zero natural increase of population Russia should have steady positive net migration from 700,000 persons to 1,700,000 persons per year (according to various scenarios) (Population of Russia 2000, p. 143). This perspective is obviously unreal (in 2001 net migration to Russia was 72,000 persons).

Immigration can only smoothen the current demographic crisis to a certain extent, it can soften some negative consequences, and solve some regional demographic problems, but no more. The sample of developed countries shows that only in the circumstances of depopulation migration can be an effective demographic instrument¹².

¹² In our opinion depopulation is a “narrowed” reproduction of population when every new generation does not compensate the previous one. This process can last

Table 8. Components of population size changes in Russia (thousands)

Years	Population by the end of years	Total Increase	Including	
			Nat. Increase	Net migration**
1897*	67473	-	-	-
1897–1916	91000	23527	24392	-865
1917–1926	93600	2600	5100	-2500
1927–1940	111359	17759	16960	799
1941–1945	97547	-13812	-9953	-3859
1946–1950	102945	5398	6505	-1107
1951–1955	112266	9321	9991	-670
1956–1960	120766	8500	9283	-783
1961–1965	127189	6423	6944	-521
1966–1970	130704	3515	4107	-592
1971–1975	134690	3986	4180	-195
1976–1980	139028	4338	3731	607
1981–1985	143835	4807	3938	869
1986–1991	148704	4869	3759	1110
1917–1991	148704	57704	64545	-6841***
1992	148750	46	-207	253
1993	148452	-298	-738	440
1994	148393	-59	-869	810
1995	148063	-330	-833	503
1996	147591	-472	-816	344
1997	147191	-400	-750	350
1998	146771	-420	-705	285
1999	146003	-768	-923	165
2000	145263	-740	-954	214
2001	144392	-871	-943	72
1992–2001	144392	-4312	-7738	3426

* As for beginning of the year

** Including migration balance with non-former Soviet Union countries: between 1927 and 1940 as well as between 1951 and 1987 it was not numerous (e.g. in 1986 — 2,300 in comparison with 20,400 in 1989 and 102,500 in 1990). It was mostly sizable between 1917 and 1925 when more than 2,5 million persons had emigrated to the Western European countries, the USA and other foreign states.

***This figure includes nearly 3,6 million persons who had emigrated to non-former Soviet states.

Sources: Population of Russia. 1973. Moscow, 1975, pp. 14, 70 (in Russian); Population and Migration in the Russian Federation in 1999. Moscow, Goskomstat, 2000 (in Russian); Social and Economic Situation in Russia. January-December 2000. Moscow, Goskomstat, 2001 (in Russian). Andreev E.M., Darsky L.E., Khorkova T.L. Demographic History of Russia 1927–1959. Moscow (in Russian). Population of Russia over Hundred Years (1897–1997). Moscow, 1998, pp. 32–34, 84–85. Social-economic Situation in Russia. January 2002 (in Russian).

during rather long time, and it is not necessarily followed by negative natural population rate or population size decrease. For example, in Germany depopulation is going on since the end of the 1960's, however, natural decrease is measured in miserable percentage, so it can't be the evidence of "deep demographic crisis" in Germany. As to Russia, situation here is absolutely different.

In order to get over demographic crisis in Russia and provide its further positive development, a complex of measures is necessary: to stimulate fertility, to enhance family institution, to consider an individual's life as the most important value of the state. The measures of demographic policy as a whole and migration policy in particular should be worked out correspondingly.

However, for certain periods and for certain purposes international migration can have positive effect on demographic development. So, the forthcoming decline in numbers of labor-active age groups in Russia (not as a result of demographic "wave" but as a steady tendency) can be partly compensated by attracting foreign labor.

These trends are to be laid in the basement of reasonable migration policy. However, in spite of over 5-years public discussion of the Russia's migration policy concept there is still no state strategy in this field. For this reason migration regulation in the country is rushing from one exceptional objective — forced migration, to the other — illegal migration.

Migration Policy

During a rather short post-Soviet period Russia has faced the phenomenon of international migration in all its forms in spite of "transparency" of new international borders and in some aspects due to this fact. Actually it has taken the country unawares. On the one hand, all the attempts to work out a reasonable state *concept of migration policy* or at least state position with regard to current and future international migration trends appeared unsuccessful.

On the other hand, the country had no experience in free *international* migration regulation. For decades migration policy in Russia was focused on management of *internal* migration flows within the country; as to international migrations regulation was composed primarily by administrative interdictions and restrictions.

Impulsive reaction of governmental institutions to occurrence of large-scale spontaneous migration flows that have gained international character was negative. Its principal idea was: both the mass inflow of population from the ex-Soviet republics and the outflow of Russian citizens abroad are undesirable and even dangerous for the country. Another reaction was unlikely to happen. Spontaneous migration flows became an additional destabilizing factor under conditions of deepening economic and political crisis. By that moment there were no comprehensive researches on international migration and its interrelation with economic development in Russia, i.e. fundamental works that could be the background for long-term reasonable governmental strategy in migration sphere. There was also the lack of experts who were competent in migration policy implementation. (Regretfully, nowadays also very little attention is paid to training and re-training of migration management personnel).

A serious mistake in developing new inter-state relations between ex-USSR countries was the lack of guaranties of basic civil rights succession for persons who wish to move from one former Soviet state to another. The moment when there was urgent need to sign bilateral agreements on guaranties of human and legal rights for “ethnic minorities” living in new sovereign states has been missed. The basic role of Russia in initiation of this process would be natural because there are tens of millions ethnic Russians that have moved to the territories of present sovereign states during the period of united country.

However, the scale of migration was increasing; it necessitated management by the State. In 1992, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) was founded. Its activities were mainly directed at refugees and forced migrants, in accordance with migration situation of the time. However, there was no distinction between in-Russian forced migrants who were running away from “hot points” and ethnic conflicts, and international migrants who arrived to Russia from neighboring ex-USSR states. Other forms of international migration dropped out from sight.

When, in 2000, the FMS was abolished, the responsibility for the management of migration was transferred to the Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy. Even the title of the Ministry demonstrates that migration policy was regarded primarily as an internal matter. International migration was again forgotten. One year later, in October 2001, the Ministry was restructured, and since February 2002 the management of migration together with migration policy has come under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This time, actions against illegal migration as a threat to national security became the core principle in the field of migration.

There is no doubt: Russia would benefit from effective combating illegal migration (especially criminal migration). The fact that Russia has been involved in the global criminal net making profit on smuggling of migrants and trafficking in illegal migrants needs efforts to stop this illegal activities. However, there is no justification of too little attention being paid to other types of international migration, first of all economic (and labor) migration.

Its scale and importance are objectively growing; that’s why it is possible that the next “turn in priorities” of Russia’s migration policy will bring labor migration regulation to the forefront. It looks inevitable for a number of reasons:

The first reason is related to the above mentioned forthcoming lack of labor resources resulting from existing age structure and population development trends. In the circumstances foreign labor force imports will become one of priorities of migration policy. In case the government provides no reasonable mechanism for legal temporary employment of foreign citizens, labor migrants will come as irregular workers. This will mean that government will lose both: control over

migrants' movements and economic gains, for example, from taxation. The growing labor migrants influx from Central Asian states adds to the former migration flows from Ukraine, China, Caucasus states; it is making the question of labor migration regulation more actual.

The second reason results from reshaping of European migration space. In Russia (as well as in Ukraine, for example) there exists a certain segment of population whose well-being strongly depends on their trips abroad. They are "chelhoks", seasonal workers, contract migrants. According to some estimates, the incomes of around 2 – 2.5 million persons in Russia are derived from international migration (it corresponds to about one third of employed in informal sector). Many of them are oriented at the Central and Eastern European states that are to join European Union soon. The problem is that, after EU expansion, the border restrictions will become inevitably more strict and many of these people will be either left without a source of income or forced to become irregular persons within the EU. In order to avoid this, it is important to undertake official, governmental efforts to provide migration opportunities under the new conditions, i.e. when a new, common immigration policy comes into force. It looks especially topical since cheap foreign labor from neighboring countries has become a structural element in some industries in the Central and Eastern European countries. Like the Ruhr coalfield mines in Germany had been dependent on Polish migrant-miners for centuries, nowadays garment industry in some regions of Poland has increased its competitiveness thanks to woman-migrants from Ukraine and Russia.

Nowadays, Russian migration policy is becoming an issue of academic and political debate, as well as in the media. Russia is in need of a policy corresponding to the real migration situation in the country and around it. For several years, migration policy was focused exclusively on forced migration. Now, the situation has changed. Labor migration – and its irregular component – is becoming a matter of particular importance. This shift needs new approaches and strategies. Furthermore, changes in the global migration situation (expansion of EU, in particular) should be taken into consideration.

At last, a very important issue is the continuing deterioration of demographic situation in Russia. In this context international migration of population is becoming a dimension of national security.

Official position towards Russian compatriots living in other countries also remains uncertain (despite special law "On state policy concerning compatriots abroad"), especially in respect of those living in non-former Soviet states. However, their moral and economic support could make an impact on economic progress in Russia (in this context China is a good example).

However, the range of new targets of Russia's migration policy is impeded by incomprehension of the essence of international migration

situation, imperfections in regulatory legislation on migration and the lack of important, up-dated laws to guarantee social and legal rights for migrants (both for those who come to Russia and those who leave Russia temporarily or permanently). Russia's migration legislation remains inadequate despite the fact that no other country in the world managed to issue as many laws, regulations, decrees in the migration field during three decades as Russia did during only one last decade.

The most important issue for Russia is to determine the strategy of its migration policy that should take into account economic, demographic, ethnic and other dimensions of its development. This strategy should be based on understanding *migration as an advantage for Russia but not an evil that is to be repressed by governmental institutions.*

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ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

On the Concept of the Second Transition

If I were invited to list the demographic publications that most impressed me and were of the greatest use to me, it would be a very heterogeneous group. No doubt the list would reflect the various stages of my professional life and the different regions I worked in. A certainty would be the paper presented by cultural historian Philippe Ariès at a conference on fertility theories organized by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and members of the German demographic community held in Bad Homburg in 1980. In that paper entitled ‘Two successive motivations for the declining of the birth rate in the West’, Ariès argues quite forcefully, that the renewed decline in fertility observed in the Western European countries after the mid-1960s could not be interpreted as a simple continuation of the process begun at the end of the 18th century. In his view the underlying motivations were radically different, if not diametrically opposed. In the first decline parents reduced family size in order to be able to invest in their children. They attempted to give them a good start in life, they were intent on being able to afford their education. Where necessary, they placed their children’s emotional well being above that of their own. The couple would, for example, not divorce even if they had long lost the love between them. As opposed to that the second decline was, in Ariès’ eyes, a reflection of the fact that the days of *l’enfant roi* — of the King-child — were over. The generations born after the 1940s were leading us into a new epoch, one in which the role of the child was greatly diminished. The child was not absent in people’s life plan, but is one of the elements that help ‘adults to blossom as individuals’ (Ariès, 1980, p. 130).

It is understandable that Ariès focused his attention almost exclusively on the child. Not only had he written a major book on the position of children in society through the ages, the new demographic trends in more developed societies were first in evidence and documented in the field of fertility. In a joint paper written in Dutch, and thus probably less frequently read that referred to, Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) noted that it was not just the level of fertility that was changing. Clearly, a major shift in family formation was taking place. They attributed that to a change in family model: the ‘bourgeois’ family model was giving way to the ‘individualistic’ family model (op. cit.: 19). Increased divorce, cohabitation and extra-marital fertility, were manifestations of that same change in underlying family model. They used the term

Second Demographic Transition to highlight that Europe had apparently entered a new phase in its demographic development. However, the two other population growth variables, mortality and migration, were not touched upon in these first public discussions. An attempt to include these dates from December 1988 (Van de Kaa, 1988, p. 27).

On the Position of International Migration

The simplest formula used in demography is the so-called balancing equation. It states very basically that the population of a given area at the end of a specified interval of time equals the population at the beginning of that increased by the births and immigrants during the interval but decreased by the deaths and emigrants during the same period:

$$P_{t+1} = P_t + (B + I)_{t-t+1} - (D + E)_{t-t+1}.$$

There are several reasons why this equation is so interesting and fundamental. The first is that it brings all three components of population growth into relation with each other. The second lies in its name. ‘Balancing equation’ states more than a fact; it implies the assumption that measured over a longer period its outcome should be an approximate equilibrium. Obviously, disturbances can and will take place, but these are likely to be temporary. The third is that the link between fertility and mortality is normally assumed to be somewhat stronger than the link between these two components of natural growth and migration. After all, the first two are overwhelmingly endogenous to the population studied.

These characteristics of the balancing equation appear to have played a major role in demographic thinking about the fertility decline that started in Europe — more in particular in France and Hungary — at the end of the 18th century. While early French authors recognized the voluntary restriction of marital fertility as a revolutionary novelty, the term demographic ‘revolution’ found no favor in the international demographic literature. Under the impact of the writings of very influential American scholars such as Kingsley Davis, Dudley Kirk, and Frank Notestein, it was termed the demographic ‘transition’. That is: a transition from a state of quasi-equilibrium marked by both high fertility and mortality to a new quasi-equilibrium state created at low levels of both mortality and fertility, the latter presumably being at replacement level or very close to it. Mortality decline was identified as the factor mainly responsible for the temporary imbalance and the, also temporary, period of rapid population growth. Once the process of fertility decline was completed things would be again as they should. Needless to say there was not a shred of empirical evidence to substantiate that assumption, but for the moment that aspect can be left aside. It was a compelling theory, better a compelling narrative or story, and I never saw reason to question it. A further consequence of the new approach was that the discussion about the ‘transition’, and about the conditions

required for its onset, tended to focus mainly on the natural population growth factors. Various authors recognized, of course, that emigration played more than a negligible role in dealing with situations of excessive population growth during the transition period. But in graphs purporting to present a model of the demographic transition, the variable net migration is usually conspicuously absent.

When I prepared my opening address for the European Population Conference held in The Hague in 1999 that struck me as odd and I tried to rectify it. Figure 1 is the graph I then developed. In sketching the trend in net migration I relied heavily on a very interesting paper by Hatton and Williamson (1994) on the pattern of European migration to the America's. On the basis of their research they distinguish four distinct phases in the migration flows from Europe across the Atlantic. After the onset of migration its volume picks up until, after quite some time, saturation occurs. Then the flows decline, slowly at first, more rapidly thereafter, so that in the end not more than a trickle remains. The authors call these four developmental stages the Introductory, Growth, Saturation, and Regression phases respectively. They were able to tie them quite specifically to the changing social and economic circumstances potential migrants encountered both in their home country and in the country of destination. For example, while the initially substantial differentials in wages created a strong motivation to migrate, the propensity to migrate declined as these differentials declined. Towards the end of the cycle other motives gain in importance. Having relatives who have already migrated and who prepare for the reception of the newcomers then constitutes an important incentive to migrate. Evidently, even when the process is allowed to run its 'natural' course, the numbers of migrants will drop off fairly rapidly once the disparities dissolve.




Figure 1. Model of First and Second Demographic Transitions

Source: Van de Kaa, 1999.

It is very tempting to seek a parallel between that migration process and the process currently taking place in the European theater. In Northern and Western Europe the Introductory phase would then have begun with the recruitment of unskilled labor through the so-called guest worker schemes of the early and mid-1960s. The guest workers were recruited officially and upon the understanding of both the host and home country that they would return to their place of origin once their contract expired. Recruitment usually occurred in the less privileged areas of Turkey or Morocco; it brought workers from areas with an excess supply of labor to a region where the production capacity exceeded the labor available. The latter partly, no doubt, because the jobs to be filled could not give the local workers the status or income they were seeking. In Southern Europe the Introductory phase started somewhat later; it also involved the return home of emigrants who had worked for a while in Western and Northern Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe the onset of the first phase would on the whole date from after November 1989, although nationals of countries with which special ties were deemed to exist (Cuba, North Vietnam) found their way as 'guest workers' to these parts of Europe well before that.

On Regional Variations in Pattern and Timing

As I see it, most of Europe is now well into the 'Growth phase'; but again with obvious variations in timing and intensity. In Western and Northern Europe the growth phase started in earnest with the process of family reunification, or family formation, of first generation migrants and their offspring. In a number of former colonial powers (France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal) that process received extra impetus through the presence of nationals and subjects who had settled in 'the home country' in the wake of the post war de-colonization process. In Germany the so-called *Aussiedler* and *Übersiedler* contributed mightily to the growing numbers of immigrants, but just as elsewhere, from the early 1990s migrants come from much farther a field. The so-called 'new' migration countries are countries like Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and many other parts of the world where dictators and/or corrupt regimes hamper instead of stimulate socio-economic progress and human rights abuses are common. The new migrants seek entry as asylum seekers, are smuggled in as undocumented migrants, overstay their visa and, generally, try to make a living in the unofficial economy. As time goes by the effects of the second demographic transition on the size of the cohorts entering the labor force also start playing a significant role. The supply of labor in the countries of destination becomes more limited as a result of the long-term decline in fertility. This has already led to shortages in various sectors of the economy. Most notably in nursing, and health care more generally, in public transport, in housekeeping and cleaning, and in horticulture. In

some instances the lack of well-trained nationals has even forced governments to launch renewed recruiting efforts.

In Central and Eastern Europe the situation is rather more complex. After, on 1 April 1991 the military domination of the Soviet Union over Central and Eastern Europe ended formally, they became potential suppliers of migrants. In several countries of the West, Eastern European migrants now constitute an indispensable addition to the work force. This especially in sectors such as nursing and the building industry, and in seasonal activities e.g. the harvesting of asparagus or grapes. Temporary migrants and visitors frequently also engage in petty trade and similar activities, for example, by bringing consumer goods bought in the West back for the ultimate purpose of reselling these to friends or relatives at a small profit. Moreover, the Central and Eastern European countries became themselves much more attractive to immigrants: individually as countries of destination and jointly as a staging area for migrants from much farther a field. The Russian Federation faced a particularly important change in migration patterns. After the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 it experienced large influxes of returning nationals. For a time at least these flows were the largest on the whole continent (UN / ECE, 1995).

In terms of their present migration patterns the industrialized countries in North America and Oceania and the European countries appear to become more similar. The range of 'home' countries has increased, aspiring migrants seeking entry as asylum seekers or without any document constitute an important fraction of the total number of entrants, trafficking — particularly of women — has become an intractable problem, and youngsters sent out on their own are increasingly numerous. It would appear that even Japan finds it impossible to keep its borders closed completely. In terms of the volume and composition of their migration streams the difference between the traditional regions of immigration and Europe is declining. Globalization affects all advanced industrialized countries, and all experience the age structural effects of an extended period of low fertility and, mostly, rising life expectancies at birth. It obviously makes the concept of a second demographic transition more generally applicable.

On Future Migration Trends

Predicting the future remains a hazardous undertaking. The four safest predictions regarding trends in international migrations are:

1. Advanced industrialized nations will continue to experience strong migration pressures on their borders for quite some time to come.
2. While they will also experience a demand for migrant labor, they will do their utmost to keep the flows of immigrants orderly and under some sort of control.

3. The more the migration problems of the European countries resemble that of the traditional countries of immigration, the more their migration practices will converge.
4. Ultimately the migration policies of all European countries will reflect their *de facto* status as ‘country of immigration’. But, in view of the strong, and apparently growing, resistance towards immigration amongst the electorate, these policies will be quite restrictive.

These four considerations lead to the conclusion that the migration process currently affecting the European countries will not run the full historical sequence of stages identified by Hatton and Williamson. The peak of the ‘growth’ phase will remain well below its potential. ‘Saturation’ will not really occur; instead a long period with fairly modest net immigration rates is in the offing. Hence the quasi confluence of lines presented in the second part of Figure 1.

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**CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
IN INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATIONS**

Introduction

This paper intends to characterize Russia's position in the international labor market. For this purpose we have shown exports of labor force from Russia to the major receiving countries and the structure of migrants by age, sex, educational level, occupation, professional experience, and by regions of departure.

The similar analysis has been made for labor importing issue; it allows us to make some interesting conclusions concerning Russia's participation in international labor exchange as well as the perspectives of the process.

However, specific features of labor migration statistics in Russia afford us to count as temporary labor migrants only those persons who leave for jobs through Russian recruiting companies that have license from the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (in 1999–2001 — from the Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy of the RF, after 2001 — from the Migration Service of the Interior Affairs Ministry of the RF). These companies are obliged to present information on the number of persons employed abroad stating their age, sex, professional experience, countries where employees have received their jobs and terms of labor contracts. This data is being published till now.

On the other hand, persons who move abroad not as temporary labor migrants but as for permanent residence are accounted in the National Statistics Committee (Goscomstat) publications; their annual number varies from 60 to 120 thousand persons for the last decade. They are not analyzed in this paper for several reasons. First of all, they are leaving for jobs with their families, the members of which are partially out of the working age (children, elder parents). Secondly, the major group of these migrants have no contracts for working abroad but only some preliminary agreements at best. As for recruiting companies, they are obliged to submit to the Migration Service all the data on those Russian citizens who have left the country under signed contract of employment, and more of this, it is prohibited for them to send people abroad without a contract. The third reason is that the National Statistics Committee does not issue information on the character of occupation, professional experience, qualification of migrant-workers and sphere of their using in receiving countries etc., i.e. the information that is actually an object of our analysis.

Besides, there is the third channel of migration data collecting. It is the statistics of the National Frontier Service on the persons who cross the Russia's border. Tourists, diplomats, sportsmen going for competitions, private visits, business missions, educational exchanges, etc. are counted in this general flow. As we can guess, this flow also includes some part of irregular labor migrants who declare any of the above purposes when crossing the border but in reality they are seeking for temporary job and later some of them probably try to arrange legalization in the country of stay. This flow is also not for analysis in this paper.

Refugees who can also be employed in the country of arrival after certain period of staying there (but not always on the regular basis) (for more details see Zayonchkovskaya, 1997) are not analyzed in this paper as well. Irregular employment is also out of the frames of this research. The scale of irregular employment is usually based on experts' estimates (see for example Krasinets, 1997) but not on official statistics.

Therefore, our research is based on the statistical data of the Migration Service of the Russian Federation, which covers the basic group of regular temporary labor migrants but does not cover members of their families who actually have no labor contracts for the moment of departure.

As for foreign labor force in Russia, the mechanism of its regulation will be described in detail below. Now it would be enough to note that the source of its study is statistical data published by the Migration Service on the basis of issued number of permissions for hiring of foreign workers by countries of origin, migrants' age, industries and regions of their employment.

This contradicts usual complaints on the lack of data in the post-socialist countries to analyze migration processes in detail. For example, the distinguished expert in migration Michel Poulain argues that statistical data presently available for understanding international migration trends in the Central and Eastern European countries is severely limited (Poulain, 2000).

I would like to highlight again sufficient level of statistical data collected and published by the Migration Service of the Russian Federation which despite ministerial leap-frog, continues its activities. This gives us an opportunity to analyze thoroughly reliable data for the purposes of this paper.

For Russia, international migration of population is not a purely new phenomenon typical for the 1990's only. While putting aside detailed description of Russia's experience in attracting foreign specialists in its historical perspective, we will just mention that since the end of the 19th century till the First World War Russia has been drawing actively foreign workers (Greeks and Persians at the Caspian Coast, Chinese, Japanese and especially Koreans in the Far East Region) who were em-

ployed primarily in agriculture, fishing industry, and for hard works. In certain years of that period, the number of labor migrants exceeded 250 thousand persons.

As for the Soviet period, there were the “waves” of using foreign labor force with peaks at the period of industrialization and between mid-1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s when the number of foreign workers and specialists mainly from Eastern Europe, Vietnam, Northern Korea and Cuba was up to 200 thousand persons.

Since 1992 a new stage of using of foreign labor force in Russia started. The geographical range of labor exporting countries has substantially widened: from China and Northern Korea to the USA, Germany, Morocco and many others including all the former republics of the USSR. In 1996, the number of countries exporting labor force to Russia exceed 120. Here we meet a surprising fact: starting from the mid-1990’s the share of workers and specialists from the former Soviet republics despite of close links, language unity etc. — according to the data of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation — is not higher than the share of legal labor migrants from non-former Soviet Union states while in 1993 the proportion was 75 : 25. Despite declarations on the necessity of formation of the CIS common labor market, in reality there is an evidence of declining of labor migration from the neighboring countries of the former USSR, at least its regular component.

As for Russia’s historical experience in labor exports, it is also rich starting from the Peter The Great epoch. For example, in the field of labor migration from Russia the contemporary situation slightly reminds the situation which has been hundred years ago when while being an exporter of cheap foreign labor to Europe (only in Germany in 1910–1913 around 300 thousand workers from Russia were employed) as well as to other overseas regions, Russia had no economic or political benefits resulting from this fact (Iontsev, Kamenskiy, 1998).

Labor Exports from Russia

During the last decade exports of labor force from Russia has become of stable character though its modest scale. It is to be noticed that in spite of forecasts of many politicians, journalists and even some scholars Russia has not become a big labor exporter. In spite of wage differences between Russia and developed Western countries, the massive exports of labor resources from Russia has not happened.

We have predicted such a situation by different reasons. The most important reasons are: “language barrier” which was the natural result of Russia’s long-term “iron curtain” isolation; poor informational base concerning employment abroad; the absence of experienced recruiting companies for exporting labor; unfavorable conditions of joining the international labor market that means that Russians are to compete with labor migrants from other countries many of whom have already had the ex-

perience of staying and working in labor importing countries or can lean for support of ethnic nets in a hosting country.

Now we will analyze labor migration from Russia by receiving countries. During the 1990's labor exports from Russia amounting 30–50 thousand persons yearly was directed to the certain group of countries. The list of these countries strongly depends on the professional structure of Russian labor migrants. They mainly consist of marine crews contracted for working in foreign marine, transportation or logistic companies. This fact affects the list of counties receiving Russian labor force. In the group of major 13 labor importing countries more than half — 7 countries — are marine countries that traditionally hire Russian crews (Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece, Malta, Japan, Liberia, and Singapore). Over 80% of the total number of Russian citizens employed abroad via recruiting companies are working presently in these countries. Russian marine personnel is hired also in the countries which are not typical marine.

Table 1. Russian labor force importers, 2001

№	Country	Number of Russian labor migrants	%
1	Cyprus	9539	20.85
2	Great Britain	3904	8.53
3	Germany	3894	8.51
4	Greece	3481	7.61
5	Malta	3100	6.77
6	Japan	2441	5.33
7	Cambodia	2025	4.43
8	Southern Korea	1746	3.82
9	Liberia	1590	3.47
10	Singapore	1449	3.17
11	Norway	1373	3.00
12	USA	1260	2.75
13	Netherlands	1153	2.52
14	Rep. of Yugoslavia	861	1.88
15	Panama	732	1.60
16	Portugal	508	1.11
17	Belize	468	1.02
18	Hong Kong	400	0.87
19	Saint-Vincent	396	0.87
20	Belgium	368	0.80
21	Spain	359	0.78
22	Others	4712	10.30

Source: Data from the Migration Service, Ministry of Interior of the RF, 2002.

The certain part of Russian labor migrants are sent to the objects that have been constructed and equipped under intergovernmental agreements on technical assistance. Many of these objects (in mining industry, manufacturing, energy supply, medicine, etc.) continue to invite Russian service personnel. This is the case of India, Malta, Pakistan, Yemen, Portugal.

In future, when economic position of Russia is being improved, its relations with traditional trade partners can strengthen, and Russia's labor force exports under construction / supporting contracts will enlarge. However, this can happen only in case of substantial progress in machines and equipment exports from Russia or in case of renewal of technical assistance projects for developing countries.

The analysis of the educational level of Russian labor migrants shows that in 2001 more than one third of the total number of migrants had higher education (universities and other higher school institutions diplomas) and almost half of migrants had special professional qualifications (college level). The total number of migrants with higher school and professional school diplomas was around 82%. The percentage of qualified cadres in the total labor migrants flow from Russia was: 93.8% in Liberia; 92.3% in the Netherlands; 91.2% in Greece; 89.5% in Cyprus. The lower percentage was: in the Republic of Korea — 63.4%, Japan — 66.7%, Great Britain — 71.4%, Singapore — 78.6%.

As for migrants with higher education only, they are 38.4% of the Russian labor force exports. The most "enriched" manpower was received by the USA — 66.7% of Russian labor migrants were with university diplomas, Liberia — 62.5%, the Netherlands — 61.5%.

The analysis of the structure of Russian labor migrants by term of professional experience gives unexpected result: 48.9% of labor migrants from Russia have professional experience less than 1 year. This is resulting from the fact that importing countries prefer young and non-experienced cadres as they need their ability for adaptation and training. These workers are likely to be employed in auxiliary and assiduous jobs.

Demand for such employees is especially high in Southern Korea — 97.8%, Singapore — 81.0%, Cyprus — 77.4%, Germany — 73.7%, Norway — 83.7%, USA — 73.7% and much lower in Malta — 32%, and Liberia — 44%.

As for professional composition of Russian labor migrants in 2001, from 45.8 thousand persons 24.2% (11,1 thousand) were representatives of marine professions (except captains who were counted as managerial staff), 17.5% (7,5 thousand) were engineers, 9% (4,1 thousand) — art employees (mainly musicians, singers and dancers).

As for regional distribution of Russian labor exports, there are several major sending regions: Saint-Petersburg (26% of the total number), Primorskiy Province in Far East (14%), Moscow (11%), Krasnodarskiy Province (12%, mainly Novorossiysk seaport), Khabarovskiy Province (7.6%), Sakhalin Island Province (3.1%).

Labor Force Imports to Russia

The total number of legal foreign workers in the Russian Federation was 283 thousand in 2001, it demonstrates the growth of over 20% in comparison with 2000. It is worth noting that since the Soviet period,

Table 2. Number of russian labor migrants by countries, by education and professional experience, 2001, (thousands)

№	Country	Total	Education		Professional experience			Share of a country, %
			Higher	Specialized professional	less than 6 months	6–12 months	over 3 years	
	All the countries, i.e.	45.8	17.6	19.9	12.4	21.2	8.9	100
1	Cyprus	9.5	3.1	5.4	2.1	5.3	1.4	20.85
2	Great Britain	3.9	1.6	1.2	1.0	2.6	0.2	8.53
3	Germany	3.8	1.8	1.6	0.9	2.8	0.1	8.51
4	Greece	3.4	1.4	1.7	0.4	2.1	0.7	7.61
5	Malta	3.0	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.7	6.77
6	Japan	2.4	0.4	1.2	1.6	0.2	0.5	5.33
7	Cambodia	2.0	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.7	4.43
8	Southern Korea	1.7	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.0	3.82
9	Liberia	1.6	1.0	0.5	1.2	0.9	0.7	3.47
10	Singapore	1.4	0.6	0.5	0.1	1.1	0.3	3.17
11	Norway	1.4	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	3.00
12	Netherlands	1.3	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	2.75
13	USA	1.2	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.15	0.3	2.52

Note: The table includes the countries with total number of Russian labor migrants over 1000.

Source: Data from the Migration Service, Ministry of Interior of the RF, 2002

Table 3. Labor exports from Russia by working experience, 2001, %

№	Country	Work experience		Both inexperienced or with minimum working experience (3+4)
		Less than 6 months	From 6 months till 1 year	
	Total	46.8	2.1	48.9
1	Cyprus	21.6	55.9	77.4
2	Great Britain	66.2	0.6	66.8
3	Germany	71.3	1.2	97.4
4	Greece	58.9	0.5	59.3
5	Malta	31.3	0.7	32.0
6	Japan	65.3	10.0	75.3
7	Cambodia	36.6	27.0	63.6
8	Southern Korea	55.1	42.7	97.8
9	Liberia	4.8	39.2	44.0
10	Singapore	3.5	77.5	81.0
11	Norway	32.8	50.0	83.3
12	Netherlands	22.9	26.6	49.5
13	USA	69.5	4.3	73.7

Source: Data from the Migration Service, Ministry of Interior of the RF, 2002

to be exact, since 1960's — 1970's foreign labor force used in the country under official contracts and intergovernmental agreements had been between 200,000 and 300,000 persons.

Contemporary Russia's economy is in need of importing labor more than of exporting it. It is obviously seen from stable correlation between labor exports and imports 1 : 5 during in the 1990's.

Historical analysis of migration processes allows us to make a conclusion that there is a variety of interrelations between migration and development (Tapinos, 1974). However, at the same time experts more and more often argue that the growth of migrants inflow in a country can have also negative effect, as migrants increase the pressure on a social sphere (Iontsev, 1999).

Table 4. Labor Force exporters to Russia, 2001

№	Country	Number of legal labor migrants	%
	Total number of foreign labor force in Russia	283728	100.00
1	Ukraine	91917	32.40
2	China	38611	13.61
3	Turkey	20915	7.37
4	Vietnam	20137	7.10
5	Moldova	13302	4.69
6	Former Yugoslavia	10187	3.59
7	Uzbekistan	10058	3.54
8	Tajikistan	10020	3.53
9	Northern Korea	9941	3.50
10	Armenia	8457	2.98
11	Bulgaria	5709	2.01
12	Georgia	4972	1.75
13	Azerbaijan	4415	1.56
14	Kazakhstan	3606	1.27
15	Lithuania	2836	1.00
16	Poland	2621	0.92
17	Afghanistan	2118	0.75
18	USA	1997	0.70
19	Finland	1891	0.67
20	Great Britain	1758	0.62
21	Kirgizstan	1721	0.61
22	India	1647	0.58
23	Germany	1610	0.57
24	Estonia	1278	0.45
25	France	1228	0.43
26	Canada	856	0.30
27	Southern Korea	761	0.27
28	Italy	695	0.24
29	Other countries	8464	2.98

Source: Data from the Migration Service, Ministry of Interior of the RF, 2002.

Demographic characteristics of foreign labor force in 2000 and 2001 were approximately the same. Male labor force was about 90% of the total. The most numerous age group was 30–39 years (over 33%), the age group 40–49 years — close to one third, while the age group 18–29 years was less than one third. This means than average age of labor migrants in Russia is higher than the world average. Similar age trends are typical for female labor migrants in Russia that is even more unusual for world practice.

During the 1990's Russia's labor market was primarily “oriented” for labor migrants from several countries: Ukraine (32.4% of the total amount in 2001), China (13.6%) and Turkey (7.4%). More detailed data for a group of 28 labor exporters to Russia is in the table 4.

Noteworthy that major labor exporters to Russia are the countries with surplus labor force (the first 15–17 countries in the table).

There are also labor migrants from developed countries in Russia (from 500 to 2000 persons), they are mainly managers and highly skilled professionals from the USA, Finland, Great Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Italy.

Foreign labor force in the 1990's was used first of all in construction industry and manufacturing, while at the beginning of the new century — in construction, trade and manufacturing. In 2001, foreign workers were mainly working in construction (39.1%), in commerce and restaurant business (15.9%), in mining and manufacturing (13.0%), agriculture and forestry (7.0%). The total of above mentioned spheres is 85.1%.

The analysis of foreign labor force in Russia by spheres economic activities and by countries of origin highlights the fact of “ethnic vocational preferences” that has been already stressed at a number of workshops and international conferences starting from the International Conference on Afro-Asian Demography in Cairo, Egypt in 1996.

We understand the term “ethnic vocational preferences” as an intention of labor migrants of the certain nationality / ethnic group to occupy jobs in the economic sphere (spheres) where they are traditionally more successful and where they can effectively compete with local workers. This trend is becoming more evident when by means of structural analysis we prove that the most part of labor migrants originating from a certain country occupy jobs in a particular sphere (spheres), or when they represent the major part of foreign labor force in a particular sphere of Russia's economy.

Such an analysis on foreign labor force in Russia shows that Armenians are represented mainly in construction (65%), Azerbaijanians — in trade and construction (37%), the citizens of former Yugoslavia — in construction (90.2%), Vietnamese people — in trade and commerce (91.6%), Chinese migrants — in trade, agriculture and forestry (61%), labor migrants from Belarus — in industry (100%), from Turkey — in construction (75%), Argentineans — in fishery (70%), and

Ukrainian drivers in Moscow exceed 50% of the total number of employees in the public transportation sector of the city.

Now we would turn to the disputable question: efficiency of foreign labor force using. We use formulas for calculating indices of efficiency of using of foreign workers (Kamenskiy, 1999) at the enterprise level and at the industry level.

$$EFL = \frac{PE}{FLE}, \quad (1)$$

where: *EFL* — efficiency of using of foreign labor force; *PE* — profit of an enterprise; *FLE* — foreign labor expenses.

In this formula *FLE* includes total labor expenses related to the foreign workers used at this particular enterprise: wages (including bonuses and extra-payments); payments for social, pension, insurance funds; accommodation costs, working clothes, etc.; other expenses paid by employee for foreign labor force using (e.g. transportation fees, luggage delivery, custom taxes, etc.). All these expenses are summarized as *FLE* in denominator of the formula.

As for numerator *PE* there is a problem of using whether gross profit or net profit, i.e. after deducting taxes on profit, payments in funds, etc. Taking into account the specific economic situation in Russia we would advice to use gross profit because many enterprises (especially big ones) have no profit of minimize it artificially. To avoid this confusion may be it's better to use Formula 2.

$$EFL = \frac{AV}{FLE}, \quad (2)$$

where: *EFL* — efficiency of using of foreign labor force; *AV* — added value; *FLE* — foreign labor expenses.

FLE is calculated by the same method as described above, and *AV* includes the value of issued products (or the funds used for construction) minus the expenses of the previous period: raw materials; non-valuable tools (eliminated while the working process); value of wearing of the basic equipment; other payments.

These expenses are counted under the recommendations of the National Taxation Department of the Russian Federation for accounting of added value taxes.

This formula is necessary used in construction industry (where there is no usual category of the profit) and nowadays it can be used in agriculture and manufacturing.

Furthermore, after calculating *EFL* by any of the above formulas, it can be compared with efficiency of total labor force used at an enterprise (industrial / construction site). The result will give a *comparative efficiency* of using of foreign labor force and national one.

$$CELF = \frac{EFL}{ETL}, \quad (3)$$

where: *CELF* — comparative efficiency of labor force index; *EFL* — efficiency of using of foreign labor force; *AV* — added value; *ETL* — efficiency of total labor force.

In case *CELF* is over 1.0 this means that foreign labor force is used at the enterprise (construction site) more effectively, than total labor resources. As a rule, if a contract is developed properly and control over foreign labor is qualified, foreign workers turn to be more efficient due to the following reasons: their productivity is higher; the result of their work is of higher quality; their salary is lower.

If it is difficult to make a comparison over the same period of time (for example, a team of Chinese agricultural workers are employed since April till October while the workers of the farm are normally employed all over the year) indices for one basic month of “hot season” (e.g. June) can be used in calculations.

This method should be used carefully for those enterprises/industrial sites where labor force is presented primarily by foreign workers, or in labor-deficit regions (for more details please refer to Kamenskiy, 1999).

Distribution of foreign labor force over the territory of the Russian Federation is very wide, however, in every economic region there is usually one leading province which is actually attracting from a half to two thirds of foreign labor migrants of this economic region.

Thus, within the Northern Caucasus Region the Krasnodar Province is using 63% of foreign labor force, in the Ural Region there is Bashkortostan Republic which is using 48%, in the Western Siberian Region there is a Khanti-Mansi Autonomous District which is using 57% of foreign labor of this region, in the Eastern Siberian Region there is the Krasnoyarsk Province which is using 44%, in the Far Eastern Region there is the Primorskiy Territory which is using 44%, in the Northern Western Region there is Saint Petersburg and Leningradskaya Province (95%), in the Central Region — the city of Moscow (71.4%), in the Volgo-Vjatskiy Region — the Novgorod Province (73.4%), in the Central-Chernozem Region — Belgorod (63%), in the Povoljskiy Region — Astrakhan and Volgograd Provinces (both 57.2%).

Usually the largest amount of labor migrants in Russia is used in those provinces and regions where the economy is developing more successfully. Thus, the city of Moscow is using about 28% of the total amount of foreign labor force in Russia, Khanti-Mansi Autonomous District — 10%, Belgorod Province — 3.2%, Leningrad Province — 1.5%. On the contrary, the regions with repressive economy do not attract foreign labor force at all or in very limited numbers: Chechen Republic — 0%; Ingush Republic — 0%, Republic of Mary-El — 0.005%.

The year of 2001 has demonstrated increasing of foreign labor force in “more successful regions” in comparison with 2000, except Moscow and Saint Petersburg where its amount has slightly decreased due to restrictions of migration regulations.

It is also important to analyze distribution of foreign labor force in Russia both in regional/province and industry aspects. This analysis can clear up a region's profile and highlight the spheres where there is a shortage of labor resources. In the Northern Economic Region the most part of labor migrants are concentrated in construction industry, mining and manufacturing; in the Northern-West Region and Central Region — in construction and trade, in the Volgo-Vjatskiy Region — in trade; in the Central-Chernozem Region — in agriculture and forestry, in the Povoljkiy Region — in agriculture and trade; in the Ural Region — in construction and trade, in the Far Eastern Region — in industry and trade.

Thus, we see the differences in distribution of foreign labor force over regions of Russia. The main trend looks like this: the more developed the region is, the more is the number of foreign workers in construction and trade.

In general, labor force imports is traditional for Russia's economy, though its scale is modest in comparison with the total number of national labor resources. The total labor force in Russia is around 50–55 million, i.e. foreign labor force is no more than 0.5%; even in the peak years of 1994–1996 this portion has never exceeded 1%. However, the fact is that foreign labor force is used in the most important spheres of Russia's economy.

Conclusions

1. Russia has started its entering into the world labor market primarily as an importer of foreign labor force though the most of experts had predicted the contra situation. After the Federal Law “On the Entrance to the Russian Federation and the Exit from the Russian Federation” of 1991, a period of time has passed, enough to understand the place of Russia in international migrations.
2. Official exports of labor from Russia is oriented first of all to marine countries, i.e. the main portion of Russian legal labor migrants who were employed abroad via recruiting agencies are the crew members of sea vessels (mainly cargo vessels and fishing boats). This fact is resulting from several reasons: first, Russia has good experience in this kind of recruiting business, second, professional level of Russian seamen fully corresponds the standards on the world labor market, third, seamen's job is hard and harmful, so it is often rejected by local citizens in developed countries.
3. The main obstacle for Russian citizens to be employed in other countries is usual ignorance in foreign languages, so called “language barrier”. Seamen who have good foreign language training in all the marine colleges and relevant practice are a lucky exception. Besides the crew members, labor exports from Russia includes art employees (musicians, dancers, circus actors who are making their show without knowing any foreign language), and also technical specialists.

4. Labor exporting regions in Russia are mainly the provinces with big sea ports (port of Saint Petersburg, port of Novorossiysk in the Krasnodar Territory, port of Vladivostok in the Primorskiy Territory, etc.). The majority of labor recruiting companies specialized in employment of seamen are registered in these regions.
5. Despite of relatively small scale of labor force exports from Russia (around 50 thousand persons a year), its studying gives us an opportunity to understand and explain vital processes of social and economical development of Russia, including demographic, employment structure differences in particular regions of Russia resulting in different trends of labor migrations. Thus, it was discovered that the major part of exported labor resources are young men with high educational level but without professional experience.
6. As an importer of labor force, Russia has a sufficient historical experience. Thus, even 200 year ago there was an official practice of inviting foreign specialists to many spheres of Russia's economy. In the period of 1816–1917 a large amount of Chinese labor migrants were used in the Far East of Russia. During the Soviet period foreign workers (up to 200 thousand) were attracted in accordance with official policy of economic cooperation with socialist countries. This proves the permanent demand for foreign labor force in Russia's economy.
7. The research of labor force imports to the USSR and especially to Russia proves that its using can be rather efficient. Thus, foreign labor can be more productive, qualified, and cheaper. Besides, foreign labor resources are actively used in Russia in the regions of opening and development.
8. The major part of foreign labor force in Russia is used in the most "successful regions" with rapid economic development, such as Moscow, Khanti-Mansi Autonomous District and southern regions. Construction is the main industry where foreign workers are used. Besides, labor migrants are attracted to manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, restaurant business and agriculture.
9. A trend of "ethnic vocational preferences" is to be noted. It means that certain ethnic communities are concentrated in particular spheres of economy, either a particular economic sphere is becoming a field of activity of one of ethnic migrant communities. This trend is typical mainly for southern and eastern nations (Armenians, Turks, Azerbaijanians, and also Ukrainians, Moldavians, etc.).

Translation into English — by the author

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO MULTIPLE DESTINATIONS

There is increasing speculation about how the pathways of international migration are changing in response to globalization processes (Cohen, 1995; Richmond, 1994; Findlay, 1993; Sassen, 1988). Globalization generally refers to increased economic, political, and technological flows between countries. Although flows of people are a correlate of other flows, there is less understanding of the volume, direction and determinants of migration flows among countries today than there is of capital or other flows. While the International Monetary Fund routinely collects and publishes data on economic flows, no international agency does that for international migration. Some crude estimates do exist. For instance, the International Organization for Migration (2001) estimated that there are over 160 million people living outside of their country of birth or citizenship. Others argue that the numbers of international migrants are on the increase albeit involving a relatively small share — an estimated 3 percent — of world population (Martin and Widgren, 2002).

Although we have limited understanding of how international migration is changing, it is apparent that the types of international migration taking place today differ from those that prevailed in previous centuries. A typology developed in 1961 by Petersen identified settlers moving with the intent of permanent settlement as the dominant type of international migrant. Following the imposition of nation state restrictions on immigration that followed World War I, many scholars predicted that the era of significant international migration had ended (Davis, 1947; Petersen, 1975, p. 326). However, the era of international migration has not ended and the foreign-born population share has increased in many countries in recent decades.

It is correct, however, that settlement migration which dominated international flows for a couple of centuries has basically ended. Settlers are permanent migrants who move from one country to another, often with their families, with the intention of starting a new life abroad. While settlement is often an end result of contemporary migrations, today's migrations usually start as temporary migrations for a specific purpose such as work, study, marriage to a foreign national, or even an extended vacation, rather than for permanent settlement. The directions of today's movements also differ from those in the past. Whereas permanent migration flowed

from relatively overpopulated countries in Europe to sparsely populated ones in other regions, today's migrations are believed to be mainly labor migrations flowing from less developed to more developed countries. According to the neoclassical paradigm, economic disparities drive contemporary international migrations and will only be curtailed by sustained economic development of the less developed regions (Cohen, 1995). Massey and colleagues (1994, p. 741) articulated how the model works: "As economic growth in sending regions occurs and emigration proceeds, international wage gaps gradually close..., lowering the incentives for movement. If the sending country is ultimately integrated into the international market as a developed, urbanized economy, net migration ceases and the former sending country may itself become a net importer of immigrant labor".

What evidence is there for the neoclassical claim that economic disparities drive international migration and that net migration slows when a country reaches an advanced stage of economic development? Studies of peaks and ebbs in transatlantic migration during the 1800s and early 1900s are often cited as support for the argument that economic growth slows emigration (Hatton and Williamson, 1994; Thomas, 1973; Massey, 1988). Some scholars claim, however, that while economic growth may have been correlated with declines in emigration historically, that is not the case today. Richmond (1994, p. 217), for instance, argues that "Contrary to the view that economic growth will itself remove the need for migration, it must be recognized that the emerging global economic and social system is one in which population movements will continue to increase rather than decline". Salt (1992, pp. 1080–1081) makes a similar argument: "...many of the processes that create and drive these [migration] systems operate on a worldwide basis, the consequence of economic globalization, capital mobility, the activities of international corporations, and the widespread realization by governments that human resources can be traded for profit like any other resource".

In this paper, I look empirically at the question of whether developed countries continue to be significant producers of migrants. In particular, I look at the determinants of two outcomes: the total number of legal migrants sent by 159 countries to eight developed countries — Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the number of developed country destinations to which each country sent migrants in the study period. By looking at which countries sent migrants to the most destinations and at the total number of migrants sent by a country to eight destinations, rather than just to a single receiver, I begin to address a question on which the migration literature is silent, namely, do developed countries continue to generate significant

numbers of global migrants? After establishing the magnitude of sending country migrations, I use multivariate analysis to look at the economic, demographic, and social determinants of migration to multiple destinations.

Measurement of Migration to Multiple Destinations

Migration from sending countries is usually looked at from the standpoint of a single destination. That limitation undoubtedly occurs because of the lack of comparative data on international migration. Most data on international migrants are generated by receiving countries and necessarily focus only on the origins of migrants admitted to that country. However, there is no reason to expect countries to send migrants to a single destination. A key question is which countries are likely to send migrants to multiple destinations and why? As globalization proceeds, it is reasonable to expect to find an increasingly complex global migration matrix characterized by country flows in multiple directions and to multiple destinations. It would also be reasonable to expect that some countries will establish more flows to multiple destinations than others and that leading senders to single destinations may differ from leading senders to multiple destinations. The task in this paper is to identify which countries are most likely to send migrants to multiple destinations and assess how that affects their overall migration profile.

The data for this analysis is the South-to-North International Migration File compiled by the U.N. Population Division (1995). That file has time series data on legal migration to eight developed countries — Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany (West), the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. For five of those countries (Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States), data from the 1989–1993 period are examined since that was the most recent five-year period for which data were available. For Canada and Germany, the most recent period was 1988–1992 and for Belgium it was 1986–1990. Although the latter falls outside of the time period examined for the other countries, I include Belgium in the analysis in order to shed light on another migration system and because migrant origins do not change greatly from year-to-year.

The eight receiving countries use different practices to record migrant inflows which stem from their different policy approaches to immigration (Zlotnik, 1996 a). For three of the receivers — Australia, Canada, and the United States — the data are for aliens granted the right of permanent residence in a given year. The United Kingdom gathers its migrant flow data through an International Passenger Survey and defines an immigrant as an

alien intending to stay for more than a year. The other four countries (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) gather information on migrant inflows via their population registers which define immigrants as aliens intending to establish residence. Although data on citizens returning from residence abroad, are included in the data systems except for Australia, Canada and the United States, only data on foreigners are analyzed in this paper. The eight receiving countries use different practices to classify migrants' country of origin. The three permanent migration countries classify migrants by their place of birth; Belgium and the Netherlands classify them by their country of citizenship; and Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom classify them by their country of last residence (see United Nations Population Division, 1995 and Zlotnik, 1996a for discussion of the U.N. data and country comparability).

Although the U.N. database includes permanent migration data for the United States, I use data from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tapes for 1989–1993 since they have data for more sending countries than the annual yearbooks of the INS, which were used to prepare the U.N. database¹. Data on flows from 159 sending countries were available for all eight receivers. Countries for which comparable data were not available tended to be small or newly formed ones for which either migration or other data were not complete for the five-year period. Countries formed out of the former USSR fit this latter case. If time series data were incomplete for one of the five years in the study period, I estimated a five-year number based on the four-year period for which data were available.

There are some deficiencies in the database which limit the generalizability of findings. The biggest limitation stems from the fact that the data set includes only permanent legal migrants in the case of three countries — Australia, Canada, and United States. While status adjustments from temporary to permanent migration are an increasing occurrence in the United States and Canada (Michalowski and Fortier, 1990; Zlotnik, 1996 b), neither country publishes data on temporary inflows that can be readily combined with permanent migration data². In the European coun-

¹ Status adjustments from illegal to permanent status authorized under the U.S. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) inflate permanent migration statistics in the year the adjustment occurs, and thus I remove status adjusters from the database. While the year of entry of illegal migrants adjusting status is unknown, they had to have arrived in the United States prior to January 1, 1982, to qualify for the IRCA program and thus would have been responding to different origin conditions than immigrants newly admitted for permanent residence in the 1989–1993 period.

² The INS publishes data on entries of non-immigrants or foreigners who have been issued temporary visas in its annual reports. However, non-immigrants already resident in

tries, on the other hand, all migrants are admitted as temporary migrants. Although the status of migrants admitted to one of the European country may subsequently be adjusted from temporary to permanent, the policy mode under which they were admitted was that of temporary migration. Limiting the analysis to permanent migration for some countries and temporary migration for others results in an underestimation of migrant inflows for Australia, Canada and the United States relative to those for European countries.

A further deficiency stems from the fact that we can only look at inflows rather than at net migration because Canada and the United States do not collect emigration data. It is well known that return migration is an integral component of most migration flows even though the proportions who return vary by destinations and origins. Another factor, illegal migration, leads to an underestimation of migration volume. Illegal migration necessarily has to be ignored because none of the countries has data on those flows. Since illegal migration is probably unevenly distributed across the senders but it is not clear how, this problem affects some senders and receivers more than others.

The Magnitude and Origins of Recent Migration to Eight Developed Countries

Table 1 lists the top 30 countries which sent the most and fewest migrants to eight developed countries in the 1989–1993 period. In that period, 9,587,579 persons migrated to one of the receivers. Five countries — Poland, Turkey, USSR, Vietnam and Philippines — produced 29 percent of those migrants and an additional 17 percent came from five other countries — Mexico, United Kingdom, Romania, China and United States. The data in Table 1 support the argument that developed countries continue to be important sources of international migrants. Indeed the presence of the United Kingdom, United States, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Australia, New Zealand, France, Canada and Germany in the list of top 30 senders calls into question the claim that developed countries are no longer major senders of international migrants.

the United States are included in these counts if they travel abroad and reenter in a given year as well as foreigners receiving initial authorization to enter. Since most categories of temporary migrants include persons of higher socio-economic status, it is reasonable to assume that a high proportion of them travel abroad to visit family or for business purposes in a given year. Unfortunately, one does not know how many non-immigrants in different categories leave and reenter in a given year and thus there is no basis for adjusting the data.

Table 1. Rank order of 30 countries that sent the most migrants and the 30 countries that sent the fewest^a migrants to eight developed countries in the 1989–1993 period

Sending country	Total number of migrants	Number of destinations	Sending country	Total number of migrants	Number of destinations
Poland	1,107,718	6	Mongolia	0	0
Turkey	500,631	7	Bhutan	7	1
USSR	400,377	5	Mauritania	45	2
Vietnam	397,363	4	Lesotho	67	2
Philippine	388,095	4	CenAfricanRep	71	2
Mexico	356,973	3	Congo	110	2
U.Kingdom	327,770	7	Botswana	113	2
Romania	320,306	4	Oman	136	2
China	308,404	4	Malawi	355	2
USA	295,460	7	Burundi	485	3
India	279,089	4	Chad	553	3
Netherlands	240,330	6	Mozambique	646	2
Italy	217,592	6	Rwanda	697	3
HongKong	196,634	3	Niger	798	3
DomRepub	176,447	3	Korea DPR	845	1
Greece	161,092	6	Madagascar	952	3
Australia	153,907	5	Mali	1,064	3
Korea Rep	151,879	4	PapNewGuinea	1,067	3
Lebanon	129,892	4	Angola	1,086	2
Pakistan	122,475	5	Benin	1,247	3
NewZealand	122,393	5	BurkFaso	1,320	3
France	122,343	6	Zambia	1,581	2
Jamaica	116,007	2	Guinea	1,634	3
Canada	115,050	6	U.ArabEmirate	2,358	2
Czechslvk	113,912	3	Albania	2,574	2
ElSalvador	107,277	4	Cote d'Ivoire	3,095	3
Hungary	106,178	3	Libya	3,786	3
Germany	94,275	6	Mauritius	3,824	3
Portugal	91,722	5	Paraguay	3,836	3
Morocco	91,120	5	Nepal	3,867	3

^aThe listing of countries that sent the fewest migrants is limited to ones that had a 1985 population of at least one million. There are countries or territories smaller than a million that sent at least as many migrants as the ones listed, including: Equatorial Guinea, Maldives, Vanuatu, Comoros, Guinea Bisseau, New Caledonia, Swaziland, Gabon, French Polynesia, Martinique, Djibouti, Gambia, Guadeloupe, Neth. Antilles, Qatar, Bahrain, Seychelles, Malta, Tonga, Brunei, Cyprus, St. Kitts, Samoa, St. Lucia, Bahamas, and Antigua.

Which countries sent migrants to the most destinations? That information is provided for the eight receivers in the third column of Table 1. A clear pattern emerges — countries that produced relatively large numbers

of migrants were also likely to send them to more destinations while those that produced fewer migrants had fewer destination points.

The mean number of destinations for the top 30 senders is 4.7 but only 2.1 for the 56 countries that sent the fewest migrants. Only three countries — Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States — sent migrants to seven receivers and seven others — Poland, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, France, Canada, Germany — sent migrants to six receivers. Of the countries that sent migrants to five or more destination points, only two — Pakistan and Morocco — are traditional developing countries. All of the other countries are high or moderate income countries or ones with relatively high human capital (e.g. Eastern European countries). All 30 countries listed in Table 1 as sending few migrants, on the other hand, are developing countries.

Determinants of Migration Volume and Number of Destinations

In this section, I use multivariate regression analysis to examine the determinants of the two outcomes described in Table 1: the total number of migrants sent by over 150 countries to eight receivers in the study period; and the number of destinations to which each country sent migrants in that period. Two demographic indicators are controlled for: 1985 population size and 1985 population growth rate. Although neoclassical theory postulates a positive relationship between population growth and emigration, I expect to find a negative relationship based on previous work by Kritz (1998, 2001) and Zlotnik (1994). I examine two economic measures: 1993 GNP per capita and labor force growth in the 1965–1995 period. GNP in 1993 is used rather than GNP for an earlier year because of increased data availability for the former. The 1993 indicator, however, is highly correlated with GNP of earlier periods (0.86 with GNP per capita in 1960–1965). To determine whether social inequalities across countries contribute to migration, I look at the relationship between migration and the human development index (HDI). The HDI is issued annually by the UNDP and is based on indicators of life expectancy, adult literacy, and economic purchasing power. Finally, I evaluate the importance of links to the global economy by looking at two factors: 1988 value of exports of manufactures to OECD countries; and value of total exports to all countries in 1988.

Data for these indicators come from the World Bank's 1988 World Development Report and have some constraints. For instance, some of the indicators are available for only a subset of the sending countries and thus reduced models have to be estimated when that is the case. In general, international trade data were not available for small territories or countries, newly formed countries in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, and countries experiencing civil strife. If the indicators' distribution is skewed, I use natural logs. Tables 2 and 3 indicate whether the log form of the variable is being used.

Table 2. Ordinary least squares regression of total number of migrants sent to eight developed countries in 1989–1993 period, standardized regression coefficients

	Model 1 Zero-Order Relations	Model 2 Control for population size	Model 3 Control for pop. size & GNP per capita
(row 1) log 1985 population size (pop85tlg)	.59*** (34.1%) N=153	--	--
(row 2) log 1993 GNP per capita (gnp93lg)	.19* (3.1%) N=153	.33*** (44.1%) N=153	--
(row 3) # destinations (emigms8)	.72*** (51.2%) N=153	.57*** (54.8%) N=153	.51*** (55.0%) N=153
(row 4) 1985 rate of population growth (natinc85)	-.35*** (11.4%) N=153	-.33*** (44.8%) N=153	-.21 (46.1%) N=153
(row 5) 1965-1995 rate of labor force growth (glab6595)	-.26** (5.8%) N=121	-.16* (35.2%) N=121	-.09 (47.6%) N=121
(row 6) 1991 human develop- ment index (hdi1991)	.52*** (26.7%) N=144	.54*** (60.0%) N=144	.78*** (62.1%) N=144
(row 7) log 1988 value of ex- ports to OECD countries (im- pavlg)	.63*** (39.2%) N=115	.49*** (47.8%) N=115	.44** (47.3%) N=115
(row 8) log 1988 value of ex- ports (exp88log)	.59*** (34.8%) N=108	.43*** (44.8%) N=108	-.22 (47.4%) N=108

Note: Each cell in the table gives results from a separate model. Model 1 includes only the explanatory variable itself; Model 2 includes that variable and population size; Model 3 controls for those two factors and GNP per capita. Line 1 in each cell gives the standardized regression coefficient; line 2 gives the adjusted R^2 for the model; and line 3 gives the number of countries used to estimate the model.

To facilitate comparisons across different sets of models, I use standardized regression coefficients which give the change in standard deviation units in the dependent variable per one standard deviation unit change in the independent variable. Standardized coefficients allow us to evaluate the substantive importance of variables which differ greatly in their metrics. However, if the number of countries evaluated differs across models due to missing data, comparisons need to be qualified. I did evaluate whether relationships differ for models estimated with a reduced number of countries

and find that the direction and significance levels remain comparable although the magnitude of coefficients may change slightly.

A series of models are estimated that specify first the zero-order relation between an explanatory variable and migration volume (Table 2) or number of destination points (Table 3). Subsequent models control for population size (Model 2) and GNP per capita (Model 3). Comparisons of change in the regression coefficients across these 3 sets of models allow us to evaluate whether the explanatory factors retain a significant relationship to each migration outcome net of population size and GNP per capita.

Table 3. Ordinary least squares regression of total number of destinations for each sender in 1989–1993 period, standardized regression coefficients

	Model 1 Zero-Order Relations	Model 2 Control for population size	Model 3 Control for pop. size & GNP per capita
(row 1) log 1985 population size (pop85tlg)	.62*** (38.0%) N=158	--	--
(row 2) log 1993 GNP per capita (gnp93lg)	.35*** (11.7%) N=158	.47*** (59.5%) N=158	--
(row 3) # destinations (emigms8)	-.45*** (19.8%) N=158	-.42*** (55.4%) N=158	-.19** (61.2%) N=158
(row 4) 1985 rate of population growth (natinc85)	-.40*** (15.6%) N=122	-.32*** (34.8%) N=122	-.23*** (57.1%) N=122
(row 5) 1965-1995 rate of labor force growth (glab6595)	.40*** (15.8%) N=149	.41*** (53.6%) N=149	.02 (61.0%) N=149
(row 6) 1991 human development index (hdi1991)	.67*** (44.2%) N=108	.57*** (47.6%) N=108	-.43 (54.1%) N=108
(row 7) log 1988 value of exports to OECD countries (impavlg)	.69*** (46.8%) N=116	.59*** (50.5%) N=116	.22 (53.3%) N=116
(row 8) log 1988 value of exports (exp88log)	.62*** (38.0%) N=158	--	--

Note: Each cell in the table is a separate model. Model 1 includes only the explanatory variable; Model 2 includes that variable and population size; and Model 3 includes those two variables and adds GNP per capita. Line 1 in each cell shows the standardized regression coefficient; line 2 shows the adjusted R^2 for the model; and line 3 shows the number of countries used to estimate the model.

Determinants of Number of Migrants: Table 2 shows that the largest zero order correlate of the volume of migration is number of destinations to which migrants flow. Not surprisingly, countries that have multiple destination outlets produce the largest number of migrants (row 3, model 1). Controls for population size and GNP per capita reduce that relationship only slightly (models 2 and 3). While all of the other relationships examined in Table 2 are significant at the zero-order level, only two of them — social inequality and trade flows — are not functions of either population size or GNP per capita. Higher scores on the social equality index, as measured by the human development index (row 6) have a strong positive zero-order correlation with migration volume. That finding is consistent with the ranking of leading sending countries shown Table 1. For instance, several Eastern European countries are included in that listing as major senders. Those countries have relatively high human capital but relatively low GNP per capita. Both trade measures (rows 7 and 8) are significant at the zero-order level and after controlling for population size but only exports to OECD countries remains significant after controlling for GNP per capita. This finding supports the world system idea that economic and other exchanges between countries stimulate migration flows between them.

Determinants of Number of Destinations: What are the correlates of the number of destination flows that sending countries have established to the eight receivers? Table 3, which includes the same covariates as Table 2, addresses that question. Altogether, population size and GNP per capita explain 59.5 percent of the variance in the number of destinations to which migrants are sent (row 2, model 2). In other words, increased population size and GNP per capita are highly correlated with increased number of destination points. In contrast, countries with rapidly growing populations (row 3) are significantly less likely to send migrants to multiple destinations and those effects remain significant after controlling for population size and GNP per capita. The relationship of labor force growth to number of destinations is similar to that for population growth — countries with rapid labor force growth are less likely to send migrants to multiple destinations and about half of those effects are due to population size and GNP per capita differences across countries. Although social equality has a significant zero-order relationship to number of destinations, that relationship disappears after controlling for GNP per capita and population growth.

The two economic linkage factors — exports to OECD countries and total value of exports — have very strong zero-order relationships to number of destination points. Since countries with large populations produce more exports, those coefficients are slightly reduced after controlling for population size (Model 2). We also know that high income countries pro-

duce more exports and find that after controlling for that dimension in Model 3, trade volume no longer has a significant relationship to number of destinations. This finding indicates that it is not exports or economic ties between countries per se that determine the number of migrant destinations but rather a country's relative income.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper, I look at the determinants of which countries sent *the largest number of migrants* to eight developed countries and at which countries sent migrants to *the largest number of destinations* in the study period. By comparing the total volume of migration to eight developed countries and examining why it is that some countries are more likely than others to send migrants to multiple destinations, some patterns emerge that cannot be observed in studies of inflows to a single receiver. The analysis shows, for instance, that developed countries are important senders of migrants if we consider the numbers they send to multiple destinations. Indeed, after aggregating the number of migrants that developed countries sent to eight destinations, it became clear that developed countries are among the most important sending countries in global migrations.

The migration literature tends to be silent about the two major findings of this paper, namely that a significant number of migrants to developed countries originate in other developed countries and that developed countries are significantly more likely than developing ones to send migrants to multiple destinations. It could be argued that these findings call into question both neoclassical and world system theories of migration, the dominant paradigms in the migration field. Both theoretical perspectives hold that today's international migrations are characterized by labor migrations from poorer to richer countries and, in turn, that emigration pressures and outflows from developing to developed regions will only be halted by reducing economic differentials (à la neoclassicists) and economic exploitation of poor countries (à la world systemists).

My analysis shows that several parts of that paradigm do not operate as claimed. For instance, with regard to the neoclassical argument that demographic and economic inequalities between countries are the principal determinants of contemporary international migration flows, this analysis offers a very different picture of the role of inequalities when we consider flows to multiple destinations rather than to just one receiver. Not only do migration flows not stop or become reduced in volume as economic inequalities decrease but the volume of such movement may actually increase among countries that have comparable economic, demographic and social

indicators. Moreover, the demographic inequalities often pointed to as determinants of migrations do not work in the expected direction. Countries experiencing rapid population growth and one of its counterparts, rapid labor force growth, are significantly less likely to send migrants to developed countries and to have multiple destination choices than countries experiencing little or no growth. Indeed, the only population dimension that has a strong and consistent relationship to migration volume and number of destination choices is population size.

This analysis has not examined a principal claim of world system theorists, namely that migration flows will be positively correlated with the extent of economic and political penetration and historical linkages between any two countries, but it does raise questions as to whether that process works exactly in the manner claimed by scholars. I find, for example, that two indicators of economic linkages — total value of exports and value of exports to OECD countries — correlate positively with migration, as postulated by world system theorists. Moreover, exports to OECD countries have a stronger effect on migration outcomes than value of total exports to all countries. Since the eight receivers examined in this study are all OECD countries, this finding supports the claim of world system proponents that economic ties between sending and receiving countries shape migration processes. World system theory, however, focuses mainly on economic penetration of peripheral countries by rich countries and flows from those peripheral countries to the rich ones. My analysis suggests that while trade and migration are linked, those flows occur mainly among high and moderate income countries rather than from poor countries to rich ones.

The finding of a significant positive effect of population size on migration volume and number of destinations initially stands out as an anomaly. Why should population size have such a strong effect on migration volume and on number of destination points net of GNP per capita? The most straightforward response is that the supply of potential migrants increases directly with population size. It should be pointed out, however, that although large countries do produce relatively large numbers of migrants, they do not have the highest emigration rates. Kritz (1996, 2001) shows that emigration rates to the United States are actually lower for countries such as Mexico, India and China that have relatively large populations and higher for Caribbean countries that have very small populations. In addition, other factors may interact with increased supply. For instance, legal migration to developed countries is increasingly limited to persons who have high technical and managerial skills. All else equal, the *absolute number* of highly skilled nationals is probably greater in large countries even if the *relative*

numbers that have such skills are lower than in more developed countries. Opportunities for acquiring technical and managerial skills are also probably better in large countries given that certain types of advanced training (e.g. graduate and professional schools) may not even exist in small countries. Moreover, multilateral corporations and development assistance agencies are more likely to set up operations in countries with large populations. These operations, in turn, may facilitate social networks between expatriates and host country nationals that increase migration opportunities.

How different might our findings be if data were available on migration flows to all receiving countries? Undoubtedly the numbers of international migrants would be considerably larger and one would observe that significant flows take place between countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Most flows in developing regions, however, occur between neighboring countries and are composed largely of refugees and labor migrants. It is probably also the case that few developing countries have established global migration systems as has been done by the leading OECD countries. For instance, there are growing expatriate communities in developing regions of technical, business and political elite composed largely of developed country nationals. Although the numbers of developed country expatriates residing in a single country may be relatively small, their pervasiveness everywhere means that small numbers would add up to big numbers. Thus while it would certainly be the case that many developing countries would emerge as larger migrant senders than suggested by this analysis, an argument could reasonably be made that the migrant numbers from developed countries would also increase significantly.

More questions have been raised than answered in this paper. To begin the process of addressing these questions, it may be best to proceed with comparative analyses for other receiving countries and regions that look at the full range of migrations they are receiving. Preconceived ideas that labor migrations are the major migration type today and that flows occur mainly from developing to developed countries should be subjected to empirical scrutiny. For developing regions, it would also be important to assess whether flows of intraregional migrants surpass those coming from outside the region. Most refugees and other displaced persons are located today in developing regions and need to be taken into account when considering global migration volume. Ideally we would have a matrix of the world's countries which would provide entry and exit data for both foreigners and nationals. Lacking such a matrix, we will have to analyze data on subsets of the matrix.

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**INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE 1990's
AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

Introduction

The outcome of the World War II had conserved political geography of Europe for about 45 years to the beginning of the 1990s. The period was marked with very deep East-West divide characterized mostly by communism in the East and capitalism in the West. There had been hardly anything important geographically in between these two blocks. For the author of this article it seems worth mentioning only the position of the second Yugoslavia from the middle of the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. Former Yugoslavia decided for market oriented socialism and for more or less open border regime with Western Europe. Eastern European block countries had severe border control regimes which almost sealed the borders with Western Europe and Yugoslavia during the entire period.

The change of the political geography in Europe around the year 1990 would have hardly been more tremendous. Communist regimes have gradually collapsed from German Democratic Republic to Romania and Soviet Union. Two German states became one in October 1990. All federal states in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe broke away. Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union disintegrated peacefully and quickly. In the second Yugoslavia, however, the disintegration has been more violent and has hardly been finished in almost a decade.

Broader political, economic and social changes in former communist part of Europe have been known in the scientific literature as well as in everyday political life as the process of transition. The main goal of fundamental and overwhelming transitional change has been the replacement of former communism with the capitalist market economy. The most important single political act which made the transition possible in these countries was the adoption of the new Constitution. This basic social and legal act passed the parliaments of the transitional countries mostly at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the real life transition in the region has been much longer. At the beginning of the year 2002, or after about a decade since the transition has started, it is possible to say that the process has been gradually going to the end. The conclusion is valid at least for the most advanced transitional countries, which have already attained the status of associate members of the European Union, in spite of the fact that even these countries are still without some important laws for regulating their economies in the new

capitalist way of reproduction. It is also important to note that the process of privatization of former state and social property is still being implemented in almost all countries in the region.

In former communist and Eastern European block countries, with the exception of the second Yugoslavia, prevailed severe border controls and travel restrictions for travelling into foreign, and especially Western European, countries. Therefore, it is understandable that among the first and most exposed consequences of the fall of communism were abandoned travel restrictions, much easier access to passports and much more accessible international migration, not only in the member countries of the former Eastern European communist block, but also into all other countries of the world.

International migrations in Central and Eastern European countries have been much more important, if not completely new phenomena, since the end of the 1980s. This is one of the main reasons for the author of this article to decide for the elaboration of the topic in the article. The period covered extends from the 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century. Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) in this article include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the third Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia or Serbia and Montenegro). The region is denoted as the East Europe in the documents of the United Nations in spite of the fact that it includes some Central European and some Mediterranean countries as well (UN, 1999).

In the article, mainly international sources of statistical data on international migration in CEEC will be used. Important source of these data is *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe*, the publication of the Council of Europe available for the period 1991–2001. This population or demographic yearbook of Europe will be combined with OECD Sopemi reports and with scientific literature dealing with the topic of this article available to the author. It should be stressed also that statistical data on international migration are notoriously unprecise and hard to define. Therefore, certain degree of comparability problems is unavoidable. The definition of any migration is connected to the definition of population in particular country. Consequently, every population definition change influences migration data. In Slovenia, for example, the new population definition was introduced in 1995 as a result of the europeisation of the national statistical system (Malacic, 2000, p. 15). Similar changes have been adopted in the other transitional countries too.

The author of this article will elaborate the topic of the analysis in subsequent sections. The next section will show the overview of the international migration situation in the CEEC region in the period 1950–1990. Mainly, the section will try to answer the question or / and impression whether international migrations in the region in the communist pe-

riod existed or not. The third and central section of the article will analyze a decade of the international migrations in the CEEC in the period of the transition (1991–2001). The fourth section will deal with the population and international migration prospects in the region. The last section will conclude the article.

International Migration in the Central and Eastern Europe in the Communist Period 1950–1990

The communist part of Europe included in the CEEC region was quite far away from the homogeneity in the period 1950–1990. It was rather heterogenous region from political, economic or social viewpoint. In spite of this heterogeneity it is possible to summarize the main characteristics of the international migration phenomenon in the region. The summary will, however, necessarily neglect several particular characteristics of the international migration important for single country but less important for the region as a whole. More significant single country characteristics will be analysed in this section too.

The main single determinant of the international migration situation in the region in the communist period was ideological battle against emigration and criminalization of would-be emigrants and, especially, the people who managed to leave illegally. In Hungary, for example, a form had to be filled out in duplicate for every person who crossed the border. One copy was given to the border control at the exit and the other when returning back to Hungary. The system of border observation enabled to keep track of any person who had stayed abroad illegally. The system was abolished in 1988 (Dővényi and Vukovich, 1994, pp. 195–196). Similar systems had been used by several other countries in the region too.

Natural consequences of the outlined ideological position were severe border control, strict limitation of travel across borders and almost negligible legal international migration in almost all countries in the region. The policy of international migration control in the CEEC region was introduced in some countries in the late 1940s and in the others at the beginning of the 1950s. The only exception was the second Yugoslavia which accepted somewhere in the middle of the 1950s the policy of open borders with the Western European countries. The policy had gradually materialized and allowed the country to become important player in European international migration in the period 1960–1990.

Generally, movements between CEEC were easier than between the region and the Western Europe. However, they were limited more on tourism and there were no significant migration flows between CEEC themselves. Former Yugoslav federation was treated more like Western countries because of its open borders policy and because of possible escape to the West with the help of Western embassies in Yugoslavia. Western capitalist countries almost automatically granted refugee status

for those people from communist part of Europe who escaped illegally or who asked for the refugee status while visiting Western countries. Occasionally even sport and art stars decided for the refugee status in spite of the consequences for their relatives at home. In most CEECs authorities would have revenged if an individual had stayed abroad illegally.

There was also pressure from the Western governments to liberalize emigration procedure in the East. They offered trade concessions and even lump sum payments for emigration permission. The policy was not very successful with the exception of ethnic German, ethnic Turk and Jewish emigration from particular CEEC. These emigrations were organized officially and were most important in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. In the period 1950-92 1,947,500 ethnic Germans returned to Federal Republic of Germany. Most of them were from Poland (1,430,000), followed by Romania (401,800), Czechoslovakia (104,700), Former Yugoslavia (89,700) and Hungary (21,300) (Rudolph, 1994, p. 118).

East-West mass migration in the region was possible only in the periods of great political crises. At least three major crises were important emigrationally. In Hungary, 193,900 persons emigrated between 23 October 1956 and 30 April 1957. Most of the emigrants were from Budapest, other bigger Hungarian cities and from Western parts of the country. Important consequence was severe loss of human capital (Dóvényi and Vukovich, 1994, p. 195). About 200,000 emigrants left Czechoslovakia during the 1968–1969 crisis¹. According to Austrian data 162,000 Czechs and Slovaks left their homeland via Austria (Fassmann and Münz, 1994 b, p. 152). In 1980–1981, about 250,000 Poles emigrated from Poland to escape the imposition of martial law (Fassmann and Münz, 1994a, p. 25). In the following years about half of these emigrants returned to Poland. The return migration was the consequence of the loosening of restrictions on foreign travel, and the emerging symptom of political chaos (Korcelli, 1994, p. 177).

Several waves of emigration of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria also had mass proportion. However, these waves were organized officially. In 1950–1953, some 250,000 ethnic Turks were allowed to leave. According to 1968 Agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey about 82,000 ethnic Turks left Bulgaria in the period 1969–1973. The last big wave of emigration of the Turkish minority caused by bulgarization took place in 1988–1989. This wave followed 1988 liberalization of the access to passports and was mixed with the 1990th wave of emigration to the Western countries. In 1988–1992, about 280,000 emigrants left Bulgaria (Bobeva, 1994, p. 225).

¹ The number is author's estimate from the population census data for 1960 and 1970 and from vital statistics published in Pavlik, Rychtarikova and Subrtova, 1986, p. 571.

There were also officially organized labor migrations in the CEEC region. Labor was exchanged between Hungarian and Czechoslovakian border regions. Hungary imported insignificant numbers of workers from Poland, Cuba and German Democratic Republic (Dovenyi and Vukovich, 1994, p.198). Bulgaria recruited labor from Vietnam, Nicaragua and some other countries. It was the consequence of the manual workers shortages. However, at the beginning of the 1990s all Vietnamese and Nicaraguan workers were expelled at the expense of the Bulgarian state (Bobeva, 1994, p. 233).

In the early 1950s, the international migration situation in Yugoslavia was similar to the overall situation in the CEEC region. During the 1950s about 300,000 Muslims and ethnic Turks left the South-Eastern parts of the country on the basis of Agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey. However, in the second half of the 1950s and in the early 1960s politically motivated emigrants were increasingly replaced by labor migrants (Malacic, 1994, p. 209). The change resulted from the gradually introduced open border policy in the country. Consequently, Yugoslavia was heavily involved in European guest workers migrations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In 1973 the number of economic emigrants peaked, with 850,000 citizens living and working abroad (Malacic, 1994, pp. 210–211). At the beginning, Western immigration countries and even migrants themselves accounted on temporariness of these labor migrations. Notwithstanding expectations the real life trends had transformed many temporary economic migrants into permanent emigrants.

Estimated number of emigrants from CEEC region in the period 1950-90 varies in the literature. Therefore, we should be cautious with them. Fassmann and Munz concluded that between 5 and 6 million people left the region; among them from Poland, 2.1 million, from former Yugoslavia 1.5 million, from Bulgaria 630,000, from Romania 460,000 (Fassmann and Münz, 1994 a, p. 32). We should add also about 400,000 emigrants from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians who emigrated from Romania to Hungary are not included in the figure. Insignificant Albanian emigrants from communist Albania can be accounted as included in the estimation in spite of the fact that the information about them is almost completely absent. Albania was completely closed country during the period studied (Sokoli and Axhemi, 2000, p. 522). There were some illegal emigrants to Greece and former Yugoslavia but statistical data are unavailable.

The CEEC region was emigration region in the period 1950–1990. Some countries in the region contributed considerable number of emigrants in spite of the strict anti-emigration policy in most of them. Some other countries, especially Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Albania participated in the process only marginally. At the end of the 1980s severe border controls and serious travel restrictions were abolished in

the region. An access to passports was granted and the situation in the fields of international travel and migrations has gradually normalized. The next two sections will analyze how international migration situation in the CEEC region has changed.

CEEC International Migration in the Decade of Transition: 1991–2001

The international migration situation in the CEEC region has changed tremendously since the fall of Berlin wall and the collapse of communism. The opening of the borders has had several important consequences for the topic studied in the article. Concerns and fears from the beginning of the 1990s regarding the possibility of mass migration into Western countries have not been realized despite sizeable internal and international migration movements in the region in the period of transition. Recent international migrations in the CEEC as a whole and in particular countries as well differ significantly from the period 1950–1990. The most important change is huge increase in complexity of the process studied. Unregistered outflows have declined during the transition and statistical data has improved in most of the countries in the CEEC region. Statistical information, however, is far from satisfactory. In a part of the CEEC region the information is absent due to political crises and wars (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)). In still other countries almost total disappearance of state and administrative structure has similar effects (Albania) (Bonifazi and Strozza, 2002, p. 81). It should be also mentioned that migrations between Czech and Slovak lands and between federal republics of Former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro) became international migrations in early 1990s. CEECs bordering with the European Union (EU) has transformed into a buffer zone protecting the EU from refugees, asylum seekers, illegal migrants and similar types of international migrations.

Most of the international migration patterns in the CEEC region in the period of transition have been governed by the economic changes in the region itself and in more Eastern neighboring countries (mainly ex-Soviet Republics which became independent states in early 1990s). The only exception to this characteristic has been migrations caused by wars and ethnic conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. Forced migrations have been the most important part of this phenomenon. Very important characteristic is also persistence of transit migration as a consequence of geographical location and increasing pressure from Third World migrants crossing the CEEC in their way to the EU.

General international migration situation in the CEEC region can be shown by available statistical data published in international sources in the period 1991–2001. The data are far from perfect. For some countries they are completely nonexistent. For other countries there are different figures for the same year in different editions of the same

publication. Still other data need corrections on the basis of national publications. The author of the article has made all necessary corrections on the basis of available information and has constructed the table 1. It shows the net migration rates (in %) for selected single years and five years average rates for the periods 1991–1995 and 1996–2000. The net migration rates are indicators of net migration flows between sovereign countries.

Table 1. Rate of net migration (in %) in the CEEC region in selected years and periods during the decade 1990–2000

Country	1990	1995	2000	1991–1995	1996–2000
Albania	- 2.77	- 0.61	- 0.40 ^x	- 1.59	- 0.45 ^{xx}
Bulgaria	- 1.09	0.00	n.a.	- 0.35	n.a.
Croatia	- 0.11	- 0.01	1.03 ^x	0.03	0.04 ^{xx}
Czech Rep.	0.01	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.09
Hungary	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Poland	- 0.03	- 0.05	- 0.05	- 0.04	- 0.02
Romania	- 0.37	- 0.09	- 0.02	- 0.42	- 0.04
Slovak Rep.	- 0.04	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.03
Slovenia	- 0.01	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.12
Macedonia	- 0.14	0.09	- 0.57	- 2.38	- 0.16
BIH ^{xxx}	- 0.42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
FRY ^{xxxx}	- 0.17	0.05	n.a.	- 0.16	n.a.

Notes: ^x 1999; ^{xx} 1996–1999; ^{xxx} Bosnia and Herzegovina; ^{xxxx} Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Source: Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1991–2001, Council of Europe, Strasbourg; Statistical Yearbook of Slovenia 2001. Ljubljana, SORS.

The data shown in the table 1 divide the CEECs in the group of immigration and the group of emigration countries. However, the delineation is not very clear. The first group can be called Central European group. Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary belong to this group. For Hungary the data are missing in the table 1, nevertheless it became an immigration country at the beginning of the 1990s (Dóvényi and Vukovich, 1994, p. 201). Almost all of these countries have experienced much reduced emigration flows and significant immigration flows, mostly from neighboring Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In this group Croatia is a special case. It has exchanged considerable number of population with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (most of them were forced migrations) and has lost many young urban professionals in the process of emigration to the Western countries due to the economic hardship, but net migrations has been still positive.

The emigration group is South-Eastern European group together with Poland. The data for some countries in this group are missing, however, the group shows great emigration potential. South-Eastern

European part of the group will be probably the most prominent European emigration region in the near future. It can be called also the Balkan part of the CEECs. Emigration in this part of the region is basically caused by political instability, ethnic conflicts and deteriorated economic conditions. Poland, on the other hand, will probably join the immigration group in the near future. It will be the consequence of improving economic situation in the country and of the increasing attractiveness of the country for the immigrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Migration stocks data for the CEEC region are less available than migration flows data. In principle, both are interconnected. However, very detailed and high quality statistics of the international migrations would be needed, if we would like to present exact changes between flows and stocks in particular country. Most of the CEECs simply do not have such statistics of the international migrations. Nevertheless, basic impressions about the stocks of international migrants in the CEEC region can be derived from the population of foreign citizenship data. Unfortunately, most of the CEECs still do not regularly collect these data and international reports are very uncomplete. The population of foreign citizenship in the CEEC region in the years 1997 and 2001 respectively are shown in the table 2. It should be taken into account that the data are not fully comparable between particular countries and between the two selected single years. The data collected by Sopemi Report use much broader concepts than the data published in the Recent developments in Europe 2001.

Table 2. Population of Foreign Citizenship in the CEEC region in 1997 (yearly average data) and in 2001 (the 1st of January)

Country	1997		2001	
	No.	%	No.	%
Albania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bulgaria	86,400	1.0	n.a.	n.a.
Croatia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Czech Republic	209,800	2.0	201,000	2.0
Hungary	219,600	2.2	110,000	1.1
Poland ^x	4,100	0.0	n.a.	n.a.
Romania	56,400	0.2	1,200	0.0
Slovak Republic	24,800	0.5	n.a.	n.a.
Slovenia	43,373	2.2	42,300	2.1
Macedonia	n.a.	n.a.	3,800 ^{xx}	0.2 ^{xx}
BIH ^{xxx}	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
FRY ^{xxxx}	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Notes: ^x Permanent residence permits; ^{xx} the 1st of January 2000; ^{xxx} Bosnia and Herzegovina; ^{xxxx} Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Source: SOPEMI (2001) Trends in International Migration 2000. Paris, OECD; Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2000 and 2001. Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

The purpose of the table 2 is completely illustrative. There is practically no need to analyze the data in this table. Only Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, which are the most developed countries in the CEEC region, have reliable statistical data of the population of foreign citizenship, but even in these countries the percentage of the population of foreign citizenship is relatively small.

Permanent emigration from CEECs to the OECD countries has been declining. In Poland, emigration during the transition period was about 40 % (comparing to 1985-89) and about 19 % (comparing to 1980-84) lower than during the 1980s (Iglička, 2001, p. 5). However, temporary migrations of workers is increasing both inside the CEEC region and in the direction from East to West. Most of temporary migrations are regulated by intergovernmental agreements and in many cases limited to the border regions. In fact, these migration flows correspond to a process of regional integration and are facilitated by geographical and cultural proximity and by the fact that visas are not required for border crossings for the most of CEEC nationals. It should be stressed also that the countries of origin of the recent immigrants to the CEEC region have been constantly diversifying. Some of them, as for example, Armenians in Poland, are traditional, while many Third World immigrants, seek the ways to EU countries.

Transit migrations towards Western Europe in some countries accompany clandestine employment, while in others are almost completely organized by smugglers and traffickers. In Poland, illegality in international population movements persisted on a large scale during the entire decade of the 1990s (Okolski, 2000, p. 64). Statistical data are, of course, not available. Nevertheless, border apprehensions data in Slovenia has shown considerable increase in the period 1996–2000. The largest increase was in the year 2000 when the number of apprehended illegal migrants increased in comparison with the previous year with the index 192,0 (from 18,695 to 35,892) (Malacic, 2002, p. 5).

The opening of the borders in the CEEC region induced considerable migrations of the members of the ethnic minorities. Many of these migrants have had family links in destination countries. Ethnic Hungarians from Romania, FR Yugoslavia and Slovak Republic have emigrated to Hungary. Similar immigration flows have been experienced by Poles (from Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Siberia), Bulgarians (from former Soviet Union), Romanians (from Moldova). However, flows of ethnic Germans diminished considerably during the same period (SOPEMI, 2001, p. 63). Similarly, migration flows of Gypsies have declined considerably within the CEECs and to the Western Europe. The trends are at least partly still the consequence of the discrimination of the Gypsy community in the CEECs.

The disintegration of the second Yugoslavia has led to the greatest numbers of displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers in modern

Europe. However, in Slovenia and Macedonia the break away of the former Yugoslavia caused insignificant migrations. Both countries experienced only the exchange of some thousands of employees of the federal army and their family members with other federal units of the former federation. The situation was completely different in other parts of the former country. The wars in Croatia (1991–1992) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1993) and the repression of ethnic minorities in Vojvodina, Serbia and Kosovo led to the largest wave of forced migration in Europe since 1945–1946. Between 1991 and 1993 about 5 million citizens of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia became displaced persons or refugees (Malacic, 1994, p. 207). Only 700,000 of them came to Western Europe. Most of others stayed in buffer zones at the territory of the second Yugoslavia and some other neighboring countries. In 1995, about 250,000 Croatian Serbs were forced to leave Krayina in Croatia as a consequence of the operations of the Croatian army (Grecic, 2000, p. 600). The next wave of forced migrations has followed armed conflicts in Kosovo since 1998 and, especially, during NATO air campaign in 1999. In the middle of the 1999 there were about 775,000 ethnic Albanian and about 219,000 Serbian refugees (Grecic, 2000, p. 603). Some displaced persons and refugees have returned to their homes during the 1990s. However, conditions for repatriation have been poor and the total number of returnees relatively small. According to the UNHCR data until 1998 only about 350,000 refugees returned to their homes (Grecic, 2000, p. 604).

In more developed CEECs, there have not been serious signs of brain drain migration. In Poland, during the 1990s less educated emigrants have dominated the field of international migration (Iglićka, 2001, pp. 5–6). Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia have experienced even less emigration of highly qualified people. In Slovenia, 50 emigrants left the science sector in the period 1988–1994, or 1.7 % of all employed scientists in Slovenian research institutions (Malacic and Bevc, 1997, p. 2). On the other side, brain drain migrations have been very serious in other countries of the CEEC region, especially in Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have been devastated by wars. From Serbia, more than 10,000 university educated individuals emigrated in Western countries in the period 1990–1993 (Grecic, 1995, p. 118). Sokoli and Axhemi reported in 2000 that about 30% of intellectuals have emigrated from Albania. Most of them are young males (Sokoli and Axhemi, 2000, pp. 523–524).

The CEEC region has been experiencing to varying degrees the development of permanent immigration since the beginning of the 1990s. Economically more developed countries in the CEEC region have embarked the process firstly, while some less developed and military devastated countries have not experienced it yet. The phenomenon is well known from migration history (Malacic, 1993, pp. 191–193) and it is possible to expect that the process will gain momentum in the near future.

International Migration and Population Prospects in the CEEC Region

During the transition period in the 1990s CEEC region have not experienced mass emigration of its population. Even forced migrations caused by the disintegration of the second Yugoslavia and wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia were the phenomena mostly limited to the Balkan peninsula and neighboring buffer zone. Western European fears and anxieties regarding the possibility of mass East-West migrations from the late 1980s and early 1990s did not materialize. These concerns led rather to the lovely discussion about the alternatives to large scale international migration (Layard, Blanchard, Dornbusch and Krugman, p. 1992; Malacic, p. 1996). It was obvious to professional economists, politicians and even to potential emigrants that there is no special virtue to produce labor-intensive goods in rich Western countries by bringing in large number of Easterners. To produce them in the East and sell them abroad is much more rational.

The opening of the borders in the CEEC region, however, has led to sizeable international migration movements. Therefore, Eastern and Western European politicians and professionals have tried to find out how to contribute to international migration stabilization in the CEEC region. Most obvious objectives of Western and Eastern policy makers should be more cooperation, more information and more democracy / tolerance (Drbohlav, 1997, pp. 96–97). The most general aim for the CEEC region should be to maintain and further develop political democracy and viable and successful market economic system. These political goals are even more important for those parts of Former Yugoslavia which experienced wars, ethnic conflicts and political instability in a decade 1991–2001.

The international migration prospects in the CEEC region will be increasingly determined by the deteriorating demographic situation in more or less entire region. Fertility decline in the period after the completion of the demographic transition (1950–1980) has led to the negative natural increase in about a half of the CEECs. In table 3, rates of natural increase and net migrations in the CEEC region are shown.

In 2000, only Romania had negative values of both rates. Hungary and Poland had negative sum of the two rates, indicating negative population growth. The demographic situation in all other countries in the CEEC region is far from satisfactory. One population projection for Bulgaria for the period 2000-2020 calculated the decline of the total population from 8.03 to 6.57 million (international migration not included) (Totev and Kalchev, 2000, 635). Similar population projections can be made for most of the other CEECs. The main negative demographic element is below replacement level of fertility. It is impossible to deal with this problem more in detail here. However, it is quite evident that low fertility and ageing of the population in the CEEC

region will cause the need for considerable increase in net international migration. Inflows of foreigners will be more important and larger in economically more successful and richer countries in the region. Nevertheless, all of the CEECs will very likely import significant proportion of immigrants from Third World countries. The only exception will be for some time Albania, because it has not completed the demographic transition yet.

Table 3. Rates of natural increase and net international migration (in %) in the Year 2000 in the CEEC region.

Country	Rate of net migration	Rate of natural increase
Albania	- 0.40 ^x	1.22 ^x
Bulgaria	0.00	- 0.51
Croatia	1.03 ^x	- 0.14
Czech Republic	0.06	- 0.18
Hungary	0.00	-0.38
Poland	- 0.05	0.03
Romania	- 0.02	- 0.09
Slovak Republic	0.03	0.04
Slovenia	0.14	- 0.02
Macedonia	- 0.57	0.59
Bosnia and Herzegovina	n.a.	n.a.
FR Yugoslavia	n.a.	n.a.

^x 1999.

Source: Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2001, pp. 40, 47.

The author of this article forecasted in 1998 that Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia will not need any substantial number of new immigrants to satisfy workforce deficiencies at least for the next 10 to 15 years (Malacic, 1999, p. 64). The forecast is probably still valid not only for the most developed countries in the region but more or less for the CEEC region as a whole. However, the deteriorating demographic situation will counteract and increasingly invite immigrants from distant countries and continents. The international migration situation in the CEEC region will, therefore, be dynamic, increasingly complex and constantly changing in the near and more distant future.

Conclusion

Political geography of Europe which was conserved by the outcome of the World War II changed tremendously at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. In communist part of Europe severe border controls and travel restrictions for travelling into foreign countries were abandoned. People got access to passports and international migration became more or less normalized.

The analysis of the international migration in the CEEC has shown variety of different types of international migration in the period 1950-1990. However, the process was, with the exception of the second

Yugoslavia, mostly politically driven. Generally, the CEEC was emigration region in the period 1950–1990. Between 5 and 6 million emigrants left the region permanently.

The opening of the borders in the CEEC facilitated international migrations. However, recent international migrations are much more complex than those in the period 1950–1990. The processes studied have been governed mostly by the economic factors, with the exception of forced migrations in military and economically devastated Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia. Recently, the CEECs can be divided in the more developed Central European group of immigration countries and emigration group of less developed South-Eastern European countries and Poland. In the near future Poland will probably join the first group. International migration patterns in the CEEC during the transition period have been changing. The main result of this constant change is increasing attractiveness of the CEEC for permanent immigration.

Alternatives to international migration have worked in the CEEC during the period of transition to certain degree. However, some other contributions to international migration stabilization are needed. From political point of view the process of cooperation between East and West, information dissemination and democracy and tolerance building are most important.

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**ON “BRAIN DRAIN” FROM RUSSIA
DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1990’s¹**

International high-skilled migration is one of characteristic features of internationalization of the global economy and its transition towards a post-industrial society. State borders have become more transparent allowing easier mobility of goods and capital, and simultaneously for migration flows — primarily for high-skilled migration. The increasing number of high-skilled migrants, first of all scientists and engineers, reflects the specificity of science-intensive and high-tech sector developments within national economies; it increases the division of labor and, paradoxically, increases world separation. State sovereignty, the failure of the “pursuing development” concept and “the split of civilization” (Inozemtsev, 1999) are making the scale, direction and structure of high skill migrants very important both for donors and recipients.

To define these flows as natural and favorable for the development of the global society, the outflow and inflow for any particular country should be equalized in general. The prevalence of the inflow of the high-skilled specialists into a country, and first of all intellectual personnel, is likely to happen when there is a developed scientific and innovative potential in a country that is a result of science and high-tech sectors being a priority in the economy, as well as of special immigration policies aimed at attracting high-skilled labor force to the country (at least at the beginning of the process). In this case the country obtains an additional resource of highly skilled specialists free of charge, and strengthens its R&D sphere. In case of the prevalence of the outflow of high-skill specialists it should be considered as “brain drain” and the loss of national intellectual potential.

High-skilled migration from Russia, and primarily migration of scientific researchers and academic teachers, has been a topical issue for the last ten years. The broad discussion on this issue has sometimes come to a standstill, and sometimes it is revived again with renewed intensity. Although all researchers and politicians concerned with this issue are unanimous when they estimate that “brain drain” is a negative phenomenon for Russian society, there is a considerable diversity in opinions when the scale and consequences of high-skilled migration in Russia are estimated, particularly when discussing whether there is a need for a special policy aimed to preserve and develop intellectual potential in R&D and what kind of policy is necessary for this aim.

¹ Acknowledgement: The research has been carried out with the financial support of the Russian **Foundation for Basic Research** (Grant N 00-02-00331a).

To a great extent these discussions are resulting from the lack of complete and reliable data about the number of scientists and highly skilled specialists who have emigrated from the country, as well as about temporary labor migration and students' migration. The only available and more or less reliable statistical data existing are for those emigrants who have left for permanent residence. These data are collected by the Department of Visas and Registration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Statistical Committee (Goscomstat).

Before 1992 statistical registration of migrants was carried out from the point of view of social groups (workers, non-manual workers, collective farmers, etc). Until this period all high-skilled employees were accounted for within the statistical group, designated as “non-manual workers”. These statistical data could be used when estimating the amount of permanent emigrants in 1988–1991.


Starting from 1992, a new form for registration of migrants and data processing was introduced by the Department of Visas and Registration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At that time the data was reflecting distribution of migrants by branches of the economy. In the second half of 1992 the data on education and academic degrees of migrants, as well as the type of their activities and sources of income, appeared. These changes allowed an estimate of how many high-skilled specialists (researchers, engineers, academic teachers, other specialists, and students) were leaving. This statistical information permitted a more realistic description of high-skilled emigration from Russia, to estimate consequences and losses, and to propose measures and mechanisms for regulation of the process. Although changes in the registration techniques have improved official statistical information, at the same time they influenced negatively on stationary time series and comparability of data for different years.

After 1997 the changes in techniques for processing initial information on migration took place again, and the new structure of official statistical information on international migration in Russia was put into practice. As a result data on education and labor activity of migrants was excluded from official statistical information. These changes happened in the period when qualitative characteristics, in particular the level of education and sphere of labor activities, were becoming more and more important for the evaluation of national human capital and labor resources, the description of external migration of highly skilled labor force, and the consequences of this phenomenon. These changes produced difficulties in studying trends of high-skilled migration.

Statistical data on inflow and outflow of international temporary high-skilled labor migrants have been provided by the Federal Migration Service since 1996. However, its use is very limited because of the specificity of migration of this group, and first of all the specificity of the process of migration of researchers and academic teachers.

Taking into consideration the lack of statistical data on international high-skilled migration, concerning both permanent emigration and temporary labor migration, its scale and structural characteristics during the second half of the 1990's, could be evaluated only on the basis of indirect data, sociological surveys and expert estimations. The analysis of data on the ethnic structure of migrants, their educational level, age structure, composition by branches of employment in regions of migrants' exit, as well as the analysis of immigration policies in receiving countries, — all these estimations can provide general understanding of international migration flows and the place of high-skilled migration trends within the process.

International migrations in Russia in the last decade of 20th century could be characterized generally as the result of stress and panic, irrespective of whether we speak about migration provoked mainly by economic factors or about ethnic migration, in terms of both immigration or emigration. However, at the same time during the last decade significant changes in migrations occurred, and the most important one is the change in qualitative characteristics of migratory flows.




In the second half of the 1990's the change in distribution of migration flows from Russia towards the former Soviet states on one hand, and towards the non-former Soviet Union states on the other hand, has become obvious: in 1992 the share of migrants forwarded towards the former accounted for 85%, while the share of migrants forwarded

towards the latter accounted for only 15%. In 1996 this distribution was 66 : 34 and in 2000 57 : 43.

During recent years the decrease in the scale of emigration including emigrants to the non-former Soviet Union states has become a lasting trend. In 1997 and 1998 the outflow towards the non-former Soviet Union states accounted for a little more than 80 thousand persons. Although the 1998 financial default in Russia has provoked a certain increase in emigration intentions that was expressed, in particular, in the increase of number of applications for exit permits, but it wasn't followed by any considerable growth of the number of people who really emigrated in this year and the next one. In 1999, 85.2 thousand persons left Russia, and in 2000 they were only 62.3 thousand (Diagram 1).

The distribution of emigrants throughout the recipient countries remained the same as it was at the beginning of the 1990's. The greatest number of emigrants forwarded towards three countries of immigration, namely Germany, Israel and the USA. However, along with this the absolute numbers of emigrants as well as their proportion in the total outflow to the non-former Soviet states have decreased. So, the number of emigrants who have left for the USA decreased from 15 thousand persons in 1993, to 4.8 thousand persons in 2000. The proportion of this outflow also decreased from 11.2% to 7.7% correspondingly (Diagram 2).



In 1999 emigration to Israel experienced a second increase, though substantially smaller than in 1990–1991. The wave was to a great extent caused by the possible instability in Russia after the declaration of financial default in 1998. In 1999 the amount of emigrants doubled, and accounted for 20 thousand persons. However, the situation changed already in 2000 when a decrease was registered as being at pre-crisis

level. While emigration to Israel has “jumped up” emigration to Germany remained at the same level as before, and emigration to the USA has demonstrated a further downfall. Thus, the economic crisis influenced different emigration flows in different ways.

The scale of emigration outflow to Germany in the second half of the 1990's was continuously decreasing and accounted for a little above 40 thousand persons in 2000. This change is a result of the reduction in the size of the German diaspora in Russia, as well as of some modifications in the immigration policy of the German government.


The number of emigrants from Russia to other countries (Greece, Australia, Canada and others) had a wavy tendency: in 1996 it was 5.6 thousand persons, then it increased to 14.4 thousand in 1998, and decreased to 11.3 thousand in 1999 and 7.6 thousand in 2000. However, the share of emigrants to these countries in the total outflow to the non-former Soviet Union states grew about twice during this period — from 6.4% in 1996 to 12.2% in 2000. Thus, the tendency traced in the first half of the decade has been continued.

At the same time during the second half of the decade the ethnic character of international migration resulted in the prevalence of emigrants forwarded to Germany again, and the main regions of their exit have remained the same as in the first half of the 1990's. Thus, the share of emigrants originating from Moscow and St. Petersburg accounted 16% in 1994 and 12% in 2000. The main exit regions are the Urals, Siberia and Povoljje. The share of emigrants from these regions was about 60%. About 13% of emigrants were leaving from the Southern region of Russia. The amount of emigrants from Russia's Western exclave (Kaliningrad Region) was also big enough.

However, in the outflow to the USA emigrants originating from Moscow and Saint Petersburg were prevailing as before. Although beginning in 1995, a stable decrease of their share became obvious. Thus, the share of emigrants originating from Moscow and St. Petersburg accounted for more than 58% in 1994, while in 1999 it was twice smaller and accounted for 29%, and in 2000, only 23.8%.

The ethnic composition of flows greatly depends on exit regions. The biggest share of emigrants from Moscow and Moscow Region, Saint Petersburg and the Region, was represented by the Russians (in 1995 — 40.0% and 45.6%, 46.2% and 46.5% correspondingly) and Jews (in 1995 — 48.0% and 30.9%, 43.4% and 13.2% correspondingly). The share of the Germans was relatively high among emigrants from Moscow and Leningrad Regions — in 1995 it was 13.0% and 19.4% correspondingly. The Germans were mostly leaving from other regions that were sending significant numbers of emigrants to the non-former Soviet Union states in total — Western Siberia, Povoljje, Southern regions of Russia. The share of the Germans originating from these regions accounted from 42% (Krasnodar Territory) up to 79.8% (Omsk Region).

During the decade three ethnic groups — the Germans, the Jews and the Russians — composed about 90% of the total emigrant outflow. However, in the second half of 1990's two basic tendencies that have appeared in the previous period have developed: firstly, the gradual growth of the share of the Russian emigrants (1.7 times) and the share of other ethnic groups living in Russia (2.2 times) at the face of decrease of the Germans and the Jews' shares (Diagram 3). Even taking into account that a significant part of ethnic Russian emigrants are represented by the members of mixed families (first of all those forwarding to Germany and Israel), however, the tendency shows an evident growth of emigration of the Russians.



The destination countries for different ethnic groups varied significantly. About all the Germans (99.8% in 1994 and 99.6% in 2000) forwarded to Germany. However, only about half of the Jewish emigrants left for Israel (51% — in 1994, 68.4% — in 1999, 54.4% — in 2000). The share of the Jews who have left for the USA was gradually going down — in 1994 they made up about 35%, and in 2000, only 18.8%. At the same time Jewish emigration to Germany increased due to some modifications in immigration legislation that made their entry to the country easier (mainly this concerns the Jews who were oppressed during the Second World War and members of their families). In 1995 the Jewish emigration to Germany increased 1.5 times compared with the previous year and achieved its maximum in 1997 when it accounted for 2283 persons. Since that time the Jewish outflow was gradually decreasing and in 2000 it accounted twice less, or 1097 persons.

The list of countries of destination for the Russian emigration is wider than for the German and Jewish emigration. About 50% of the

Russians were forwarding to Germany, more than 20% to Israel, 12% to the USA, 18% to other non-former Soviet Union states. There is an evident tendency in the decreasing amount of the Russian emigrants forwarding to the USA — in 1994 they made 18% of the total Russian emigration (4,4 thousand persons) and only 12% (3.1 thousand persons) in 2000. However, in the total emigration outflow from Russia to the USA, the share of the Russians was increasing constantly: from 42.4% in 1994 to 63.9% in 1998, and 65% in 2000.

These changes in the ethnic composition of the outflow from Russia were followed by a qualitative shift in the structure of Russia's emigration. The ethnic Germans and Jews emigration is gradually decreasing due to the fact that the migration potential of these ethnic groups in Russia is gradually running low, however, emigration of Russians' is increasing. The Russians are looking for new job opportunities in other countries, resulting in the growth of their emigration to Canada, Australia, Finland, and to East European countries, though the scale of emigration from Russia to these states is still not very high.

The outflow of high-skilled specialists from R&D field and enterprises of the military-industrial sector is a critical issue for the preservation of national intellectual and scientific potential. The research institutions and military-industrial enterprises are located mainly in so called “closed” towns. The R&D potential in these towns is extremely high. Thus, in the former “closed” town Fryazino (Moscow Region) with the population of 53,000, every sixth citizen has higher education, and there are 150 persons with Dr.Sc. degree and 450 persons with Ph.D. degree (Arguments and Facts, 1998).

The greater number of specialists (more than 60%) who emigrate from the “closed” towns prefer to stay in another country permanently, while in the “closed rocket” towns this share is still higher — about two thirds of the total outflow. Specialists from the “closed nuclear” towns prefer to move abroad on temporary labor contracts. And again, among them there is a difference in preferences depending on the nationality of migrants: the Germans and the Jews emigrate for permanent residence but as for the Russians, their decision depends on the sphere of activity, destination country, and purpose of migration.

Scientists and researchers strongly prevail in the outflow from the “closed” towns. The intensity of migration of scientists in comparison with other categories of specialists was the highest. A sociological survey carried out in 1992 showed that while the proportion of researchers in the total number of employed in scientific institutions was 61%, it preceded 75% among the migrants. The intensity of migration of specialists having a scientific degree was higher than of those without these degrees. Thus, 33% of the total number of people employed in institutions have a scientific degree, while among emigrants the proportion is higher — over 50% (Tikhonov, 1994; 1996).

The results of the survey carried out in 1999 (Tikhonov, 2000) have founded the same tendency; the intensity of emigration was the highest for research centers and the lowest for industrial enterprises in this sector. One third of the outflow from the “closed nuclear” towns consisted of scientific researches, and two thirds of engineers. Emigrants to Israel included 20% of specialists with scientific degree; among those forwarded to Germany this share was only 4%.

Thus, if at the beginning of 1990's emigration to the non-former Soviet Union states had an obvious ethnic character, in the second half of the decade it started to loose this specific feature. In the context of high-skilled emigration studies these changes are of extreme importance.

However, the essence of permanent emigration in the second half of the 1990's was still ethnical (mainly when speaking about Germany) or family reunifications. This results in a relatively low proportion of emigrants with university degrees. In this case the structure of emigrants is closely related to the qualification and professional structure of migrants of the particular ethnic group in the region / country of origin, and by their place of residence, while not by the situation in the international labor market and, in our particular case, in its high-skills segment. Thus, both in the first and second halves of the decade the emigration flow of the Germans and their family members from Russia, people originating from agricultural and industrial areas, prevailed. Therefore, it is possible to talk about a relatively stable educational and professional structure of migratory outflow to Germany during this period. However, we can assume a certain deterioration of the structure over time because normally the most active and qualified people are involved in migration first of all — they formed the first waves of emigration at the early 1990's.

Emigration flow to Israel, that mainly consisted of the Jews and the Russians (as family members), carried a significant share of migrants originating from Moscow and St. Petersburg as in the previous period. So, if we extrapolate the tendency of the previous period we can assume that the share of emigrants employed in R&D, education, public health, cultural activities is high enough among emigrants to Israel. However, the latest studies of Israeli scholars show that educational level of migrants who arrived to Israel from Russia at the beginning of the 1990's was higher than that of new immigrants.

Emigration flow towards the USA differs greatly from the flows to Germany and Israel as it has a high share of migrants of Russian nationality and those originated from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Despite a relatively high proportion of the elder age groups in the flow to the USA (that reflects most likely the process of families' reunification) we can note constantly high qualification and professional level of migrants and even its increase. 1996 Amendments to the USA Immigration Act granted significant privileges to prominent scientists and high-skilled specialists who are strongly demanded by the American economy. This regulation undoubtedly attracted highly skilled specialists from other countries, including Russia.

A smaller emigration flow of high-skilled labor force, in particular researchers and academic teachers, forwarded to the EU countries (besides Germany), to Canada and Australia. European immigration legislation limits the inflow of highly skilled specialists in an attempt to keep equilibrium within the local labor market and especially in the high-skilled labor sector.

Emigration to such countries as Canada and Australia doesn't have either an ethnic or family reunification character. The immigration legislation in these countries, similar to the American one, grants privileges to high-skilled migrants. This has a definite effect on the educational and qualification levels of migrants. On the other hand, these countries do not have a highly developed R&D sphere and are not leaders in science and technology. So, we can assume that the share of leading researchers who have emigrated to these countries is not too high. The priority of the leading countries in R&D sphere is obviously noticeable in migrations of Russian scientists.

Expert estimations of the scale of emigration for scientists and academic teachers who have left Russia in the first half of the 1990's vary greatly: from 2 thousand persons (Allakhverdyan, Agamova, 2000) to 8 thousand persons (Lakhtin, Mindeli, 2001, pp. 980–987). In our opinion, the most realistic estimation is about 6 thousand people; this estimation takes into account both the high proportion of emigrants originating from Moscow and St. Petersburg at the beginning of the 1990's, and its decrease later on (for details please refer to Ushkalov, Malakha, 1999). Considering the general tendency of decreasing numbers of emigrants leaving for the non-former Soviet Union states, the changes in structural characteristics of emigration flows in the second half of 1990's, as well as temporary high-skilled labor migration, we can estimate that permanent emigration from Russia amounts to around 0.5–0.8 thousand people per year, or around 4 thousand people over the period². Between 1992 and 2000, in total about 10 thousand researchers and academic teachers emigrated from Russia.

Thus, a certain part of mainly ethnic migration outflow represents an intellectual emigration, or “brain drain”, that is indeed an irretrievable loss of human capital, not to mention national intellectual potential.

Along with continued high-skilled emigration in this period a temporary labor migration exceeded rapidly. In this case researchers are working abroad for a certain period of time (three months on average) mainly being engaged in experimental work or teaching. A scanty financing of scientific research in Russia has already led to a situation where it is impossible to implement a great deal of scientific experiments using available equipment. Surely, this operates as an important factor that stimulates the temporary migration of Russian scientists.

² This estimation does not include those migrants who have left Russia under temporary labor contracts or personal invitations and stayed abroad for a longer period.

The temporary high-skilled migration could be evaluated only on the basis of indirect methods, such as sociological surveys, estimates of the changing size of Russian diasporas in certain countries, and expert estimations. A certain amount of data could be received from the Federal Migration Service statistics; however, it registers only international labor migrants with employment contracts signed through authorized services.

Taking into account that in most of the countries temporary international labor migration is not a subject for any special limitations (excluding those individuals who carry secrets of the State) and even long-term stay in a foreign country doesn't mean the necessity of changing citizenship, the majority of high-skilled specialists prefer to move temporarily but not permanently. They take this decision because of the high risk of not finding a desirable job in accordance with their qualifications, or to lose it later. Temporary labor migration assumes contract work in a particular institution (scientific center, university, research laboratory) and possible return home with additional professional skills and experience of work in an international team in case the migrant does not wish or can't prolong his/her contract, or can't find another suitable job.

Specialists' preferences for temporary labor contracts could be easily explained; firstly, the contract guarantees a definite job and conditions of work, possibility to implement scientist's creative aspirations, and secondly, a certain social protection. Moreover, if the first guarantee is more important for specialists from developed countries, the second one is non-the-less important for scientists from countries in transition, including Russia. This springs from a hard economic situation in this country, which makes it difficult to carry out scientific studies and complicates everyday problems.

Elite scientific professionals and young researchers who migrate with the aim of increasing their professional level prefer to leave under a temporary employment contract (even if they have the intention not to come back in the future). The total amount of specialists who have departed under employment contracts is estimated as being 3–5 times greater than the number of permanent emigrants (Ushkalov, Malakha, 1999; *Evaluation of Social and Economic Consequences...*, 1993, p. 7). Thus, if the Russian scientific diaspora living permanently in foreign countries accounts about 30 thousand persons, the number of temporary contract labor migrants is 4 times bigger — around 120 thousand persons (Professor Egerev's estimate presented in: Davidova, 1998).

Those scientists who emigrate with a strong intention to work in R&D sphere register officially their departure as “for permanent residence” very rarely because short-term contract is in practice the only possibility to get job in university or research laboratory in developed countries.

This conclusion is also confirmed by the results of sociological surveys carried out in this period (*Evaluation of Social and Economic*

Consequences..., 1993; Gokhberg and others, 1994; tikhonov, 2000; Social Characteristics..., 2001). The survey among the personnel of the Khabarovsk Research Center of the Far Eastern Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences showed that more than 64% of respondents would wish to go abroad for a short temporary stay and only 5.7% — for permanent residence. Among those researchers who have already stayed abroad for some time about 50% were invited to work in scientific centers and 37.5% — in the universities (Social Characteristics..., 2001).

Sociological surveys in so called “closed” towns showed that about all the Germans and the Jews originating from the “closed nuclear” towns left for Germany and Israel (correspondingly) for permanent residence, while 60% of the Russians left for temporary work in Germany, Sweden and the USA (Tikhonov, 2000).

The priority of countries with strong R&D sphere is obvious. In 1996 of the total number of 4,084 Russian scientists working abroad (under the labor contract, invitation or on the basis of scientific exchange) 26.6% were in the USA, 17.1% — in Germany, 9.25% — in France (Nekipelova, 1998). Among the researchers of the Khabarovsk Research Center who were working abroad, 75% were in Japan, the USA and Western European countries. The extremely high share of those who were working in Japan (44.4%) reflects a specificity of geographical location in the Far East Region.

Analysis of data on the age and qualification structure of scientists who were working in other countries brings us to the conclusion that a significant part of Russian scientists who participate in the “brain drain” are the elite or “future elite” of Russian science (Nekipelova, 1998, p. 77; Gokhberg and others, 1994, p. 15).

The survey at the Khabarovsk Research Center has also demonstrated a high intensity of intentions to stay abroad forever: none of the respondents has expressed a desire to return if there were the possibility to stay, and a quarter of respondents had a desire to stay but had no possibility to do so (Social Characteristics..., 2001). A possibility to prolong the employment contract or to sign a new one greatly depends on the labor market situation both in recipient and donor countries. If the contract could be prolonged, then the probability of ultimate settlement in the host country increases. A labor migrant can also change the country of stay or move to the third country in search of better conditions for work and life. But in any case labor migration, in contrast to migration for permanent residence, is a more flexible form of migration and employment.

The items discussed above allow to make a conclusion that estimations of emigration of scientists and specialists based on the data from the Department for Visas and Registration of the Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that reflect the “classical brain drain” indeed cover only part of the real scale of high-skilled migration.

Another peculiarity over recent years is a new scheme used by potential young migrants. In contrast to the previous period, when young people were eager to migrate as soon as possible, including leaving for university and postgraduate studies, nowadays they prefer to move after graduating from university and getting the Ph.D. degree, looking for job opportunities (while studying) in universities and research centers in developed countries, a postdoctoral position being more preferable. Paradoxically, however, in contemporary Russia various grants and special scholarships for young researchers approve this tactical scheme of potential emigrants and allow them to search for job opportunities in other countries more effectively.

The comparison of the trends of high-skilled specialists' permanent emigration and labor migration brings us to the conclusion that in Russia by the end of the 1990's the role of high-skilled specialists' permanent emigration decreased. Specialists realize their intentions to migrate primarily in the form of temporary labor migration.

There is no basis to predict fundamental changes in the trends of international migration of the Russia's high-skilled labor force in the nearest future. This conclusion results on the one hand from internal developments which would be unlikely to have cardinal changes in the short-term perspective. Here very "modest" investments to the R&D sphere, both of the government and private capital, inconsistent institutional changes of scientific sphere, macroeconomic instability, demographic problems should be mentioned.

On the other hand, "external" factors, such as the demand of the international labor market for highly skilled specialists, special immigration programs for scientists and high-skilled personnel are likely not to be limiting but stimulating factors for migration³.

Whether it is necessary and expedient to develop and implement a special program which would stimulate (with the help of special grants and scholarships) the scientists who have emigrated to other countries to come back home, this question is nowadays one of the most topical issues for discussion in the Russian scientific community.

While many countries including transition economies do have more or less successful experience in this sphere, the efficiency of such kinds of initiatives in Russia is still in question. Contemporary Russia seems to be likely to start with the shift of priorities in social and economic development from focusing on mining industries towards investments in science-intensive and high-tech industries, development of scientific and innovative infrastructure, and the maintenance of social stability and security.

Translation into English — by the author

³ 25% of respondents from the Khabarovsk Research Center argue that the wave of emigration will grow up, 62,5% marked out that the intensity of emigration will depend on the situation in Russia and 12,5% supposed that this will depend on western countries' immigration policy (Social characteristics ... , 2000).

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A SYNTHETIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

At the dawn of the new century, all developed nations in the world have become countries of immigration, whether or not they choose officially to recognize this fact. As a result, policies that govern the number, characteristics, and terms under which foreigners enter a country have become salient policy and political issues worldwide. Since enlightened policy necessarily begins with objective understanding, it is important to develop an accurate theoretical account of the social and economic forces responsible for contemporary international migration.

In this article I present a comprehensive model of international migration that addresses the five fundamental questions: what are the structural forces in developing and structurally transforming nations that produce emigrants? What are the structural forces in developed nations that create a demand for their services? What are the motivations of people who respond to these macro-structural forces by moving internationally? What social and economic structures arise in the course of international migration and globalization to support and sustain international movement and how do they feed back on migratory processes? And, finally, how do national governments respond to the resulting flows of people and how effective are their policies likely to be?

Integrating Migration Theory

My synthetic theory of international migration grows out of the work of an international, multi-disciplinary team of scholars appointed by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. It was asked to survey existing migration theories to identify areas of conflict, complementarity, and overlap and to assess the validity of different theoretical explanations with respect to the empirical research literature. The committee, whose findings are reported in Massey et al. (1998), focused on six bodies of theory: *neoclassical economics* (Todaro, 1976), *the new economics of labor migration* (Stark, 1991), *segmented labor market theory* (Piore, 1979); *world systems theory* (Sassen, 1988); *social capital theory* (Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 1994); and *the theory of cumulative causation* (Massey, 1990). They evaluated each theoretical explanation against empirical research drawn from the world's major international migration systems, discerned the degree of support for propositions linked to each theory, and developed a synthetic explanation for the emergence and persistence of international migration at the dawn of the new century.

The committee concluded that international migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the expansion of capitalist markets into pre-market and non-market societies (as hypothesized under world systems theory). Pre-market societies are those reliant on peasant agriculture whereas non-market societies are based on central planning, such as the command economies of the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other nations in the pre-1989 socialist block. For ease of expression, I refer to both cases as structurally transforming societies.

In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets and capital-intensive production methods into peasant or command economies disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about the widespread displacement of people from customary livelihoods, creating a mobile population of people who actively search for new ways of achieving economic sustenance. Studies consistently show that international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of market development, but from the development of markets themselves.

One means by which people displaced from traditional livelihoods seek to assure their economic well-being is by selling their services on emerging national and international labor markets (neoclassical economics). Because wages are generally higher in urban than in rural areas, much of this process of labor commodification is expressed in the form of rural-to-urban migration, particularly in developing nations. This movement occurs even when the probability of obtaining an urban job is low, because when multiplied by high urban wages, the low employment probabilities still yield expected incomes above those prevailing in rural areas, where wages and employment are both low. According to the neoclassical model, if the difference between incomes expected in urban and rural sectors exceeds the costs of movement between them, as is typical, people migrate to cities to reap higher lifetime earnings.

Wages are even higher, of course, in developed countries overseas, and the larger size of these international wage differentials inevitably prompts some displaced people to offer their services on international labor markets. The tendency for international — as opposed to internal — migration is especially pronounced among people living in former command economies undergoing a structural transformation toward the market, since they are already quite highly urbanized.

International wage differentials are not the only factor motivating people to migrate, however, or even the most important. Indeed, Massey et al.'s (1998) review found that most people displaced in the course of economic growth did not move hoping to reap higher lifetime earnings

by relocating permanently to a foreign setting (although some did). Rather, households struggling to cope with jarring structural transformations used international migration as a means of overcoming market failures that threatened their material well-being (as predicted by the new economics of labor migration).

In structurally transforming societies, urban labor markets are volatile and characterized by wide oscillations that frequently render them unable to absorb streams of workers being displaced from pre-capitalist or non-capitalist sectors. Since national insurance markets are rudimentary and government unemployment insurance programs are limited or nonexistent, households cannot adequately protect themselves from risks to well-being stemming from their under- or unemployment. Thus, the lack of access to unemployment insurance creates an incentive for families to self-insure by sending one or more members overseas for work. By allocating members to different labor markets in multiple geographic regions — domestic and foreign — a household can diversify its labor portfolio and reduce risks to income, as long as conditions in the different labor markets are weakly or negatively correlated.

Household members in rural areas who seek to participate in the ongoing structural transformation of agriculture, meanwhile, lack access to insurance markets for crops and futures. As households shift from subsistence to commercial farming, they are forced to adopt new production methods that make use of untested technologies, unfamiliar crops, and untried inputs. As they plunge into the unknown world of production for the market rather than self-consumption, the lack of insurance or futures markets leaves agrarian households vulnerable to economic disaster should these new methods fail, providing yet another incentive for them to self-insure against risk through international migration. Should crops fail or commodity prices fall precipitously, households with at least one worker employed overseas will not be left without a means of subsistence.

Structurally transforming countries also lack well-developed markets for capital and consumer credit. Families seeking to engage in new forms of agriculture or looking to establish new business enterprises need capital to purchase inputs and begin production. The shift to a market economy also creates new consumer demands for expensive items such as housing, automobiles, electronics, and appliances. The financing of both production and consumption requires rather large amounts of cash, but the weak and poorly developed banking industries characteristic of most developing nations cannot meet the demands for loans and credit, giving households one final motivation for international labor migration. By sending a family member temporarily abroad for work, a household can accumulate savings and overcome failures in capital and consumer credit markets by self-financing production or consumption.

Thus, whereas the rational actor posited by *neoclassical economics* takes advantage of a temporary geographic disequilibrium in labor markets to move abroad *permanently* to achieve higher lifetime earnings, the rational actor assumed by the *new economics of labor migration* seeks to cope with failures in insurance, futures, capital, and credit markets *at home* by moving abroad *temporarily* to repatriate earnings in the form of regular remittances or lump-sum transfers. In this way they control risk by diversifying sources of income and they self-finance production or consumption by acquiring alternate sources of capital.

Direct empirical contrasts between neoclassical economics and the new economics of labor migration are scarce and confined largely to the North American literature; but wherever they have been done, propositions associated with the new economics have proven to be more powerful and efficacious in explaining the migration behavior of individuals and households. Indeed, wage differentials often do not produce international movement (witness the lack of movement between south and north within the European Union), and migration often ceases before wage differentials have disappeared (witness the case of Puerto Rico and the United States), outcomes that are difficult, (though not impossible, to explain under neoclassical assumptions, but which are readily accommodated under the new economics of labor migration. In addition, the massive flows of remittances catalogued around the world (and the uses to which they are put) are anomalous under neoclassical theory, but specifically predicted by the new economics.

In sum, a preponderance of evidence from around the world suggests that wage differentials, the favored explanatory factor of neoclassical economics, account for some of the historical and temporal variation in international migration, but that failures in capital, credit, futures, and insurance markets — key factors hypothesized by the new economics of labor migration — create more powerful motivations for movement. In theoretical terms, wage differentials are neither necessary nor sufficient for international migration to occur. Even with equal wages across labor markets, people may have an incentive to migrate if other markets are inefficient or poorly developed. In practical terms, however, large-scale international movement is rarely observed in the absence of a wage gap; but the existence of a wage differential still does not guarantee international movement, nor does its absence preclude it.

While the early phases of market development in structurally transforming nations may create a mobile population seeking to earn more money, self-insure against risk, or self-finance production or consumption, post-industrial patterns of economic growth in wealthy market societies yield a bifurcation of labor markets. Whereas jobs in the primary sector provide steady work and high pay for native workers, those in the secondary sector offer low pay, little stability, and few opportunities for advancement, repelling natives and generating a

structural demand for immigrant workers (as theorized by segmented labor market theory). The process of labor market bifurcation is most acute in certain *global cities*, where a concentration of managerial, administrative, and technical expertise leads to a concentration of wealth and a strong ancillary demand for low-wage services (world systems theory). Unable to attract native workers, employers turn to immigrants and often initiate immigrant flows directly through formal recruitment (segmented labor market theory).

Although instrumental in initiating immigration, recruitment becomes less important over time because the same processes of economic globalization that create mobile populations in developing regions, and which generate a demand for their services in global cities, also create links of transportation, communication, as well as politics and culture, to make the international movement of people cheaper, quicker, and easier (world systems theory). Immigration is also promoted by foreign policies and military actions that core developed nations undertake to maintain international security, protect foreign investments, and guarantee access to raw materials, foreign entanglements that create links and obligations which generate ancillary flows of refugees, asylees, and military dependents.

Eventually labor recruitment becomes superfluous, for once begun, immigration displays a strong tendency to continue through the growth and elaboration of migrant networks (social capital theory). The concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a “family and friends” effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. If enough migrants arrive under the right conditions, an enclave economy may form, which further augments the demand for immigrant workers (segmented labor market theory).

The spread of migratory behavior within sending communities sets off ancillary structural changes, shifting distributions of income and land and modifying local cultures in ways that promote additional international movement. Over time, the process of network expansion itself becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration creates social infrastructure capable of promoting additional movement (the theory of cumulative causation). As receiving countries implement restrictive policies to counter rising tides of immigrants, they create a lucrative niche into which enterprising agents, contractors, and other middlemen move to create migration-supporting institutions that also serve to connect areas of labor supply and demand, providing migrants with another resource capable of supporting and sustaining international movement (social capital theory).

Transition Theory

During the initial phases of emigration from any sending country, the effects of market expansion, market failure, social networks, and cumula-

tive causation dominate in explaining the flows, but as the level of out-migration reaches high levels and the costs and risks of international movement drop, movement is increasingly determined by international wage differentials (neoclassical economics) and labor demand (segmented labor market theory). As economic growth in sending regions occurs, international wage gaps gradually diminish and well-functioning markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures come into existence, progressively lowering the incentives for emigration. If these trends continue, the country ultimately becomes integrated into the international economy as a developed, capitalist society, whereupon it undergoes a migration transition: net out-migration progressively ceases and the nation itself becomes a net importer of labor.

This emigration transition follows a characteristic trajectory, moving from low to high to low rates of out-migration, yielding an inverted U-shaped curve, which Martin and Taylor (1996) have called the “migration hump”. Historically, the transition took about eight or nine decades, but recent evidence from Asia suggests that it has now been compressed into three or four decades. Hatton and Williamson (1998) used historical data for 15 European nations from 1850 to 1914 to develop a stylized curve for the emigration transition — the pattern of out-migration experienced by nations as they underwent economic development. They found a standard pattern of transition from low to high back to low rates emigration that occurred over eight or nine decades, approximated by a simple quadratic equation:

$$ER = -0.35 + 2.66 \cdot t - 0.27 \cdot t^2 ,$$

where ER represents the annual emigration rate and t represents the number of decades since the beginning of out-migration.

Figure 1 plots this curve to show the stylized emigration transition that prevailed during the classic “age of migration” before 1914. As can be seen, the transition lasted roughly nine decades, a period that Hatton and Williamson call “emigration time”. Ninety years may seem like a long time for a country to accept immigrants while waiting for economic conditions to improve in sending regions. However, the transition in Europe occurred under a very different technological, governmental, and international circumstances, and evidence from the late 20th century suggests that emigration time is now much shorter than before 1914.

A good example is South Korea. In 1965 it ranked among the world’s poorest nations with a per capita income of only \$159, a mere 4% of that in the United States. By inserting itself into the global trading regime, however, and adopting a disciplined monetary strategy that encouraged a high rate of savings and investment, South Korean officials were successful in building a modern industrial economy in just 30 years. By 1995 the per capita income had risen to \$9,700.

Despite its rapid economic growth and the accompanying sharp reduction in fertility, the Korean economy was not able to absorb *all* of

the workers entering its non-agricultural workforce each year. As in Europe, these “surplus” workers ended up as international migrants, and between 1965 and 1995 some 768,000 Koreans emigrated to the United States, representing about 4% of its total population increase. Such a level of emigration during development is not at all exceptional by historical standards. Between 1846 and 1924, Britain exported nearly *half* of its demographic increase. What is remarkable about the Korean case is *how little* emigration occurred in the course of economic development.




Figure 1. Emigration transition in prewar Europe and postwar Korea

Even more remarkable than the modest *scale* of Korean emigration was its *timing*. Whereas European nations took eight or nine decades to complete their transition, South Korea did it in three or four. Figure 1 also plots the rate of Korean emigration by emigration time (where 1965=0). The smaller scale of Korean emigration is not readily apparent from this graph, because rates are expressed as emigrants per 10,000 persons, whereas Hatton and Williamson expressed European rates per 1,000 people. Nonetheless, following the liberalization of U.S. laws in 1965, Korean emigration rapidly rose, reaching a peak value of 8.5 after 2 decades (around 1985). Thereafter the rate fell rapidly, reaching 2.9 by the middle of the third decade (the late 1990s). The Korean emigration transition corresponds roughly to the quadratic equation of $ER = 0.75 + 9.00 \cdot t - 2.4 \cdot t^2$, meaning that the rise and decline of emigration occurred roughly *three times faster* in Korea than was true historically in Europe.

Conclusion

Most policy makers and citizens in developed capitalist nations *think* they know why foreigners seek to enter their nations. Standards of living are low in structurally transforming societies and high in the developed, capitalist world, and by moving between the two migrants can expect to realize a net gain in their material well-being. In practical terms, migrants are assumed to make a cost-benefit calculation that weighs the projected costs of moving against the expected returns, monetary and otherwise, from living and working in a developed country. Since this balance is large and positive for most people outside the nations of the OECD, they rationally choose to emigrate.

As we have seen, however, reality is more complicated than this simple scenario suggests, which means that most policy makers in the world today are basing their actions on false assumptions and understandings. Policies, if they are to be successful, must be grounded in scientific truth. The two decades of theoretical and empirical research summarized in the synthetic theory described above reveals several basic truths about international migration, and policy makers should be aware of them.

First, contrary to common belief, *international migration does not stem from a lack of economic growth and development, but from development itself*. As industrialization spread across Europe after 1800, its onset triggered waves of emigration in country after country; and in the current day, the poorest and least developed nations do not send the most international migrants today. The fact of the matter is that no nation has undergone transition to a developed market economy without a massive displacement of people from traditional livelihoods, which are mainly located in the countryside; and in numerous cases a large fraction of these people have ended up migrating abroad.

A second basic truth is that *immigration is a natural consequence of broader processes of social, political, and economic integration across international borders*. When the upheavals of market creation occur, those who adapt to changing circumstances through emigration do not scatter randomly, nor do they necessarily head for the *nearest* wealthy society. Rather, they go to places to which they are *already linked* economically, socially, and politically. Economic links reflect broader relations of trade and investment. Political links stem from formal treaties, colonial administration, and military deployments. Social ties stem from any institutional arrangement that brings people into contact with one another on a regular, sustained basis, such as overseas military deployments, student exchange programs, diplomatic missions, tourism, trade, and multinational corporate activities.

Third, when they enter developed capitalist nations, *immigrants are generally responding to a strong and persistent demand that is built into the structure of post-industrial economies*. Owing to shifts in the

technology of production, the emergence of the welfare state, and the embedding of market relations in broader social structures, labor markets in developed nations have become increasingly segmented into a primary sector containing “good” jobs attractive to natives and a secondary sector of poorly paid “bad” jobs that natives shun. To fill the latter, employers turn to immigrants, often initiating flows through direct recruitment. If there were no demand for their services, immigrants, particularly those without documents, would not come, as they would have means of supporting themselves.

A fourth basic fact about immigration that surprises many people is that *migrants who enter a developed country for the first time generally do not intend to settle there permanently*. Settlement intentions reflect underlying motivations for migration. The motivation that most people imagine when they think about immigrants is their desire to maximize earnings, which indeed involves permanent relocation. In reality, however, most moves are motivated by a desire to overcome incomplete markets for capital, credit, and insurance. People become migrants to solve economic problems *at home*. They seek to work abroad *temporarily* to generate earnings that can be repatriated to diversify risks, accumulate cash, and finance local production and consumption.

Recognizing the diversity of immigrant motivations yields another basic observation: *that international migration is often less influenced by conditions in labor markets than by those in other kinds of markets*. Immigration policies to date have implicitly assumed that immigrants come to maximize earnings and policies have consequently sought to influence conditions in labor markets. If migrants are moving to self-insure, acquire capital, or substitute for credit, however, then lowering expected wages may not eliminate or even reduce the impetus for international migration. More leverage on migration decisions might well be had influencing other markets, through programs designed to improve the performance and coverage of sending-country markets.

Whatever a migrant’s original intentions, a sixth basic truth is that *as international migrants accumulate experience abroad, their motivations change, usually in ways that promote additional trips of longer duration, yielding a rising likelihood of settlement over time*. Although most migrants begin as target earners, they are changed by the migrant experience itself. Living and working in an advanced, post-industrial economy exposes them to a consumer culture that inculcates new tastes and motivations that cannot be satisfied through economic activities at home. Rather, the easiest path to their satisfaction becomes additional foreign labor. As migrants spend more time abroad, they acquire social and economic ties to the host country and begin to petition for the entry of family members. Over time, temporary migrants thus have a way of turning into permanent settlers.

A seventh basic fact about international migration is that *it tends to build its own infrastructure of support over time*. As a result, migra-

tory flows acquire a strong internal momentum make them resistant to easy manipulation by public policies. As politicians in country after country have discovered to their chagrin, immigration is much easier to start than to stop. The most important mechanism sustaining international migration is the expansion of migrant networks, which occurs automatically whenever a member of a some social structure emigrates to a high-wage country. Emigration transforms ordinary ties such as kinship or friendship into a potential source of social capital that aspiring migrants can use to gain access to a high-paying foreign job.

Finally, despite strong tendencies toward self-perpetuation and settlement, *immigrant flows do not last forever — they have a natural life that may be longer or shorter but are necessarily of limited duration*. Data indicate that most European nations underwent an “emigration transition” from low to high to low emigration rates with economic development. Historically, this process took eight or nine decades, which is admittedly a long time to accept immigrants while waiting for economic conditions to improve in sending regions; but recent experience suggests that the transition time has been considerably shortened. Not only is mass emigration temporally limited; recent evidence suggests that the time required for the emigration transition has shortened dramatically.

Immigration policy is often cast as a Hobson’s choice between open and closed borders, between the free and unhindered movement of immigrants and the imposition of strict limitations on their numbers and characteristics. Whether they realize it or not, public officials generally rely on the conceptual apparatus of neoclassical economics when thinking about immigration. They see a world filled with millions of desperately poor people who, unless they are forcibly blocked or at least strongly discouraged, will surely seek to improve their lot by moving to developed nations. When framed in these stark terms, the necessity of a strict immigration policy seems self-evident, and given the conceptual tools offered by neoclassical economics, the only realistic policy is to attempt to raise the costs and lower the benefits of immigration.

Such has been the logic employed by policy makers throughout Europe and North America in recent decades. As we have seen, however, the causes of international migration are by no means limited to those specified under neoclassical economics. International migration stems as much from mechanisms specified by the new economics of labor migration, social capital theory, segmented labor market theory, and world systems theory as those described by neoclassical economics. If a comprehensive understanding of international migration requires a synthesis of different theoretical viewpoints, so too does the formulation of an enlightened and efficacious immigration policy.

This realization suggests a *third way* between the extremes of an open border and draconian restrictions on international movement. Rather than attempting to discourage immigration through unilateral re-

pression — seeking to stamp out flows that global trade policies otherwise encourage — policy makers should recognize immigration as natural part of global economic integration and work multilaterally *to manage it more effectively*. Much as flows of capital, commodities, and goods are managed for the mutual benefit of trading partners by multilateral agreements and institutions such as GATT and the WTO, labor migration can also be cooperatively managed to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs for both sending and receiving societies. In short, international migration must be recognized as an inextricable part of economic globalization and be brought under the aegis of broader multilateral agreements regulating trade and investment.

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**THE INCOMING CIVILISATIONS, THE OUTGOING
CIVILISATION ON THE TURN OF THE 20th CENTURY.
REFLECTION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEMOGRAPHY**

This essay attempts at an insight into the most fundamental macrodemographic phenomena of the past century. Though it may sound provocative, the demographic turnabout of innumerable consequences, and at the same time the most fascinating population phenomenon of the last century, seems to be not that which was fully revealed in that epoch, but rather forming premises for a radical change in a long-term demographic rhythm of various civilisations.

Although the 20th century did not entirely change demographic order on the Earth, undoubtedly it has laid the foundation for a wide range of new demographic processes that will leave their imprint on coming decades, if not centuries of the third millennium.

It was far more than the population explosion outside Europe. At least Europe had its own explosion in the second half of the 19th century and the beginnings of the 20th century. The population of the continent increased at the pace that was much faster than the rate of natural increase of other populations. Moreover, it created big surplus, which, exported — not always voluntarily — contributed to acceleration of growth of few other territories, notably North America.

Considering far-reaching consequences for the future, there were — apart from the population explosion in the (so-called) South — two other fundamental demographic phenomena of 20th century, namely persistent below-replacement reproduction of the population in the North (West) and mass-scale population transfers from the South to North. Both of them, similarly to the explosion of the population outside Europe, came to the fore in the second half of that period¹. All of them have composed a coherent triad from the perspective of the thoughts to follow.

For nearly 300 years since the repelling of Islam invasion in 1683, the western civilisation did not face more challenges. On the contrary, the rest of the world was continuously challenged by it. Its technical supremacy was confirmed by territorial gains and dominant demographic expansion. It was, however, in the second half of the 20th century that great breakthroughs, above mentioned, put an end to that situation. They have led to demographic potential of European civilisation being abruptly decreased in proportion to other civilisations. Moreover, the

¹ In such a light, major population phenomena of the first half of the bygone century seem far less fascinating. The shameful record of manslaughter of both totalitarian systems, Stalinism and fascism, belongs *inter alia* to that period.

number of native inhabitants in a substantial part of Europe is being reduced. At the same time unprecedented influx of people from outside Europe is taking place.

Without declarations of war or using military potential the, western civilisation has found itself retreating. In the last quarter of the bygone century Europe and North America (also Australia and recently Japan, westernised enough) have been peacefully invaded by followers of Islam, and non-Islamic people from Africa, Asia and (to a slighter degree) Latin America. Simultaneously, the inner demographic potential of non-western civilisations is growing fast.

There are no grounds for reasonable, plausible predictions concerning political and socio-cultural consequences of that sudden change of demographic parity between western civilisation and other civilisations. On the other hand, it is difficult not to notice that in countries of the West where recently that parity has been disturbed to immigrants' (often originated from various distant civilisations) advantage, that phenomenon has a great impact on political and social relations. The tension observable in these relations indicates the alienation from given civilisation, if not racial or civilisation hostility, and it is heralding the necessity of reevaluation of the relations between different civilisations. Is that possible?

That question will stay unanswered in this essay². It would go beyond demography and its competence. On the other hand, when I ponder on the three demographic phenomena, which — from my point of view — have given rise to that dilemma, I will not be able to avoid a direct reference to that question.

To interpret population phenomena, a contemporary demography is applying — however, with some reservation — a paradigm of demographic transition. The theory is based on the premise of global equilibrium depending, among other things, on relatively stable population in relatively stable environment. It means that in a long run, a certain amount of deaths is balanced by the similar number of births. One postulate of the theory of demographic transition says that in the circumstances of modernisation, which upsets the stability of environment in a significant way, the change of population's reproduction from a wasteful regime to a conservation regime is inevitable and irreversible³. To be exact, the high fertility and mortality are replaced by the low fertility and mortality. In the former regime, preserving given population size practically requires extremely high

² It manifests itself *inter alia* in the polemic between the supporters of conciliation concept represented by Fukujama (e.g. 1992) and antagonistic concept represented by Huntington (e.g. 1996)

³ The notions of “wasteful” and “conservation” reproduction have been borrowed from Muhsam (1979).

(relative to human fecundity) fertility, while the latter regime needs very low fertility. For a population to last a woman has to give birth to three or four daughters in a regime of wastage of human life, while in a regime of conservation of human life one daughter is just enough.

The fact that the same demographic result (in terms of number of people) can be achieved with a substantially different fertility owes to differences in life expectancy. In the circumstances of wasteful reproduction, before the onset of demographic transition, life expectancy at birth is short, around 25 years, which reflects very high mortality. Most of children are born unproductively, somewhat they are born to die. They create the pool from which only highly selected individuals survive, strong enough to take part in procreation. That is why this kind of reproduction might be called “wasteful”. In case of “economical” reproduction, after the completion of demographic transition, life expectancy at birth is usually longer than 75 years, the majority of people turn out to be well-fitted to reach seniority. Due to effective death control young and middle-aged people’s chance to survive is close to certainty. Procreation is not wasted and reproduction is economical as the length of life depends on “genetic clock” of the individuals, not the immediate mechanism of selection.

Let’s depart from the subject for awhile. Prolongation of life of an average individual is the occurrence of the great magnitude in the whole history of demographic development. Since the human race appearance on the Earth life expectancy at birth stayed at nearly the same level, oscillating around 25, probably with a maximum deviation of 5 years. The majority of people did not reach the age of reproductive and social maturity. Each moment of life was endangered by hazard of death. Such a state lasted for thousands of years and recently, in a time shorter than two hundred years, it was destroyed and transformed into a new quality. Nowadays in many populations the vast majority of people live through all physiological and social phases of a life course, the significant part enter the seniority in a good health. That conspicuous progress, however, is not related to the changes that took place in the 20th century, as the foundations for its fulfilment were laid in the 19th century (Chesnais 1986).

According to the theory of demographic transition, when the last- ing fall in mortality occurs within a society with a wasteful population reproduction, the demographic transition becomes inevitable. Therefore, the beginning of the transition is connected to bigger chances of survival, which springs from modernisation. Not all populations, however, experienced the onset of modernisation at the same time. Western civilisation was on the privileged position. The theory postulates, however, that in a relatively short time much of delays in demographic transition are levelled. This is due to the process of accelerated learning of the “latecomer populations”, thus being in a way advantageous. In

other words, the later the transition starts, the sooner it is fulfilled, and the course of change is more intense. The postulate of “catching-up” seems to be the main weak point of the theory, for it does not take into consideration all aspects of the process of change. Despite the fact that latecomers make use of the pioneers’ experience, when they start their demographic transition they meet the situation of “dealt cards”, namely their modernisation comes from outside. That is why it has got slow and erratic course.

Moreover, the transition from wasteful reproduction to conservation reproduction is not always harmonious. The changes of mortality usually precede the changes of fertility. In consequence the relatively lasting disparity between the number of births and deaths is observable, which brings about the rise in the rate of natural increase. That natural increase becomes more intense, and after reaching a peak, at the final phase of the transition, its rate tends to come back to the initial, close to zero level.

In reality western populations needed around 100 years, some of them even 150 years for a transition to be completed. The process had moderate intensity, the rate of natural increase did not exceed 1% at the momentum. Although the majority of populations of the South has not completed the transition yet, the momentum of the rate of natural increase has been reached. For many of them the maximum value exceeded 3,5%. The full process of transition is expected to be contained in the period of some 40–50 years.

As it is widely recognised, the theoretical paradigm of demographic transition constitutes the empirical reflection of the experience of Western Europe. The prediction concerning demographic change, which made use of that model turned out to be more or less fallible, depending on the civilisation distance in relation to west-European model or departures from modernisation course typical for Europe. The example of drastic failure of that prediction is much bigger difference in population growth multiplier over the entire period of demographic transition in case of many southern populations relative to west-European populations.

Populations belonging to the civilisations far from the West met particular obstacles to accomplish the demographic transition. This was so despite the fact that the improvements in preventive medicines and public hygiene, which Europe had been developing arduously for centuries, were made available to those civilisations almost instantly. Thus, due to common and relatively easy access to those innovations, the fall of mortality and increase in the life expectancy in many non-western populations were quicker and much more substantial than in Europe. Nonetheless fertility was resistant to those changes (which were in fact only a poor substitute to modernisation). In consequence, the population growth rate increased faster and reached higher level than in the West. Eventually, with high probability we can expect the six-time growth of

population size in countries not belonging to the West to be the result of demographic transition while in the West the population quadrupled over a comparative period in its history⁴.

The changes produced by demographic transition recorded by 2000 proved that the South' share in the world population was 80% while in 1950 it was only 68%. Taking into consideration the fact that the level reached in the middle of the bygone century meant the lowest proportion of population in that part of the globe in modern times (as well as the fact that in the first half of 21th century, this share is going to reach unprecedented high level of 90%), we must agree that the second half of the 20th century witnessed a major breakthrough in demographic situation on the Earth.

While in the South the population growth was far more substantial than expected by widely accepted demographic knowledge, at the same time in the North (West) it drastically slowed down. Many populations reached negative rate of natural increase. Deep and rather persistent fall of fertility, far below the minimum level allowing population replacement, points to the structural character of that process.

That phenomenon is known as a second demographic transition. Contrary to the "first" or "proper" transition, the second transition has nothing to do with the change of a long-term pattern of reproduction equilibrium. Moreover, the vice-versa is true.

The notion of second transition is in fact the empirical attempt to grasp the process that has not been anticipated by the theory of demographic transition — the disintegration of a family as an institution with procreation and generations' succession as its priority.

In terms of demographic transition, modernisation implies adjustment of the rational reproductive behaviour to growing chances of survival, or to be more specific, it implies bringing down of procreation to a level allowing the same everlasting aim — giving birth to progeny in the number big enough for the population to last. The postulate is in a way altruistic, but it is deeply rooted in the history of almost all civilisations in the form of institutions, which stimulate fertility to meet that objective.

Postmodernity, which has formed premises for the second demographic transition has (implicitly) contributed to undermining a number of foundations of the theory of demographic transition. First of all, this

⁴ According to a number of the United Nations publications, in 1885 the population of contemporary North (West) countries was around 300 million. That figure denotes the state at the beginning of the demographic transition. The stabilisation of the population number on the level 1,150–1,200 million was to occur around 2000. The population of the South in 1950, seen as a beginning of transition in many populations of this part of the world, was 1,750 million. The stabilisation on the level around 10,300 million can be expected at the end of the first half of the 21st century (UN, 1973; 1992; 1999).

includes the principle of inviolability of a family as a lasting relationship of a man and woman aimed to give birth to children and bring them up. The priority of individualism, freedom of choice, mutual independence of partners in a relationship and difficulty in combining their personal careers, problems with combining social and parental roles, high costs of “lost career opportunities”, which affect women due to marriage and maternity, unclear and unsure parental rules, limitation of parents’ free choice as a result of partnership between a parent and a child, appearance of childlessness and being single as accepted options, etc. — all of them not only have substantially weakened an institutionalised family, but also shaken strong — so far — relationship between the sexuality and procreation and a relationship based on the partnership rule and lasting marriage contract (Van de Kaa, 1988). A man reaching maturity has started focusing on self-realisation, personal success, hedonistic satisfaction. The former altruistic (let’s admit, to moderate degree) reproduction was replaced by a deeply egoistic approach. At the same time the revolutionary development of contraceptives has reduced the risk of unintentional conception to zero. That has relieved a sexual intercourse from fear and extraordinary responsibility.

The fall of fertility in the course of demographic transition is attempted to be explained by the disruption of a familial mode of production, which at times was complementary to a feudal mode of production, and as a matter of fact it was then indispensable⁵. The coexistence was based on a specific duties division between a man and a woman. A man took part in the feudal division of labour and served community, while a woman with juvenile progeny were part of a familial division of labour as well as, adequately enough, in a social (outside family) and inside family labour division. It was a man’s role to fulfil duties outside the family (military service, state and social easement, earn a living), while a woman was responsible for fulfilling them within the family (maternity, care of children, serving the rest of the family, basic production satisfying the family needs)

Due to modernisation, not only could the new capitalist mode of production operate without a family mode, but it has put in question its necessity and reduced woman’s function within the family to maternity and care for children aged to 5 or so years old. Social division of labour within the capitalistic mode of production, has deprived a family of its monopoly on some of its functions (for example: education, basic social care), and questioned the economic rationality of a familial mode of production in other fields (food and clothing production social security, etc.). Due to those developments, in condition of the falling fertility a woman has entered the capitalist mode of production.

The premises of the “first” and second demographic transition are sharply differentiated by changed gender relations. On the threshold of

⁵ Caldwell is the author of that concept (1982).

modernisation the social roles are balanced, as the social division of labour is dominated by a man, while a woman is in the centre of a family, which provides a peculiar equilibrium of those relations. However, at the end of modernisation a dramatic asymmetry is observable. The position of a woman in the household, due to her declining family functions, becomes low. On the other hand, on the labour market the men's domination is observable while women are clearly discriminated. In consequence women are invited to accept their second-rate role: inside and outside a family. In a modern society the asymmetry of roles and relations between genders triggers the women's pursuit to achieve equality in the labour division. The uncertainty and competition accompanying that process have led to women liberating themselves of their functions in a family. That is finally destroying the foundations of a family⁶.

That process can be seen from a complementary perspective. It is the concept of different responsibilities within the familial division of labour. The distribution of responsibilities is the consequence of the society wealth and labour productivity. In a poor and backward society a family work force (including children), which is both cheap and of low productivity, is indispensable for a family to survive. As the society affluence and labour productivity are growing it becomes possible for a man (a father) to find work outside the family, where productivity and pay are higher. However, a family has to rely on a mother and children's work inside the family. Gradually ongoing mechanisation of household jobs, based on extensive use of electricity, allows to handling this without children's help. The surplus of free time induces a woman to look for a career and satisfaction outside home.

Eventually, the conforming to labour market requirements, in a wealthy society of high labour productivity, thwarts the attempts to combine parental responsibilities with a successful career. That (affecting family ethos or not) has led to the drop of fertility to a level close to zero⁷.

Since the second half of the sixties in Western population the genders relations have undergone the process of transformation. The position of a woman outside a family has become stronger, while a family itself become weaker. Moreover, it has been accompanied by an avalanche of large amounts of a sexual freedom, partnership liaisons based on erotic fascination, variety of relationships based on a partnership, single parenthood possessing equal rights, tendency to split up with ease (including divorce), widespread birth control⁸. Those phenomena have shaken the foundations of western civilisation. Even the Decalogue — the source and core of western culture — has been contested (Ester, Halman, de Moor, 1994).

⁶ The process is analysed in Heintz and Obrecht (1980).

⁷ That concept was presented by Snookes (1996). I refer to it mainly because of the argument simplicity and complementary character in the comparison with the concept of gender asymmetry.

⁸ I analysed the process extensively in Okólski (1999a).

The unexpected fall of fertility has been the direct result of those changes. For the last 30 years in many countries of Western Europe the fertility level has been on the decrease. As a result, at present fertility is much below the replacement level. In some countries the total fertility rate (TFR⁹) ranges from 1.2 to 1.8, which means only 15–45% relative to the replacement level¹⁰ (which is close to 2.1). Around 1990 (or slightly earlier) West European countries were joined by East European and non-European populations of the same civilisation core. In a strikingly short time East and Central Europe became the leader in the limitation of fertility. According to data for 1998, 9 (and only 2 belonging to so-called West — Spain and Italy) out of 36 European countries had TFR lower than 1.3 (2 of them, former GDR and Latvia, lower than 1.1). If that tendency lasted, next generation would only be half as much numerous than the generation participating in the process now. Other European countries are not much different. As many as 12 had TFR from 1.30 to 1.49, only 3 countries above 1.89 (but lower than 2.00). It is characteristic that probably there are no countries of above-replacement fertility¹¹ in Europe, excluding Turkey, where fertility has been on the sudden decrease recently (2.38 in 1998).

The tendency is of a lasting character and — as some scientists argue — difficult to avert. It is also spectacular if we look at it from the perspective of contemporary social changes. Here it is civilisation of the highest dynamics Anno Domini, which seems to condemn itself to biological marginalisation voluntarily. Widespread reluctance to procreation, in conditions of relativity or confused value systems, unusually rapid, in a way subjected to ephemeral fads, rotation of authorities, moral norms, and social aims do not herald that vision to become outdated soon. After all, the consequences of shrinking demographic resources for developmental potential of civilisations cannot be disregarded. There are persuasive examples of civilisations, which due to insufficient reproduction of their populations, collapsed in our history¹².

If we juxtapose that tendency with a somehow contradictory phenomenon: slower than expected fall of fertility, and higher demographic dynamics in populations outside western civilisation, we will see the emerging dramatic change of proportions between the demographic resources of the two present great civilisation spaces, and we will be able to understand the scale of that alteration.

The phenomena that noticeably distinguish the past and the present are migrations. They have influenced demographic rhythm of

⁹ I refer here to the concept of cross-sectional total fertility rate.

¹⁰ The lowest limit stands at approximately 2.1.

¹¹ The mentioned countries do not include Albania, where fertility is probably also decreasing.

¹² The examples can easily be found in UN monograph on factors and effects of population development (UN, 1973) and Okólski and Pajestka's work (1978).

particular societies, as well as have shaken the spatial distribution of the world population resources. As early as in 16th century a man was capable of reaching to most parts of the globe, but first of all it was the thrilling opportunity, not the movements on a big scale. Only the last decades of the bygone century witnessed spectacular breakthrough. Frequent and common journeys to remote areas of the Earth became a routine experience of many people. That was possible due to, among other things, globalisation (including a growing openness of various civilisations towards the influx of aliens), fast-circulating and far-reaching information, the telecommunication revolution, spread and lowering rates of air travelling (and the improvement in other means of transportation) (Castles, Miller, 1993; Okólski, 1999b).

That transformation may enable the western civilisation to last, even if predictions heralding its demographic marginalisation would turn out to be right. For, as it is widely known, in the past 300 years or so sparsely populated (according to contemporary standards) regions of the globe, where other civilisations remained undisturbed for ages, were the destination for the surplus of people from Europe. And it needs to be reminded that those transfers of people not necessarily assumed a peaceful course. Moreover, the emigration of Europeans undoubtedly alleviated appearing the social-economic conflicts that occurred in the period of demographic transition (and stemmed from modernisation or industrialisation).

In a way, today there is a chance to repay. The decreases in population size of the West, which may persist for several generations, can be compensated by the influx of immigrants from suddenly growing populations of the South.

Between 1965 and 1990 the number of immigrants in the west of Europe increased from 12 to 23 million, in North America — from 13 to 24 millions, in Australia — from 2.5 to 4.5 m., in Japan from 0.6 to 1.2 m. (UN, 1998). The number of foreigners staying in those countries temporary was even bigger, the growth was much faster. Additionally, there has been strong influx of illegal migrants. At the same time the ethnic and national composition of immigrants has changed. For example, in the USA, still the main country of the net immigration in the world, in the two first decades of 20th century the majority of immigrants (nearly 90%) came from Europe. In the 1960s, however, Mexico took over (25%) followed closely by two other groups, with relatively high and nearly equal shares (around 20%): Europeans from the West and North of the continent, and people from Latin America (excluding Mexico). Two other national groups of immigrants also contributed significantly, namely: from the South and West of Europe (around 15% of the whole influx) and Asia (12%). In the 1980s the share of whole Europe decreased to 10% and Latin America (including Mexico) to 35 % while the share of Asia increased to around 50%¹³.

¹³ In the late 1980s among 10 main sending countries were 9 countries of the South: Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Cuba, India, China, the Dominican Rep., Jamaica and Vietnam.

On the other hand, in Australia in the mid-1960s the British and Irish alone made up 55% of newly arriving immigrants, and among 7 next top countries 5 were European, plus the USA and New Zealand. At the time the participation of southern countries hardly (and in rare cases) exceeded 1%. However, in the early 1990s the contribution of the British and Irish immigrants decreased to 18%, and 8 out of 10 main countries were Asian, including the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia and the participation of each country ranged from 3% to 11%¹⁴.

Lastly, in many European countries there has been a sudden growth of immigrants from Asia and Africa. In Germany, the second (after the USA) country of net immigration in the world, in the late 1950s there were almost no influx of foreigners coming from Africa and Asia in the work pursuit. On the other hand, in the mid-1990s immigrants only from three countries: Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia made up 30% of all foreign labour force. The Netherlands, until recently the country of relatively small number of immigrants (and if so, from not far territories) in 1990 had 700 thousand immigrants, and more than a half of that number consisted of newcomers from Morocco and Turkey. At the same time, in France the Algerians were the most numerous foreign nation, and substantial number of immigrants originated also from other African countries and Asia. Moreover, apart from the countries mentioned above, most European countries faced massive inflow of migrants (many of them illegal) from South and East Asia.

That migration trend allows for the following reflection. In the twilight of 20th century the teleological fabric of the theory of demographic transition was subjected to hard test of reality. Admittedly, it appears that the equilibrium, as an ultimate dynamic state of the population reproduction, will probably be restored — the latest at the second half of our century — in the most populations. On the other hand, however, the proportion of the demographic growth effects connected with the transition from the old equilibrium to a new one will probably drastically differ from any reasonable proportion of wealth (material and non-material resources) accumulated at the time. For, the environment¹⁵ in which the population of western civilisation exists has expanded to a far bigger extent than environment of the most other populations, while demographic resources of the West have increased in a far lower extent than resources of other civilisations. If we compare relatively typical, closed (that's of

¹⁴ Here, Japan is worth mentioning, where 86% of staying foreigners came from Korea, and from the mentioned countries only 2 played a role: China (6%) and USA (3%). In 1995 variety of sending countries much was bigger and due to that fact the participation of Korea was smaller. The substantial role in the influx to Japan was played — apart from China (16%) — by Brazil (13%), the Philippines (5%), Peru (3%), followed by Thailand, Vietnam and Iran.

¹⁵ There is no need to specify the meaning of the notion “environment”. Generally, it is about the measure of common wealth and instruments of amassing it. To some extent, the volume of gross domestic product *per capita*. can be used for that purpose.

negligible migration) European population and African one, at the time of demographic transition, the multiplier of population growth will be, respectively, 3–4 for Europe and 6–8 for Africa while the multiplier of growth in gross domestic product (per capita) will be, respectively, 10–15 and 2–3. This seems to adequately reflect the scale of disproportion when the effects of those changes are concerned.

In such a context, shall the escalation of the flow of people from the South to the West in the end of the 20th century surprise us? On the other hand, continuity and endurance of that flow is not obvious. Each State decides independently on the extent to which its borders are open for citizens of other States as well as methods of selection, and by this it controls the inflow of people from other civilisations. For example, the USA were able to block effectively for a long time the immigration from non-European countries, mainly from Asia.

The Western civilisation so far recognised inter alia by a uniform complexion (colour of skin), conventionally called white, starts sparkling with various shades and colours. Newcomers of all skin colours are entering the new areas of social and cultural life, such as entertainment or sport. Melting into society seems to be a natural process. When in 1998 the French national football team won the World Championship, France was very proud of that achievement and overwhelmed by euphoria. The fact that in the winning team there were not many French native football players and leading roles were played by immigrants (or immigrants' descendants) from the countries of Maghreb did not cast a shadow on the state of public mind. Paradoxically, at the same time, the influx of foreigners was strongly opposed and protested by French citizens and a tendency to see the problem of unwelcome immigrants as a political issue had its strong supporters in the political world.

The next, even more characteristic example is the case of Germany. Undoubtedly, the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War would have been much more painful and long-lasting if a foreign labour force had not been used. It is hardly surprising that at the end of the 1960s solemn atmosphere and friendly attitude of local community accompanied the arrival of one-millionth immigrant (heaving a symbolic meaning). He was offered congratulations by the authorities of the land he was to start work in, and he was given a radio set by the local residents. The two-millionth immigrant was celebrated even more solemnly; he was given a motorbike. However, when in 1993 the four-millionth newcomer was registered, the mood in Germany was entirely different and instead of celebration the Turkish immigrants' houses were set on fire. Moreover, in the late 1990s one of the CDU leaders gained popularity due to coining the slogan "Our own children instead of immigrants"¹⁶. Quite

¹⁶ The slogan "Kinder statt Inder" is attributed to Ruetters, the CDU chairman of a German land (North Rhine-Westphalia). The word Inder (Indian) appeared because

clearly, in the meantime, in Germany the feeling of benefiting from influx of foreign labour force was largely overwhelmed by the feeling of civilisation strangeness of immigrants.

The majority of Western countries are facing similar problems. If there are few immigrants, a relation between foreigners and a local community is harmonious. If the amount of foreigners is felt as substantial and observable in each field of community life, the tolerance limit is being crossed, to use Francois Mitterand's words. Indeed, for number of reasons; from economic ones (segmentation of the labour market) to social and political (rights and duties connected with foreign citizenship) and cultural (language and religion) the alienation of immigrants is of a lasting character.

On the other hand, international labour flows it is a mechanism operating as a suction and force pump, transferring workers from countries where wages are low to countries where wages are relatively high. In other words, to a large extent, it means a flow from other civilisation to the West. While the economic mechanism, the source of that phenomenon, is obvious, non-economic obstacles, such as cultural difference or political principles and legal regulations concerning the entry of foreigners are not common or effective enough to disturb or adjust the operating of the economic mechanism in a significant way. Moreover, the hypocrisy of the Western governments is observable in managing of this phenomenon. In spite of the fact that they introduce legal regulations meant to curb excessive influx of emigrants and prevent them from working without adequate permission, they tolerate the immigrants' presence, for the functioning if not survival of different branches of economy is based on their work.

Contemporary studies on the world economy (including international mobility of labour force) are — unlike any other academic field — under strong influence of the Marxist school. The old concept by Rose Luxemburg seems to be in accordance with the modern concept developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, or at least sets the same direction for research. Generally, it is about the accumulation of the surplus value by the capital, whose reach is — as it was foreseen by Marx and Engels in “Communist Manifesto” — international. The social order of western wealthy countries is maintained thanks to the functioning of the subordinated structure, named by Wallerstein “the capitalist world economy”. To be more specific, wealthy countries (the core economies) are able to appropriate the surplus produced on the peripheries of the global system. Recently, since the 1980s the range of means used to appropriate the surplus have been widened due to the globalisation trends by the reorien-

of the intention of the Federal Republic of Germany to import a certain amount of Indian citizens (computer scientists) to Germany.

tation of mechanisms governing the labour market right in the centre of world economy. The key element of that reorientation was the immigrants' labour force.

The new phase of globalisation, whose one of the direct impulses was the 1973–1975 recession, has been related to the hasty process of “structural adjustment” of western economies to challenges posed by the rise of new international competitors, mainly dynamic Asian economies. Surprisingly alike, western countries have more widely opened their markets and subjected themselves to the operation of international markets. It appeared that the State in the West has voluntarily got rid a lot of its prerogatives of sovereignty. In relatively short time and in many areas the state has disposed itself of its inner regulative and redistribution functions. The domestic labour markets have been affected by those occurrences severely. Also, the sudden decline of a number of branches of manufacturing industry in the highly developed western countries have contributed to that phenomenon as well. To be sure, the segmentation of labour market in the West started a little earlier, i.e. already during the long-lasting post-war boom. In the period of sudden growth of industry (and gradual and ultimate fall of agriculture), demand for the labour force sharply exceeded the local supply. That created the favourable employment opportunities, lifted the wages to a high level and provided the workers with many welfare benefits unattainable before. Soon, the importation of foreign labour has become common in western countries. The employers took advantage of that inflow, and used it for lowering wages while the substantial part of local workers took this opportunity to leave the most painstaking jobs and improve their situation on the labour market. This became feasible as the immigrants were not able to make any financial claims or have any requirements concerning the terms of employment, and their main objective was to return home as soon as they manage to save sufficient money. That meant being prepared to work extremely hard.

Here, the case of Germany is good exemplification. From 1961 to 1968 1.1 million native workers were promoted to become office and white-collar workers and they were replaced by more than half a million of foreign labourers (blue-collar workers). The primary sector of labour market — generally comprising highly qualified workers — has emerged as a firm and lasting element of that market. It was characterised by cultivating workers' rights and strong position of trade unions. At the same time, the secondary sector grew weaker offering jobs mainly to workers of poor qualifications. The former was the domain of native employees, the latter — increasingly — foreigners. In the course of time local workers started to avoid the secondary sector as it was associated with failure and low skills, and ultimately somehow stigmatised. They preferred — in a worst case — to stay unemployed and living off an unemployment benefit.

The dictate of global competition observable in the West since the 1980s deepened the segmentation in an unexpected way. The State no longer intervened in the labour markets mechanisms, allowing (in face of the declining tendency in manufacturing industry) for high unemployment, the revision of rules and lowering of costs of social security and opening the way for flexible employment policy. A lot of young people, especially just entering the labour market became short-term, part-time or sub-contract workers, sublet or self-employed. Some were hired on the condition that they do their work at home. It was conducive to hire women, who were still indispensable at home, as their discrimination on the labour market had already a long tradition. In such circumstances the notions of a stable employment (for an entire life) and standard day, week or year of work devaluated, and collective pay negotiations, collective work agreement or trade unions activity lost their significance. All of those changes led to a substantial decrease in real wages in the secondary sector, accompanied by a substantial rise of wages in the primary one.

The flexible rules of employment in a natural way suited the foreigners — usually single, planning a temporary stay, and prone to live below acceptable standards. Moreover, the earlier recession gave the pretext to take advantage of foreign workers, using them for domestic political fights and made them “scapegoats”. Hence, the recruitment of workers abroad was stopped, and the regulations concerning immigrants’ entry and employment were tightened. There was still great demand for foreign workers, however, which turned former observable influx from abroad into “invisible” one (partly illegal), leading to the appearance of informal (irregular) labour market, where the work conditions were far worse than offered to foreigners before. In consequence, the deepening of segmentation on the labour market triggered off a sort of competition for jobs in the secondary sector between a foreign and native labour force. Contrary to the trend observed prior to 1973, the inflow of foreign workers no longer meant the chances for promotion or real advantages of local workers, and it even endangered their position.

Indeed, there is no denying that recently in certain parts of the West only foreigners are able to support local industries. This is quite clear with regard to manual jobs, especially temporary, seasonal jobs in agriculture, construction industry, cleaning cities, offices, apartments, hotel trades, catering business, public transport, care necessary in hospitals, shelters, old people’s homes, private houses. There is hard evidence in favour of the opinion that the branches of western economies, which were able to maintain the comparative advantage, employ mainly foreigners, and as a matter of fact the cheap labour of foreigners gives the West a chance to compete on the global market.

This is easily exemplified by New York where “in the two to three thousand garment shops in the high-fashion garment industry, there are

perpetual vacancies — to work a ten-hour day at a furious, piece-rate-governed pace, in dark and dangerous conditions for pay which was at worst, in the 1980s, no more than \$1 an hour (compared to a federal minimum wage of \$3.35). Single mothers with dependent children could not take such a jobs even if they lived close enough travel costs; but illegal immigrants could” (Harris 1995, p. 19). The quoted author expressed the opinion, which seems to be a good conclusion for the above considerations: “Thus, on the back of the lowly immigrant, a new world order is being created” (Ibidem, p. 20). on humble immigrants’ shoulders” (Ibidem, p. 20).

The contemporary centres of world economy, called global cities — New York, San Francisco, London, Paris, Tokyo — to a large extent reflect ethnic composition of the world population. In those metropolises and other poles of economic growth the immigrants create their enclaves and networks, and in the course of time become their lasting element. The symptomatic situation of the Ford company plant in Cologne, where 75% of workers are Turkish, points to one more tendency. Not only do the employers prefer foreign work force, but — to reduce the cost and make management easier — quite often they want their employees to be a homogeneous ethnic group. This is heightening the effect of large concentration and ‘visibility’ of ethnic minorities in the West (Waldinger, 1996).

Sometimes the strategies of transnational corporations, involving the wide use of foreign labour in Western subsidiaries, contribute to the weakening of legal order of those countries, despite the governments attempts to control the inflow of migrants. Let us take Paris clothing industry as an example, which in the early 1990s lost its position of world leader¹⁷. In order to revitalise that branch, the strategy of big companies fragmentation and outsourcing was successfully used. The strategy was based on separating basic stages of the production out of the proper companies and transferring them to the informal economy, where the work force consisted of illegally employed foreigners. (Iskander, 1999).

Today it is difficult to imagine the West without cultural mosaic created by recent waves of increased migration. Or even without growing penetration by foreigners originated in more or less remote parts of the globe. Experience of the last two decades, however, have proved distinctly that the influx of people representing distant non-western civilisations, may not be devoid of drastic social relations or conflicts.

Firstly, the most apparent cause of the potential tension seems to be the strong concentration of foreigners on relatively small territories

¹⁷ The participation of France in the world volume of export of clothing industry product was reduced from 6.0% in 1980 to 3.7% in 1994, to the advantage of Asian and Latin American where the labour cost is much lower.

only in some parts of the country. In conditions of not so highly predictable global economy, the West sensitivity to the world economy business cycle, and in the face of high and still increasing costs of public sector (especially social welfare), the visible and strongly perceptible presence of foreigners make them easy victims of domestic failures in their host countries. The more so, a lot of immigrants are not under the full protection of law, and there are those whose legal status is irregular.

Another source of potential conflicts is the foreigners' gradual adaptation to a new environment as well as their social mobility. Contrary to the early waves of inflow, the following waves comprised people not so eager to return to the home countries soon. Hence, the immigrants are no longer satisfied with any kind of job. Moreover, foreigners are increasingly determined to find their place in the primary sector of labour market, which over past decades developed into a bulwark occupied by native workers. To be sure, they are gradually achieving that objective. This gives the impression of displacing the native workers, and in reality leads to growing competition. In consequence, the real wages of local labour force are often being reduced.

Thirdly, the foreign workers are far more than the locals aware of exploitation. There are victims of misuse or dishonesty among them (that usually happened at early stage of their stay in the West). Many of them had some experience in claiming their rights in western justice or administration system. They are prone to associate or organise collective protest. As the trade unions are growing weaker, the migrants become the essential source for recruitment of new members and the dynamic element of the organisations.

At that point we can not disregard traditional contempt or disrespect towards a new immigrants' wave. The phenomenon is so deeply rooted that it can even be noticed in relations between the older and younger generations within the same ethnic Diaspora.

Lastly, the imponderables play an essential role here. The political rhetoric and hypocrisy towards foreigners, mainly those coming from outside the West, is a good example. Modern canons of correctness do not allow to use certain gestures or express some opinions (such as race or civilisation superiority) or to suggest that migrants' rights should be limited comparing to native citizens rights. It does not impede, among the members of western societies, to discriminate of foreigners ostentatiously or to display arrogance towards those people. On the other hand, the role played by foreigners in economy tends to be passed over in silence. Another symptom of hypocrisy seems to be coexistence of gestures made by governments aimed to make impression, that not only the inflow of foreigners, but also the number of settled foreigners needs to be reduced, and governments tolerance of big capital expansion based on the immigrants' work (sometimes irregular). It contributes to a deep perplexity both among foreigners and local population.

The West probably will need immigrants from different civilisations for a long time and the South due to enormous demographic potential will be able to satisfy that demand. The growing (already rather high) percentage of foreigners in western populations, the fact that they are already well rooted (if not integrated) in societies and their growing political and economic expansion will cause irreversible change — civilisation pluralism of western societies, so far homogeneous. The fast demographic growth of the South and the demographic decline of the West (North) have laid foundations for basic change of demographic parity between western civilisation and other civilisations, and to essential marginalisation of the former one. Such shift may occur — as I have suggested — not just on aggregate scale, i.e. globally, but virtually everywhere on the Earth, including Europe and North America, on these two continents due to above depicted “bloodless invasion of immigrants”.

This phenomenon could be of far-reaching consequences, going beyond demography. Hence adequate reactions — interactions, adaptations, adjustments, modifications — will also have to take place beyond that sphere.

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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ALIYAH AND JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM RUSSIA

In the years 1989–2000 about 1.4 million (ex-) Soviet Jews and their non-Jewish relatives left the former Soviet Union (FSU). Most of this movement (887,500, or about 63 percent) was directed toward Israel. The group of persons eligible for immigration to Israel (aliyah) according to the Israeli Law of Return is rather large; it includes Jews, their children and grandchildren, and all respective spouses. During 1991–1994, and again in 1999, immigrants from the Russian Federation were the most numerous group to arrive in Israel¹. However, in the 1990s Jews migrated from Russia not only to Israel, but also to other countries, especially the USA and Germany. Thus, statistics of aliyah and statistics of Jewish emigration from the Russian Federation are not the same.

Russian statistics contain data both on emigration to Israel, and on emigration of Jews to outside the FSU. The Israeli statistics of immigration, in turn, single out data on people arrived from the Russian Federation. Moreover, in both countries several sources of information reflect the various stages of the migration process, allowing for a profound comparison of the available data. This is of real importance, since only through such analysis can indicators of migration from Russia to Israel be correctly interpreted. The ultimate aim of this paper is to elaborate on the dynamics of the total level of Jewish emigration from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU on the basis of combined use of the statistical data of the two countries.

Sources of the Statistical Data

Publication of detailed data on emigration from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU by ethnicity, including Jews, was started by the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics (Goskomstat of Russia) for the second half of 1992 and employed special processing of the personal forms of the statistical registration of migration (Goskomstat of Russia, 1993). Simultaneously, in the same statistical bulletin, according to the information of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the number of people who received permits (exit visas) to depart for settlement in Israel was presented. Publication of these data by the Goskomstat of Russia has since become annual (Goskomstat of Russia, 1994–2001).

¹ This rather numerous movement has attracted scholarly attention in the country of its origin, and the term “aliyah” was introduced into Russian demography (see: Iontsev, 1994; Iontsev, 1999, p. 301).

In Israel the Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel CBS) prepared its first special publication on immigration in which the data on some countries of the FSU, among them the Russian Federation, were presented for 1990–1992 (Israel CBS, 1994), and then again for 1993 and 1994 (Israel CBS, 1995a and 1995b). Subsequently these data began to be published in the special annual collection of statistical data devoted to immigration to the country (Israel CBS, 1996–2001). However even in this publication the data do not differentiate among all the countries of the FSU and the data on some of them are combined, though more detailed data are available². In addition to the Israel CBS data, the numbers of Israeli visas issued in the Russian Federation for immigration to the country according to the Law of Return and some data of the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption of immigrants will be useful to our analysis.

It is natural to begin with a comparison of the available Russian and Israeli data (Table 1). These data show that the majority of people who received exit visas for emigration to Israel in 1989 went to the USA, the last year when this was possible (see: Gur-Gurevitz, 1996, Chapter 2). By 1990 anyone who was issued a visa for departure to Israel could go only there.

Table 1. Migration from the Russian Federation to Israel, 1989–2000, Thousands

Year	Russian emigration permits to Israel*	Registered number of emigrants from Russia to Israel**	Registered number of immigrants in Israel from Russia ***	of these:	
				Immigrants who entered the country on an immigrant visa	Tourists who took on immigrant status
1989	22.0****		3.3		
1990	61.0		45.5		
1991	38.7		47.3		
1992	22.0		24.8		
1993	20.4	12.8	23.1		
1994	16.9	12.1	24.6	24.2	0.4
1995	15.2	12.7	15.7	14.5	1.2
1996	14.3	12.8	16.5	14.8	1.7
1997	14.4	12.9	15.3	13.5	1.8
1998	16.9	12.8	14.5	13.2	1.3
1999	36.3	20.0	31.1	29.5	1.6
2000	16.3	9.4	18.8	17.6	1.2

Notes: * According to data of the passport and visa service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs; ** According to the Goskomstat of Russia, data based on neighborhood passport office deregistration of emigrants who lost residence status in Russia; *** According to Israel CBS data for 1990–2000; and Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption data for 1989; **** Most emigrated to the USA.

At the same time, receipt of an emigration permit and actual departure do not always occur in the same year (Mkrtchyan, 2001, p. 73). Actually, many of those who received exit visas in 1990 left for Israel only the following year, a fact brought to light by our comparison of the

² Distribution of immigrants to Israel providing data for all states of the FSU is given in Appendix 1.

of the statistics of the two countries. In 1990 many more persons received Russian exit visas to Israel (61,000) than immigrated to this country from the Russian Federation according to the Israeli data (45,500). However, in the following year when the number of requests for exit visas to Israel declined, and fewer were actually issued (38,700), the number of immigrants arriving in this country from Russia (47,300) was higher than in the previous year.

In the four years 1990–1993, which are the most appropriate for an analysis of the wave of aliyah in the beginning of the 1990s, the number of permits to depart for settlement in Israel according to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (142,100) almost equaled the number of immigrants from Russia registered by the Israel CBS (140,700). This shows good correspondence of the statistical data from the two countries for this period in which different stages of the process of migration are recorded.

Of course, in the given Israeli statistics not all immigrants are distributed by the countries of the FSU. The unknown distribution was especially significant for 1992 and 1993: 4,300 (6.6 percent) and 5,600 (8.4 percent), respectively. In 1990 3,200 (1.7 percent) immigrants were in this category, but in 1991 there were only about 400 (see: Appendix 1).

However we are not inclined to surmise that among the unknown were a significant number of immigrants from the Russian Federation. During this period, most of the emigrants from the different FSU countries carried passports of the Soviet Union. A very difficult identificational problem for the statistician were those people who originated in regions outside Russia with uncertain status (Abkhazia, Trans-Dniestria), or other parts of the FSU (e.g., Tadjikistan) where there were ongoing military activities, due to which emigration to Israel frequently went through neighboring states.

Data on the origin distribution of immigrants from the Russian Federation who entered the country on immigrant visas, or as tourists (including students) and later officially became immigrants, have been available since 1994. Obviously the latter category of immigrants is not reflected in the statistics of permits to depart for settlement in Israel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and, hence, this category should not be taken into account when comparing the statistics of the two countries.

In 1994 despite the rather insignificant number (about 400) of tourists who switched to immigrant status, the Israeli data on immigration from the Russian Federation (24,600) considerably exceeded the number of permits to depart for settlement in Israel which were granted by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (16,900). In the two years 1993 and 1994 about 20,000 Israeli visas for immigration were granted in Russia, including cases in which the prospective migrants decided subsequently not to emigrate. This would seem to confirm our earlier supposition regarding overestimation in the Israeli statistics of the number of immigrants from Russia in 1994 at the expense of other parts of the FSU (see Tolts, 1999, p. 20).

For later years the Israeli statistics data, following the exclusion of tourists who switched to immigrant status, are in most cases close enough to the data of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, comparison of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs data and the Israel CBS statistics shows that, at the beginning of a new wave of aliyah following the financial crash in August 1998, many people who received Russian exit permits in that year left for Israel only in the following year: in 1998 the number of persons who received exit permits to Israel (16,900) was higher than the number of immigrants from Russia according to the Israeli statistics, again excluding those tourists who switched to immigrant status (13,200).

In 1999 the number of permits to depart for settlement in Israel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was also higher (36,300) than the number of arrivals registered in the Israel CBS data (29,500). But in the following year the number of requests for permits to depart for settlement in Israel declined, and there were fewer exit permits issued (16,300) than there were arrivals in Israel from the Russian Federation (17,600).

The statistics of Goskomstat of Russia (based on neighborhood passport office deregistration of emigrants who lost residence status in the Russian Federation) are more closely aligned with those of the Israel CBS for 1997–1998 than are the figures of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs: when the number of tourists who officially became immigrants is subtracted from the Israeli statistics, the Goskomstat data are lower by only about 400–600 (3–5 percent).

However, for years preceding 1997, statistics of the Goskomstat show obvious lacunae, in comparison both with the statistics of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Israel CBS³. Under-registration of migration to Israel was especially significant in the Goskomstat statistics in 1993. In this year 20,400 exit permits to Israel were issued according to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (which almost equals the number of Israeli visas for aliyah given that year in the Russian Federation). In Israel, 23,100 immigrants from the Russian Federation were registered whereas the Goskomstat counted only 12,800 who left for permanent residence in Israel.

Comparison of the Russian and Israeli statistics under consideration for 1999–2000 shows that coverage of emigration to Israel in the Goskomstat data, after the improvement noted in 1997–1998, had again become incomplete. In 1999 the Goskomstat data were lower by 1.5 times than the Israeli figure after excluding those tourists who had changed their status to that of immigrants, and in 2000 this discrepancy increased to 1.9 times.

³ In this period plausibly part of the emigrants were only registered in more general statistics of the Goskomstat (existed through 1996; see more on these statistics below) and in the process of deregistration in the neighborhood passport offices, the prospective moves to permanent residence in Israel were not noted.

However only in the migratory statistics of the Goskomstat are the data on ethnicity of all those (including Jews) who left Russia for outside the FSU given. Moreover, we have two sets of these data: for 1989-1996 the total number of Jews who noted as their destination a country outside the FSU in the personal forms for statistical registration of migration when they left Russia for at least 1.5 months, excluding tourist departures, and for 1993-2000 the registered numbers of those who lost their residence status in the country (Table 2).

Table 2. Registered Emigration of Jews from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU, 1989–2000, Thousands

Year	Total number of emigrants*	Number of emigrants who lost residence status in Russia*	Percent ratio
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)/(1)x100
1989	11.0		
1990	28.6		
1991	31.0		
1992	21.1		
1993	18.2	14.0	77
1994	15.2	13.6	90
1995	13.2	12.8	97
1996	13.1	12.5	95
1997		9.5	
1998		7.3	
1999		9.0	
2000		4.5	

Note: * According to the Goskomstat of Russia, data based on neighborhood passport office deregistration.

Both sets of data were computed on the basis of the forms for statistical registration of migration (migrant registration questionnaire). However, the first set covered, along with cases of departure for permanent residence abroad, also such events as leaving the country for work and education (Denisova and Michugina, 1994). Therefore it is to be expected that the numbers of the first set should be higher than those of the second set.

However, the discrepancy for 1993 calls attention to itself by its size — 23 percent. For this year our previous analysis revealed especial incompleteness of the Goskomstat data on emigration to Israel, making it possible to assume that a significant number of departures for permanent residence outside the FSU were not registered in these data (the second column of Table 2) though they were included in the more general statistics of the Goskomstat of Russia (the first column of the same table).

On the other hand, for 1995–1996, when the Goskomstat data on emigration to Israel more closely approximated Israel CBS statistics, the two sets of the Goskomstat data on emigration of Jews to outside the FSU were also very close: the discrepancy between them was around 3–5 percent.

It is obvious that during the period under consideration departures of Jews for work and study abroad frequently led to permanent emigration, but were much rarer than were departures for permanent residence.

Therefore it is possible to assume that for the period of 1989–1992, for which there are no other data, available data approximate the emigration dynamics of the Jews well enough.

However, for 1999–2000 the given data are clearly incomplete as revealed by our comparison of the Israeli and Russian statistics above. For these years a more correct estimate of the number of Jewish emigrants to outside the FSU which would be comparable to the previous Goskomstat data is therefore necessary. But before we can make such an estimation, we must note the peculiarities of the different definitions of “who is a Jew” in the Russian and Israeli statistics.

Role of Different Definitions: Jews in Russian and Israeli statistics

In the Soviet Union, ethnicity (*national'nost'*) was listed in the internal passports of all persons aged 16 and over. This “legal” provenance was the ethnic nationality of both parents; only a child whose parents belonged to different ethnicities could choose one or the other. In 1997 the authorities of the Russian Federation proposed a new type of internal passport in which ethnicity would not be given. When these were introduced, the Goskomstat of Russia recommended that ethnicity be specified in personal forms of the statistical registration of migration “as reported by citizen himself (*so slov*)” (Goskomstat of Russia, 1997, p. 5).

For children without passports (since 1997, in the Russian Federation passports have been granted from age 14), ethnicity is defined on the basis of the parents’ ethnicity; children who have no passport are listed in personal forms of the statistical registration of migration of one of their parents. “If the parents of the minor belong to different ethnic groups, then one registers the ethnic identity [of the child] as that of one of the parents, preference being given to the mother’s ethnicity” (*ibid.*).

In the Soviet population censuses (as well as in the 1994 Russian microcensus), respondents declared their nationality (ethnicity, not religion), and data from these censuses were based entirely on self-declaration of respondents. Not only did the censuses not require documentary evidence for answers to any given question, but in regard to ethnicity the census takers were explicitly given instructions that this was to be determined solely by the person polled — without any corroboration. However, most scholars agree that for adults the census / microcensus figures on Jewish ethnicity were very similar to the “legal” ethnic nationality as recorded in internal passports. Thus, migration figures for adults correspond very closely with the census/microcensus data.

For children in the census / microcensus, ethnicity was determined by their parents. The data on offspring of Jewish mixed couples collected in the Soviet Union show a clear preference for non-Jewish ethnic affiliation. Even in the post-Soviet era, according to the most recent data of the 1994 Russian microcensus, non-Jewish ethnic affiliation was clearly preferable among the offspring of such couples. For children under 16

der 16 who were living in Jewish-Russian mixed families, the proportion declared Jewish was about the same regardless of the composition of the mixed couples — only 11 percent (Table 3). Clearly, migration data for children overrepresented Jews when compared with census / microcensus data.

Table 3. Percentage of Children Declared Jewish of all Children Living with Mixed Couples in the Russian Federation, According to the 1994 Microcensus

Composition of mixed couples	Age of children	
	under 16	16 and above
Jewish husband, Russian wife	10.9	6.2
Russian husband, Jewish wife	11.6	4.1
Total among Jewish-Russian couples	11.1	5.6

Drawn from: Tolts, 1996, p. 15.

According to official Russian data, the proportion of Jews among all those who emigrated to Israel fell from 64 percent in the second half of 1992 to 53 percent in 1995, 31 percent in 1998 and 27 percent in 2000 (Table 4). Only for a small part of emigrants to this country in these data is ethnicity unknown: 1.8 percent in 1999 and 4.0 percent in 2000; we have excluded these from our computation of the indicator. In publications of the Goskomstat of Russia for the preceding two years (1997-1998) all emigrants to Israel were distributed by ethnicity,⁴ and in 1992-1996 the proportion unknown was very small (0.2-0.4 percent).

Table 4. Percentage of Jews among Migrants to Israel from the Russian Federation and Entire FSU, 1990–2000

Year	Russian Federation		Entire FSU
	Goskomstat of Russia data*	Israel CBS data**	Goskomstat of Russia data*
1990			96
1991			91
1992	64***		84
1993	60		82
1994	58		77
1995	53	72	72
1996	49	66	67
1997	36	59	59
1998	31	53	53
1999	31	49	49
2000	27	45	45

Notes: * Of the emigrants whose ethnicity was known (for 1992–1996 and 1999–2000); ** Of the immigrants whose ethnicity/religion was known by the start of 2002; *** Second half of the year.

Israeli statistics are based on the Ministry of Interior Population Register file, whose definition of “who is a Jew” is according to the halakhic (Jewish religious) approach: a Jew is a person born to a Jewish

⁴ Probably this was a consequence of the imputation of “empty” records to the most frequent (modal) group of answers (on this approach, see: Tchoudinovskikh, 2001, p. 45).

mother (female lineage is instructive and the number of generations backwards is not determined), or one who converted to Judaism (Della-Pergola, 1998, pp. 85–87). As in the Israeli Law of Return, only conversion to another religion can disrupt Jewish lineage.

Logically, in the official Israeli data the share of Jews among all immigrants from the FSU countries in Israel appears much higher: 96 percent in 1990, 72 percent in 1995, 53 percent in 1998 and 45 percent in 2000. In 1995–2000 this proportion was almost the same as among the immigrants from the Russian Federation. However, composition of immigrants to Israel on the basis of the Law of Return may be better understood if we combine Jews with their spouses, though of other ethnicity (including widows and widowers), and children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers. In 2000, according to the Israeli criteria, Jews and their specified nearest relatives constituted about four-fifths of all immigrants from the FSU countries; the others were spouses of children of Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, and grandchildren of Jews and their spouses.

At the same time, there are some rare cases of change in the opposite direction as a result of migration when, according to the Israeli definition, the person who was “officially” Jewish in the FSU is not granted such status in Israel. These are a small portion of the offspring of mixed marriages who were listed as Jews in the old internal passports and had a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother; according to the 1994 Russian microcensus, among the offspring aged 16 and above of couples consisting of a Jewish husband and a Russian wife only 6.2 percent were counted as Jewish (see: Table 3).

Thus, the Israeli data on Jews who immigrated to this country can not be applied directly to elaborate on the dynamics of the total emigration of Jews from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU. However, on the basis of combined use of the statistical data of the two countries we may make the necessary estimates.

Combined Use of the Statistical Data

In the migration statistics of the Goskomstat of Russia as revealed in our previous analysis, in 1999–2000 a very significant number of emigrants to Israel was not counted, and the total number of Jews who emigrated from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU was underestimated. To attain a better estimate of the total number of the Jews who emigrated from the country in those years (which would be comparable to the previous much more accurate Goskomstat of Russia statistics) the data of the two countries were combined.

The starting figure for our estimate was the total number of registered immigrants in Israel from Russia according to the Israel CBS data. Those who entered Israel as tourists and changed to immigrant status only later have been excluded, as they would not have been included in the

emigration statistics by Goskomstat of Russia. To facilitate comparability, the proportion of Jews among the migrants was taken from the data of the Goskomstat. After that, on the basis of these figures the number of Jews who emigrated from Russia to Israel was computed. And finally, using the data of the Goskomstat on Israel's proportion of the entire emigration of Jews from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU, the necessary estimates for each year were made (Table 5).

Table 5. Estimate of Number of Jews who Emigrated from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU, 1997-2000, Thousands*

	1997	1998	1999	2000
1. Registered number of immigrants in Israel from Russia **	15,3	14,5	31,1	18,8
1a. Of these, tourists who took on immigrant status	1,8	1,3	1,6	1,2
2. Proportion of Jews among registered emigrants from the Russian Federation to Israel***	0,36	0,31	0,31	0,27
3. Estimated number of Jews who emigrated from Russia to Israel (3)=[(1)-(1a)]x(2)	4,85	4,1	9,15	4,75
4. Israel's proportion in entire emigration of Jews from Russia to outside the FSU***	0,48	0,55	0,68	0,54
5. Estimated number of Jews who emigrated from Russia to outside the FSU (5)=(3)/(4)	10,1	7,4	13,5	8,8

Notes: * Based on combined Israeli and Russian statistics; ** According to Israel CBS data; *** According to the Goskomstat of Russia data.

My estimation for 1999 (13,500 Jewish emigrants) is higher by 50 percent than the registered number of the Goskomstat of Russia, and for the year 2000, (8,800 Jewish emigrants) it is higher by 96 percent. At the same time, the results of identical calculations for 1997–1998 were quite close to the Goskomstat data for these years (Table 6). We see that in the earlier two years, the method used to estimate the number of Jews who emigrated from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU led to results closely comparable to the data of the Goskomstat, whereas the same method delineates the sizable differentials in the latter two years.

The estimates I attained essentially enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the considered phenomenon. They show the most recent peak of the emigration in 1999 when, according to the Goskomstat data the total number of Jews who emigrated from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU (9,000) was lower than in 1997 (9,500). This contradicts our estimate for 1999, where it appeared to be much higher (13,500). Moreover, my estimate for 2000 (8,800, versus a surprisingly low 4,500 according to the Goskomstat) shows that the total number of Jewish emigrants in this year was higher even than the respective Goskomstat figure for 1998 (7,300).

Table 6. Comparison of Estimated and Registered Numbers of Jews who Emigrated from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU, 1997–2000, Thousands

Year	Registered data*	Estimate**	Estimate as percent of registered data
1997	9,5	10,1	106
1998	7,3	7,4	102
1999	9,0	13,5	150
2000	4,5	8,8	196

Notes: * According to the Goskomstat of Russia, data based on neighborhood passport office deregistration of emigrants who lost residence status in Russia; ** According to the author’s estimate based on combined Israeli and Russian statistics (see: Table 5).

Estimate of the General Level of Jewish Emigration

In the period examined here the number of Jews in the Russian Federation rapidly declined. Our estimates show that during the first 12 years of the recent mass emigration (1989-2000) their total number fell from 570,000 to 275,000, or by 52 percent (Table 7).

Table 7. Number of Jews in the Russian Federation, 1989–2001

Year	Thousands		Index numbers (1989=100)	
	Total	Excluding “Tats”**	Total	Excluding “Tats”**
1989**	570	551,0	100	100
1994***	409	401,0	72	73
1999****	310	305,6	54	55
2001*****	275		48	

Notes: * In Soviet censuses and the Russian 1994 microcensus some of the Mountain Jews were registered separately as “Tats”; data on this group were not presented in migration statistics; ** According to the 1989 census; *** According to the 1994 microcensus; **** According to the author’s estimate for the beginning of the year.

These estimates for the period after the Russian microcensus are based on its data and the subsequent statistics of births, deaths and migration (Tolts, 1999. p. 29). However for our estimate of the number of Jews in 1999-2000 when the data of the Goskomstat on emigration as shown by our analysis were very incomplete, the above estimated numbers of Jews who emigrated to outside the FSU, based on the combined use of Russian and Israeli statistics (see: Table 5), were utilized. No other corrections of the Russian migration statistics were made to reach these estimates. Of course, some Jews immigrated to the Russian Federation without being registered in Russian migration statistics. However, the migration data for minors overrepresented the Jews as compared with the microcensus data (see above). These factors work in opposite directions (of unknown size), and thus somewhat offset each other.

The fast reduction in the number of Jews in the Russian Federation has necessitated the use of emigration rates based on comparable

data in this analysis. We have estimated two sets of indicators based on the data available from the Goskomstat of Russia: for 1989-1996 the rates are based on the total number of Jews who noted as their destination a country outside the FSU in the personal forms for statistical registration of migration filed when they left Russia for at least 1.5 months, excluding tourist departures, and for 1993-2000 the rates are based on the registered numbers of those who lost their residence status in the Russian Federation (Table 8).

Table 8. Emigration Rates of Jews from the Russian Federation to outside the FSU, per 1,000 of Russia's Jews, 1989–2000

Year	Based on total number of emigrants*	Based on number of emigrants who lost residence status in Russia*	Adjusted series of rates
1989	21		21
1990	56		56
1991	65		65
1992	48		48
1993	44	34	44**
1994	39	35	39**
1995	36	35	36**
1996	37	36	37**
1997		29	29
1998		23	23
1999		30	45***
2000		16	31***

Notes: * Registered data presented in Table 2; ** Based on total number of emigrants; *** Based on estimate using combined Israeli and Russian statistics (see: Table 5).

Based on our previous analysis of statistical data, we may assume that for the period of 1989–1992, for which there are no other data, the estimated rates approximate the emigration dynamics of the Jews well enough; for the period of 1993-1996 better coverage of emigration is given by the more general statistics of the Goskomstat of Russia on which the first set of rates is based, and we chose these indicators for the adjusted series of rates for these years. For 1999-2000 in the adjusted series of rates we utilized indicators based on estimates using combined Israeli and Russian statistics.

The given rates show that the level of emigration peaked in 1990-1991 (56 and 65 cases per 1,000 of Russia's Jews, respectively), after which it decreased steadily till 1999. By 1997-1998, there was an essential decrease of intensity of emigration (29 and 23 cases per 1,000 of Russia's Jews, respectively). But in 1999 the rate of emigration doubled in comparison with the previous year, and in 2000 it was in 1.35 times above that of 1998, when the low level of emigration was marked.

To correctly interpret the rates of emigration, we must remember that its level depends on the changing age structure of the population. Thus it is necessary to take into account that over the period considered here, as one of the results of mass emigration the Jewish population of

Russia aged quickly. According to data from the 1989 census on the Jews in the Russian Federation, the population aged 65 and over made up 27 percent of the total; according to our estimate, by 1999 this segment constituted as much as about 35 percent. The median age of these Jews had reached 58.2 years which was 5.9 years more than in 1989 (Tolts, 2000, pp. 193–194). At the same time, previous analysis revealed a clear difference in the tendency of the Jewish population to emigrate by age: the propensity to emigrate is the lowest at the most advanced ages (Tolts, 1998, pp. 10–13). However, the sizable corrections of the emigration figures for 1999–2000 prevent us from applying standardization to the indicators computed on their basis. But even without this correction, it is clear that the given rates of emigration give us an underestimated representation of the level of emigration for the end of the considered period as compared with the beginning.

Final remarks

Our analysis has shown that the Russian and Israeli statistics contain data which reflect various stages of aliyah and emigrations of Jews from Russia. Therefore the most fruitful approach is to use them together, instead of preferring one to another. At the same time, these data do not always fully cover all the processes, and are in fact sometimes overestimated and in need of correction.

As part of our analysis, definitions of Jews in the Russian and Israeli statistics were studied. We have established that according to the Israeli criteria and to the most recent available information (2000), Jews and their nearest relatives made up the overwhelming majority of FSU immigrants to Israel. At the same time, the data of the Russian statistics show lower percentages of Jews, and certainly do not reflect features of the immigration to Israel on the basis of the Law of Return.

Combined use of the statistics of the two countries essentially aided our understanding of the processes under analysis and made it possible to adjust indicators when necessary. In particular, analysis of the data of the Goskomstat of Russia for 1999 and 2000 revealed serious underestimation of emigration to Israel and emigration of the Jews as a whole. Use of the Israeli statistics for correction of the data of the Russian statistics allowed us to show the growth in the rate of emigration of the Jews from Russia in these years, and thus, to better understand the entirety of the dynamics of the phenomenon.

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Appendix 1. Migration from the FSU to Israel, by Country, 1989–2000

Country	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Russian Federation	3,281	45,522	47,276	24,786	23,082	24,612	15,707	16,488	15,290	14,454	31,104	18,758
Ukraine	3,575	58,936	39,769	13,149	12,833	22,733	23,556	23,447	24,103	20,083	23,231	20,321
Belorussia	1,121	23,356	16,006	3,273	2,265	2,906	4,219	4,381	3,369	2,258	2,692	2,560
Moldavia	1,470	11,926	15,452	4,305	2,173	1,907	2,407	1,953	1,396	1,194	1,345	1,774
Latvia	294	4,393	1,852	866	1,399	845	541	709	599	447	326	390
Lithuania	322	2,737	1,052	369	333	245	353	339	332	194	198	300
Estonia	30	391	225	81	110	61	60	99	75	40	55	100
Georgia	263	1,346	1,407	2,595	3,750	3,295	2,275	1,493	1,107	944	1,050	858
Azerbaidzhan	466	7,833	5,676	2,625	3,133	2,285	3,090	2,627	1,876	1,134	1,240	854
Armenia	10	162	108	132	387	370	114	97	82	125	121	126
Uzbekistan	1,544	20,726	14,271	5,533	8,471	6,510	6,172	3,410	2,695	2,399	2,858	2,276
Tadzhikistan	202	2,389	2,736	2,286	1,581	413	455	317	138	97	72	47
Kirgiziia	73	992	572	250	449	447	367	347	203	214	247	472
Turkmenistan	3	33	0	79	54	59	359	465	400	279	246	193
Kazakhstan	67	1,313	998	475	536	699	2,736	2,034	2,350	1,948	1,861	1,757
Unknown	211	3,175	439	4,289	5,589	692	2,436	843	603	222	202	30
Total	12,932	185,230	147,839	65,093	66,145	68,079	64,847	59,049	54,618	46,032	66,848	50,816

Note: Israel CBS data; Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption data (distribution by country for 1989, and for Baltic States for 1990–1994).

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**The publication of the 10th jubilee volume of the Series
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INFORMATION FOR FOREIGN READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

The book series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World” was founded in 1998 in view of the fact that there was not a single scientific periodical in Russia dealing with international migration of population. Due to this reason the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University made a decision to establish a book series aiming to raise both theoretical and applied aspects of contemporary trends of international migration of population as well as its determinants and consequences. The Editor-in-Chief is Professor Vladimir Iontsev, the Head of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics. The Executive Secretary of the series is Irina Ivakhniouk, Senior Researcher at the Department of Population.

The volumes of the series are published biannually. They can be either edited volumes or monographs. The series is in fact an active discussion on various dimensions of international migration in the world and in Russia in particular.

The **first volume** (1998) mainly consist of the papers of Russian scholars presented at the IUSSP General Population Conference at Beijing, China in October 1997. (Detailed information about the Conference is also presented.) These are the articles by Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamensky «*Russia and the International Migration of Population*» dealing with the entrance of Russia into the international community by means of migration and the allied problems — both for Russia and the world; and the article by Andrey Ostrovsky «*Labor Migration from China to Russia’s Far East: Possibilities of Immigration Today and in Future*» concerning the turn of labor migration into permanent immigration at the certain region.

The other articles of the first volume are devoted to a very topical for Russia aspect of international migration — “brain drain”: Igor Ushkalov — «*Intellectual Emigration from Russia: the Factors, Scale, Consequences, Ways of Regulation*», Irina Malakha — «*“Brain Drain” in the Central and Eastern Europe*». Besides, the issue included the digest of the well-known book by Julian L. Simon — «*Economic Consequences of Immigration*» (N.Y.: Blackwell, 1989). Reviews of noticeable publications of Russian and foreign specialists on international migration is an integral part of every issue of the series. Another important section of every volume is “Young Scholars’ Viewpoints”, where students and post-graduate students from the MSU and other universities are granted an opportunity to publish the results of their research in international migration.

The **second volume** (1999) included articles on a broad variety of themes related to international migration in Russia and in the world:

Vladimir Iontsev, Aminat Magomedova — «*Migration between Russia and other Former Soviet states (Historical Review)*»; Irina Ivakhniouk — «*The Experience of State Regulation of Labor Force Emigration (Case of Turkey)*»; Andrey Kamensky — «*Labor Force Export and the Impact of Migrant Workers' Remittances on Balance of Payment of a Sending Country*»; Igor Ushkalov — «*Emigration and Immigration: Russian Phenomenon*». Apart from the Russian scientists' articles the volume also includes contribution of Prof. Janez Malačič, (the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) — «*Labor Market and International Migration Situation in Central European Transitional Economies*». Starting from the second volume it has become a good tradition of the series to invite foreign colleagues to contribute because their papers can be hardly available in Russian.

The **third volume** (1999) presents the monograph of Vladimir Iontsev «*International Migration of Population: Theory and History of Studying*» dealing with the classification of main scientific approaches for the studying of migration. The analysis of principal concepts in the field of international migration that exist presently both in Russia and the world demographic science are presented. There is also a detailed analysis of international migration affecting Russia since the eighteenth century up to the present day, as well as a projection of possible future migration trends. The work includes a glossary of terms used in Russian-language demographic studies on migration. It is worth mentioning that this monograph contains a numerous bibliography of publications on international migration of population (1200 titles).

The **forth volume** (2000) presents a number of articles depicting both global trends in international migration of population and specific migration flows to and from Russia. The article by Prof. Sema Erder (The Marmara University, Turkey) «*New Trends in International Migration and the Case of Turkey*» presents the author's view on migration picture of contemporary Europe and the changing place of Turkey within this picture. The appearance of new migration space in the Eastern Europe has encouraged new migration flows in the region. That is the subject of two other articles — by Irina Ivakhniouk — «*International Labor Migration between Russia and Turkey*» and by Evgeny Krasinets and Elena Tiuriukanova — «*From-Russia-to-Italy Migration as a Model of Ethnically Neutral Economic Migration*». Ethnic aspect of international migration is presented by the article of Israeli demographer Mark Tolts (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) — «*Migration of Russian Jews in the 1990's*».

Among the book reviews presented in the forth volume one is worth to be stressed. That is the digest of the last publication of Igor Ushkalov — «*“Brain Drain”: Scale, Reasons, Consequences*» (Moscow, 1999) which has gained special emphasis because of the untimely decease of the author in November 1999. Igor Ushkalov was undoubtedly among the best specialists on international intellectual migration.

The **fifth volume** (2000) has one common theme that penetrates all the articles — the impact of international migration on demographic development. The situation in three former Soviet Union states — Russia, Ukraine and Armenia — is presented in the articles of scholars from the corresponding countries: Vladimir Iontsev — «*International Migration of Population and Demographic Development in Russia*»; Alexander Khomra — «*International Migration and Demographic Development of Ukraine*»; Ruben Yeganian — «*Demographic Realities and Perspectives of Armenia on the Eve of the 21st century*». The article by Mikhail Denissenko — «*Replacement Migration*» is analyzing the Report of the UN Scientific Project on Replacement Migration, in which the author had taken part. The article is trying to answer the question if the replacement migration could be a solution to declining and ageing populations. Besides, the paper by Michel Poulain, professor of the Louvain Catholic University (Belgium) — «*The Comparison of the Sources of Measurement of International Migration in the Central European Countries*» — can be evaluated as a contribution for promoting some common methodology in international migration studies.

The **sixth volume** (2001) is fully devoted to forced migration taking this chance to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Regional Office of UNHCR in Moscow has supported this publication. Naturally, all the articles of the sixth volume deal with forced migration: Vladimir Mukomel — «*Forced Migration in the Context of Migration Processes and Migration Policy in the CIS: Stages of Development*»; Marek Okolski (Poland) — «*Migration Pressures on Europe*»; Sergei Ryazantsev — «*Forced Migration in Europe: Current Tendencies and Problems of Regulation*»; Philippe Wanner (Switzerland) — «*Asylum-Seekers in Switzerland: Principal Socio-Demographic Aspects*»; Marina Kunitsa — «*Forced Migration of Population in Regional Development: Specific Problems in the Bryansk Region, Russia*»; Svetlana Gannushkina — «*Russia's Migration Legislation and Policy*»; Yakhya Nisanov — «*Totalitarian Traditions and Business in Russia: Law's Clashes Force to Migrate*».

The **seventh volume** (2002) is breaking up the chronology of the series due to the fact that it is timed to coincide with the jubilee of the Center for Population Studies at the Faculty of Economics of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University which includes the Department of Population as well. This volume is different from the others as it is presented by the annotated bibliography of publications on migration at the Center. It is titled *Migration of Population: 35 years of Research at the Center for Population Studies of the Moscow State 'Lomonosov' University (1967–2002)*. (The author — Irina Ivakhniouk). This bibliography represents the scale and traditions of migration studies which have formed the theoretical background for developing the modern approach to investigation of the contemporary stage of Russia's migration history.

The **eighth volume** (2001) deals with the problems of international migration statistics and registration, which have national peculiarities in every country, and this fact seriously impedes the comparative analysis of the world migration flows. The article by Olga Tchoudinovskikh «*Present State and Perspectives of Current Migration Registration in Russia*» analyzes the shortages of the Russian system of migrants' primary registration that perform as an obstacle for reliable migration estimates and studies. The article by Mikhail Denissenko «*Emigration from Russia According to Foreign States Statistical Data*» represents foreign states immigration statistics as an alternative, more exact source of estimation of emigration flows from Russia. A short contribution of George Tapinos «*International Migration of Population as the Factor of Economic Development*» contains valuable comments, very topical for contemporary migration situation in Russia and other former Soviet states. The article by Alexander Slouka «*International Migration of Population and Demographic Development of the Western Europe*» continues the theme which is meaningful for the editors — about the role of international migration in demographic development — started in the third and the fifth volumes.

The theme of the **ninth volume** (2002) is highly topical for Russia and the neighboring countries as well as for many other regions of the world — illegal immigration. The contributors to the volume are researchers and practical workers from Russia and other former Soviet Union states: Galina Vitkovskaya — «*Irregular Migration in Russia: Situation and Policy of Counteraction*»; Eugeny Krasinets — «*Irregular Migration and Latent Employment in the Border Territories of the Russian Federation*»; Elena Sadovskaya — «*Prevention of Irregular Migration in Kazakhstan*»; Lyudmila Shakhotko — «*Illegal Migration: Factors of Growth and Methods of Solution*»; Tatyana Kutsenko — «*Illegal Migration and Irregular Employment of Foreign Citizens and Apatriids in the Russian Federation*». Geopolitical position of the former USSR states and transparent borders between them have turned this vast territory into the corridor for transit migrants from Asia heading to Europe. All the authors stress on indissoluble relation between illegal immigration and irregular employment and on the importance of government control over illegal hiring of foreign labor force in the context of struggle against irregular international migration.

You can get more detailed information on the scientific series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World”, the themes of the forthcoming volumes, the terms of contribution to the series, etc. from the Editorial Board: Department of Population (room 458), Faculty of Economics, Moscow State ‘Lomonosov’ University, Leninskiye Gory, GSP-2, 119992 Moscow RUSSIA.

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